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WHAT'S FAIRNESS GOT TO DO WITH IT?*
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE
SITING OF LOCALLY UNDESIRABLE
LAND USES
Vicki Beent
Policy makers and local land use officials have long struggled to
cope with the "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome in attempting to site "locally undesirable land uses" (LULUs), such as homeless shelters, drug or alcohol treatment centers, and waste disposal
facilities. In general, LULUs are considered beneficial to society at
large,' and many agree that they should be located somewhere.2
Those same citizens protest vigorously, however, when such a use is
sited near their homes. 3 This protest is quite rational. The benefits
*
Cf TINA TURNER, What's Love Got to do With It?, on TINA LIVE (Capital Records
1988).
t Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I would like to
thank participants in the NYU Brown Bag Lunch series and the Boston University
School of Law Workshop, as well as Lea Brilmayer, Luke Cole, Larry Crocker, Michael
B. Gerrard, Bruce Hay, Helen Hershkoff, Brian Israel, James Jacobs, Lewis Kornhauser,
William Nelson, James Pope, Richard Revesz, Larry Sager, Ross Sandier, Michael Schill,
William M. Sloan, Richard Stewart, and Naikang Tsao for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. I also would like to thank Steven Nataupsky, Jody Rosen
Knower, Joshua Koltun, Rachel Schuldiner and Todd Smith for their assistance in the
research for this Article. I am grateful for the support of the Filomen D'Agostino and
Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at the New York University School of Law.
1 The debate over the placement of LULUs generally assumes that the land uses
are beneficial to society at large. In contrast, Robert Lake has argued that LULUs are
not needed by society, but "constitute structurally constrained political solutions to economic problems that privilege the needs of capital." Robert W. Lake, Rethinking NIMBY,
59 Am. PLAN. ASS'NJ. 87, 88 (1993). His argument does not eliminate the need to examine how LULUs can be sited more fairly, but it does point in the direction of the
theory of fairness as the efficient internalization of costs. See infra notes 293-300 and
accompanying text.
2
Opponents of a siting often assert, however, that the land use should not be
located in anyone's backyard because it is unnecessary or represents an inappropriate
solution to a particular problem. Battles over nuclear power plants, resource recovery
plants for municipal solid waste, hazardous and low level radioactive waste facilities, and
prisons all have involved debates over whether the facilities were really necessary or
whether they were the best solution to the problem they sought to address. See, e.g.,
Michael Heiman, From 'Not in My Backyard!' to 'Not in Anybody's Backyard!' Grassroots Challenge to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 56 AM. PLAN. Ass'NJ. 359 (1990).
3 See generally KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FAcILITIEs:
THE NIMBY SYNDROME 10-14 (1991) and Michael Dear, Understandingand Overcoming the
NIMBY Syndrome, 58 AM. PLAN. ASS'N J. 288 (1992) (both discussing the nature of the
NIMBY syndrome).
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that LULUs produce typically are diffused .throughout society, while
their costs and risks are concentrated on a relatively small group of
neighbors. 4 No one wants to be one of the unlucky folks forced to
5
bear those costs.
Because local protest can be costly, time-consuming, and politically damaging, siting decision makers often take the path of least
resistance-choosing sites in neighborhoods that are least likely to
protest effectively. 6 Not surprisingly, many of the neighborhoods
selected are populated disproportionately by the poor and by peo4
The costs of LULUs vary by the nature of the project. Noxious LULUs such as
hazardous waste facilities, nuclear power plants and polluting factories often pose health
risks to those living nearby. Additionally, neighbors fear that such LULUs will decrease
neighboring property values, increase noise, odors, pollution and congestion, and stigmatize the community. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES:
THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL Toxic EXPOSURE 17-117
(1988); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE-A SERIOUS QUESTION THAT NEEDS TO BE ANSWERED 10 (1978); James M. Melius et al., Facility
Siting and Health Questions: The Burden of Health Risk Uncertainty, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
467 (1984); David Morell, Siting and the Politics of Equity, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT 117, 120-21 (Robert W. Lake ed., 1987); Celeste P. Duffy, Note, State Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting: Easing the Process Through Local Cooperation and Preemption, 11 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 755, 769-70 (1984). Social service LULUs may decrease neighbor-

ing property values, pose risks to neighbors' personal safety, and threaten the neighborhood's quality of life. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. DEAR & S. MARTIN TAYLOR, NOT ON OUR
STREET 22 (1982); Richard Balukas &Joan W. Baken, Community Resistance to Development
of Group Homesfor People with Mental Retardation, 46 REHABILITATION LITERATURE 194, 196

(1985); Harold A. Berdiansky & Richard Parker, Establishing a Group Home for the Adult
Mentally Retarded in North Carolina, 15 MENTAL RETARDATION 8, 9-10 (1977); Dear, supra
note 3, at 290-91; Paul Maxim & Darryl Plecas, Prisons and Their Perceived Impact on the
Local Community: A Case Study, 13 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 39, 49 (1983); Phyllis Solomon,
Analyzing Opposition to Community Residential Facilitiesfor Troubled Adolescents, 62 CHILD WELFARE 361, 364 (1983); Donald E. Weber, NeighborhoodEntry in Group Home Development, 57
CHILD WELFARE 627, 634 (1978).
5 Local benefits, such as increased tax revenues, new jobs, increased revenue for
local suppliers and amenities provided by the facility's developers, usually are insufficient to counter the facility's local costs. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 124 (1979); Lawrence S.

Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The
Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 265, 268-69 (1982); Gail Bingham &
Daniel S. Miller, Prospectsfor Resolving Hazardous Waste Siting Disputes Through Negotiation,
17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 473, 474, 478 (1984); A. Dan Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded
Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 429, 433 (1984).
6

A consultant's report regarding the siting of three incinerators proposed by the

city of Los Angeles contained the following frank advice:
Certain types of people are likely to participate in politics, either by
virtue of their issue awareness or their financial resources, or both. Members of middle or higher-socioeconomic strata (a composite index of level
of education, occupational prestige, and income) are more likely to organize into effective groups to express their political interests and views.
All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major
facilities, but the middle and upper-socioeconomic strata possess better
resources to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher-socioeco-
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ple of color. 7 Indeed, many representatives of low income and
predominantly African American, Latino, or other minority neighborhoods charge that industry and governmental siting officials
have adopted a PIBBY-"put it in blacks' backyards"-strategy for
siting LULUs.8
Those neighborhoods are now fighting back. 9 Several community groups have sued local governments and LULU developers, alnomic strata neighborhoods should not fall at least within the one mile
and five mile radii of the proposed site.
. . . [A]lthough environmental concerns cut across all subgroups,
people with a college education, young or middle-aged, and liberal in
philosophy are most likely to organize opposition to the siting of a major
facility. Older people, people with a high school education or less, and
those who adhere to a free market orientation are least likely to oppose a
facility.

J. STEPHEN POWELL,

CERRELL AssocIATEs, PoLrricAL DIFFICULTIES FACING WASTE TO ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING, REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA WASTE MANAGEMENT

BOARD 42-43 (1984). Accordingly, the consultants recommended that "communities
that conform to some kind of economic need criteria should be given high priority" and
that officials should look for "lower socioeconomic neighborhoods" that were also in "a
heavy industrial area with little, if any, commercial activity." Dick Russell, Environmental
Racism, 11 AMicus J. 22, 25-26 (1989) (quoting Cerrell Associates, supra). For discussions of how the relative political power of neighborhoods factors into siting decisions,
see, e.g., Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix, The Politicsof Pollution: Implicationsfor the
Black Community, 47 PHYLON 71, 78 (1986); James H. Johnson, Jr. & Melvin L. Oliver,
Blacks and the Toxics Crisis, 13 W.J. BLACK STUD. 72 (1989); Patrick G. Marshall, Not in My
Backyard!, 1989 EDITORIAL RES. REP. 306, 313, 315; Ginny Carroll, When Pollution Hits
Home, NAT'L WILDLIFE, Aug./Sept. 1991, at 31-32;John Elson, Dumping on the Poor,TIME,
Aug. 13, 1990, at 46; Dennis Pfaff, Pollution and the Poor, THE DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 26,
1989, at IA, 14A; Peter Steinhart, What Can We Do About EnvironmentalRacism, AUDUBON,
May, 1991, at 18. For empirical evidence of the role political power plays, see James T.
Hamilton, Politicsand Social Cost: Estimatingthe Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste
Facilities, 24 RAND. J. ECON. 101, 115-18 (1993).
7
For a discussion about why poor communities are less able to organize to protest
a siting proposal, see Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor& Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Questfor Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 69,
71 (1991); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to EnvironmentalProtection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOL. L.Q. 619, 628 (1992).
8
See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 5 (1990). The disproportionate siting of LULUs in low income and minority
neighborhoods is one aspect of the movement that has become known as "environmental racism," "environmental equity" or "environmental justice." The movement contends that racial minorities are exposed to greater environmental risks than are whites
because of racism in the siting of environmental risks, the promulgation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, and the clean-up of polluted areas. It seeks
greater environmental protection for minorities and the poor. See Robert D. Bullard,
The Threat of EnvironmentalRacism, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (1993); Karl Grossman,
EnvironmentalJustice, E MAG., May-June 1992, at 31. This article adopts the term "environmental justice" to refer to the movement.
9 The quest for justice in the siting of LULUs is the flip-side of the inequitable
municipal services movement of the 1960s. There, many charged that communities disproportionately placed "goods" such as street lamps, libraries, and other beneficial services in wealthy neighborhoods to the exclusion of poor neighborhoods. See, e.g.,
CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS (1986);
EQurrY IN THE Crr, (P.N. Troy ed., 1981); ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQ.UALrITY AND URBAN
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leging that officials have made siting decisions in a discriminatory
manner, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 10 The lawsuits
have not been successful, and promise little success, because of the
Arlington Heights requirement that the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent." As a result, neighborhoods have adopted grassroots techniques, such as protests, civil disobedience and initiative
POLICY (1977); Kenneth W. Bond, Toward Equal Delivery of MunicipalServices in the Central
Cities, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 263 (1976); Robert L. Graham &John H. Kravitt, The Evolu-

tion of EqualProtection-Education,MunicipalServices, and Wealth, 7 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
103 (1972); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuitof Local Fiscal
Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1979); Gershon Ratner, Inter-NeighborhoodDenials of Equal
Protection in the Provision of Municipal Services, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1968); Carl S.
Shoup, Rules for Distributinga Free Government Service Among Areas of a City, 42 NAT'L TAXJ.
103 (1989); Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics of Serrano and Shaw, 82
YALE LJ.89 (1972); Note, The Right to Adequate MunicipalServices, Thoughts and Proposals,
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 753 (1969); Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of
Municipal Services, 100 HARv. L. REV. 946 (1987) (book review).
10 See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aft'd, 977 F.2d 573
(4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the siting of a landfill in a
predominantly black neighborhood); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. MaconBibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aft'd,
896 F.2d 1264 (11 th Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff's evidence insufficient to establish that
"improper racial animus" motivated zoning board's decision to approve a landfill in a
predominantly black community); Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n, Inc. v.
Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding no discriminatory intent in decision
to site a homeless shelter in a predominantly minority neighborhood); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aft'd, 782 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (refusing to grant a preliminary injunction against construction of
solid waste disposal facility near a predominantly black school and a predominantly
black residential neighborhood); Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the
proposed construction of two highways through a public park predominantly used by
blacks was racially motivated).
Several cases raising equal protection claims have not yet been decided on the merits. See, e.g., Matthews v. Institute for Community Living, No. CIV 92-4029 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 20, 1992); Bordeaux Action Comm'n. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, No.
390-0214 (M.D. Tenn. filed Mar. 12, 1990); El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v.
Chemical Waste Mgmt. Inc., No CIV-F-91-578-OWW (E.D. Cal. filed July 7, 1991);
Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
Plaintiffs also have challenged siting decisions under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, but have not been successful. See Coalition of Concerned
Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
11 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For
discussions of the difficulty of meeting that standard in environmental racism cases, see
Robert W. Collin, EnvironmentalEquity: A Law and PlanningApproach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L. REV. 495, 518-37 (1992); RichardJ. Lazarus, Pursuing"Environmental Justice": The DistributionalEffects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787
(1993); Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of EnvironmentalRace Discrimination,41
KAN. L.REV. 271, 290-97 (1992); Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. H. Robertson, Note,
Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 TuL. ENVrL. L.J. 153,
198-205 (1991); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 394 (1991); Naikang Tsao, Note, AmelioratingEnvironmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide
to Combatting the DiscriminatorySiting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L.REV. 366, 405-16
(1992).
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campaigns as their primary challenge to sitings. 12 When they litigate, neighborhoods attack disproportionate sitings indirectly by
using environmental protection and land use laws to block sitings. 13
Additionally, advocates for "environmental justice" have lobbied Congress, state legislatures and local governments to prevent
the unfair distribution of LULUs. The most notable success thus far
is the "fair share" criteria that New York City adopted in 1990 to
ensure that every borough within the city, and every community
within each borough, bear its fair share of undesirable land uses.14
Congress may follow suit. 15 In 1992 Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn.)
and Congressman John Lewis (D-Ga.) proposed the "Environmental Justice Act of 1992" to "ensure that [the] significant adverse
health impacts that may be associated with environmental pollution
in the United States are not distributed inequitably." 1 6 Congressman John Lewis (D-Ga.) reintroduced the legislation in May 1993.
The Environmental Justice Act would declare a moratorium on the
siting of toxic chemical facilities in "environmental high impact areas," the 100 areas that contain the most toxic chemicals, if research
demonstrates that there are "significant adverse [health] impacts"
17
from the pollution in those areas.
Congressmen Mike Synar (D-Okla.) and Bill Clinger (R-Pa.)
have introduced legislation to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act
12 See, e.g., Austin & Schill, supra note 7, at 71-76; Robert D. Bullard & Beverly H.
Wright, The Questfor EnvironmentalEquity: Mobilizing the African-American Communityfor Social Change, 3 Soc'y & NAT. RESOURCES 301, 305-07 (1990); Cole, supra note 7, at 646-54;
Elson, supra note 6; Elizabeth Martinez, When People of Color Are An Endangered Species, Z
MAG., April 1991, at 61; Dennis Pfaff, Minorities Speak Out MoreAbout Pollution, THE DETRorr NEws, Nov. 26, 1989, at Al; Russell, supra note 6, at 22-24, 26-31.
13 See, e.g., Community Alliance for the Env't v. Dinkins, No. 400080/93 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., New York County, filed Feb. 25, 1993) (alleging that a decision to site an incinerator
violates state environmental laws and city zoning laws); El Pueblo Para El Aire y Agua
Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20357 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sacramento County 1991) (alleging that a decision to permit a toxic waste incinerator
near a small farmworker community that is 95% Latino violated the California Environmental Quality Act, the state planning and zoning law, and the county zoning
ordinance).
14 New York City Planning Commission, Criteria for the Location of City Facilities
(1990).
15 State legislatures also are considering various measures to ensure fair siting. See,
e.g., CA A.B. 2212, 1993-94 Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (1993) (requiring permit applications
for waste facilities to describe the demographics of the proposed host area); N.Y. A.B.
3363, 215th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing an equitable land use commission to
create guidelines for the siting of new facilities).
16 S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
17 H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See 139 CONG. REC. E1243 (daily ed.
May 12, 1993) (statement of Mr. Lewis). Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.) introduced the
EnvironmentalJustice Act of 1993 in the Senate inJune 1993. It is similar to H.R. 2105
but does not contain the moratorium provision. S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
See 139 CONG. REC. S8093 (daily ed. June 24, 1993) (statement of Mr. Baucus).
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to require the permitting process for hazardous waste facilities to
consider "community information statements" that assess the demographic characteristics of the proposed site.' 8 The community information statements would also analyze the LULU burdens that the
community already bears. 19 Congresswoman Cardiss Collins (DIll.) has sponsored the Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993,
which would require environmental officials to reject proposals to
site hazardous or solid waste facilities in any "environmentally disadvantaged" community. 2 0 An environmentally disadvantaged
community is one that already has certain kinds of facilities and is
21
disproportionately poor or minority.
The various legislative solutions to the problem of disproportionate siting reflect different conceptions about why disproportionate siting is wrong, and about what would constitute "fair" siting.
The differences are not surprising. Calls for environmental justice
are essentially calls for "equality" and, as Peter Westen has noted,
''equality in the end is a rhetorical device that tends to persuade
precisely by virtue of 'cloak[ing] strongly divergent ideas over which
people do in fact disagree.' "22 Advocates of environmental justice
have wisely chosen to advance general concepts of equality, rather
than endanger their coalition by attempting to specify the precise
content of "justice," "equity" or "fairness." 23
This article takes a hard look at the content of the goal of environmental justice. It explores what various conceptions of equality
would look like if translated into concrete siting programs. Attempts to specify what "virtue words" such as fairness, justice and
equity mean often unmask many vices; this project is no exception.
In the context of siting, all the leading theories of fairness encounter
significant philosophical and pragmatic objections. In revealing
those objections, the article seeks to chart the course for further
thinking and debate about the validity and feasibility of calls for fair
siting.
18
H.R. 495, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See 139 CONG. REC. E135 (daily ed. Jan.
21, 1993) (statement of Mr. Clinger); 139 CONG. REC. E151 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1993)

(statement of Mr. Synar). SenatorJohn Glenn introduced a similar bill in the Senate. S.
533, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993). See 139 CONG. REC. S2550 (daily ed. March 9, 1993)
(statement of Mr. Glenn).
19 H.R. 495, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
20 H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See 139 CONG. REC. E1106 (daily ed.,
April 30, 1993) (statement of Ms. Collins).

21

H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(D) (1993).

22 PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 270-71 (1990) (quoting Charles Frankel,
Equality of Opportunity, 81 ETHICS 191, 192 (1971)).

23

See Dorceta Taylor, Can the EnvironmentalMovement Attract and Maintain the Support

of Minorities,in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 28, 44-45 (Bunyan
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter INCIDENCE].
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Part I of this article explores the evidence that LULUs are sited
disproportionately in neighborhoods whose residents are predominantly poor or people of color.2 4 The article relies both on evidence
about the particularly noxious LULUs that have been the focus of
the environmental justice movement and on literature regarding the
siting of social service LULUs such as group homes for the mentally
retarded. Accordingly, it provides a much more comprehensive
25
look at the distribution of LULUs than previous literature.
Part II discusses four general objections to any attempt to remedy disproportionate siting. First, it explores whether the siting
process that is the focus of reform proposals actually caused the disproportionate siting patterns documented by the evidence.2 6 It concludes that the evidence fails to establish causation, and suggests the
direction future research should take to remedy that failure. It argues, however, that because some proposed reforms are forwardlooking and do not depend upon proof that siting decisions in the
past were illegitimate, the debate over those reforms need not await
further research.
Part II then examines whether the dynamics of the real estate
market render any attempt to distribute LULUs fairly a futile exercise. 27 It shows that theoretically, even if the current distribution of
LULUs could be rearranged to yield an unquestionably fair distribution, the interaction of poverty, racial discrimination in housing
markets, and the normal forces of residential mobility might soon
recreate a situation where those living next to LULUs were predominately poor and people of color. The Article argues, however, that
the problem of mobility does not derail attempts to ensure fair
siting.
Next, Part II explores whether fair siting programs can focus
only on the burdens that a LULU imposes on a community, without
considering whether those burdens are offset by benefits the community also has received through the political process. 28 All government decisions, from taxation to police protection, benefit some
See infra notes 39-76 and accompanying text.
Examination of evidence regarding the siting of social service LULUs is not
meant to imply that they are equivalent to noxious land uses such as hazardous waste
facilities. Resistance to noxious land uses is based primarily on the risk the facility poses
to neighbors' health and safety, while resistance to social service facilities often is based
upon neighbors' fears about or prejudice toward the people who will use the social service, concerns about neighborhood "character" and concerns about property values.
Despite those differences, neighborhoods view both types of LULUs as inequitably distributed and have called for greater fairness in the siting of both. It is therefore helpful
to consider both in discussing what it means to site land uses fairly.
26
See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
24
25
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neighborhoods more than others. To assess whether a siting is fair,
those other decisions may be relevant. The Article suggests one justification for focusing exclusively on the distribution of LULUs, and
challenges advocates of fair siting programs to offer others.
Finally, Part II acknowledges the argument that fair siting proposals run contrary to the free-market ideology of the United
States.2 9 Currently, environmental amenities are generally allocated
by the market, and infringements upon the market generally require
some justification. The Article suggests the direction such justifications might take.
Part III advances seven theoretical arguments about why disproportionate siting is unfair, and explores what fairness would
mean under each of those theories.3 0 First, fair siting could mean
31
that LULUs are evenly apportioned among all neighborhoods.
Second, fair siting might mean that neighborhoods in which a LULU
32
is not sited must compensate the host community for its damages.
Third, fairness could require "progressive siting," in which wealthier neighborhoods receive a greater number of LULUs, or pay a
greater share of a host community's damages, than poor or minority
neighborhoods. 33 Fourth, fairness could demand that all communities receive an equal number of vetoes that they could use to bid
34
against other communities for the privilege of excluding a LULU.
Fifth, fair siting might require that those who benefit from a LULU
bear its cost.3 5 Sixth, fairness could simply require that the siting
process involve no intentional discrimination against people of
color.3 6 Seventh, fair siting could require a process that shows
"equal concern and respect" for all neighborhoods. 37
Like Part I, Part III seeks to integrate the approach of the environmental justice movement with that of the social scientists who
have long been concerned about the problem of disproportionate
siting of social service agencies. It also draws upon the work of
economists and urban policy analysts who have modeled siting
processes, as well as that of philosophers and political scientists who
have explored the problems of distributional inequity. Part III does
not seek to prove the primacy of one conception of fairness or offer
a "new and improved" model of fairness. Instead, it demonstrates
29

See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

31
32
33
34
35
36

37

133-354 and accompanying text.
158-200 and accompanying text.
201-46 and accompanying text.
247-76 and accompanying text.
277-92 and accompanying text.
293-319 and accompanying text.
320-36 and accompanying text.
337-54 and accompanying text.
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that different theories of fairness should lead to radically different
siting programs, so that one cannot adequately evaluate a fair siting
proposal without first identifying its underlying conception of fairness. In addition, this Part examines the problems that must be resolved before the various fairness theories can be translated into
effective siting programs.
Part IV analyzes the legislative strategies that have been
adopted or proposed to address the problem of disproportionate
siting, and suggests the conception of fairness that each embodies.3 8
It explores problems with each strategy in light of Part III's analysis
of what different conceptions of fairness require and shows that
some are likely to be too weak or narrow to change siting patterns
significantly. It reinforces the discussion in Part III by showing the
further work required to craft a theoretically and practically sound
program to ensure that LULUs are sited fairly.
I
THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATORY SITING

Several recent studies have documented the extent to which locally undesirable land uses are located disproportionately 39 in
neighborhoods that are populated primarily by the poor and people
of color. 40 The United States General Accounting Office conducted

the first major study on this issue, examining the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the residents of communities near four
38 See infra notes 355-478 and accompanying text.
39 The studies discussed in this Article focus on the location of LULUs. Other studies show that the poor and people of color bear a disproportionate share of the general
burdens of pollution and of the costs of cleaning up pollution, but do not specifically
address the burden of hosting polluting LULUs. See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E.
Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30J. EcoN. Lrr. 675, 727-28 (1992) (reviewing
the literature); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and
Class as Factors in the Distributionof EnvironmentalHazards, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 921 (1992)
(reviewing 16 such studies). Additionally, studies show that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is much less vigorous in its enforcement of environmental laws in
minority communities. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial
Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. See also Rae Zimmerman,
Social Equity and Environmental Risk 20 (Feb. 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author) (finding that the higher the percentage of blacks in a community, the less
likely it was that hazardous waste sites had progressed to a particular stage of cleanup,
especially when the community also was relatively poor, but finding that the higher the
percentage of Latinos, the more likely the cleanup had progressed). But see John A.
Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund, 12J. POL'Y ANALYsIs & MGMT.
323, 337 (1993) (finding no relationship between the pace at which sites are cleaned up
and the host county's socioeconomic characteristics).
40
I shall sometimes refer to people of color by the unfortunate term "minorities."
For a discussion of the problems with the term, see PatriciaJ. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 404 n.4
(1987).
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hazardous waste landfills in the Southeast. 4 1 The landfills studied
are among the largest in the United States. As of 1980 three of the
four host communities were predominantly African American. Indeed, while only about twelve percent of the population of the
United States was African American in 1980,42 African Americans
comprised between fifty-two percent and ninety percent of the population in three of the host communities. 4 3 The fourth landfill was
sited in a portion of a county that was only thirty-eight percent African American, but the population of areas within four miles of the
landfill was between sixty-nine percent and ninety-two percent African American. 44 All of the communities were disproportionately
poor, with between twenty-six percent and forty-two percent of the
45
population living below the poverty level.
In 1987 the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial
Justice (CRJ) published the first national study of communities in
which hazardous waste dumps were located. 4 6 The CRJ's cross-sectional study compared the racial and socio-economic status of residents of the zip code areas surrounding 415 commercial hazardous
waste facilities to those of zip code areas that did not have such facilities. 4 7 CRJ found a correlation between the number of commercial
hazardous waste facilities a community hosts and the percentage of
the community's population that is "nonwhite." 48 Areas with one
operating commercial hazardous waste facility, other than a landfill,
had almost twice the percentage of people of color than those areas
without such a facility. 4 9 Furthermore, areas that had more than
41

The states included in the study, which comprise EPA's Region IV, were Ala-

bama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Tennessee. U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION wrrH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING

COMMUNITIES 2 (1983) [hereinafter GAO].
42

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1992, at 16.
43 GAO, supra note 41, at 4.
44 GAO, supra note 41, app. I at 3.
45 GAO, supra note 41, app. I at 4.
46

COMMISSION FOR RACIALJUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND

RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1987) [hereinafter CRJ].
47 Commercial hazardous waste facilities are public or private facilities that accept
hazardous waste from a third party for a fee for the purpose of treating, storing or disposing of the waste. Id. at 65. The CRJ studied all such facilities in the contiguous
United States that could be identified through the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data Man-

agement System. Id. at 10, 65.
48 The CRJ study considered a correlation to be significant at both the 99% confidence level, which is generally used in empirical studies, and at the 90% confidence
level. Accordingly, a one in ten probability exists that some of the findings were chance
occurrences. Id. at 11. For criticisms of the methodology of the CRJ, see Lazarus, supra
note 11, at 802 n. 56.
49 CRJ, supra note 46, at 13. But see Michel Gelobter, Toward a Model of "Environmental Discrimination",in INCIDENCE, supra note 23, at 72 (CRJ's finding that 24% of all mi-

1993]

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

1011

one operating facility, or had one of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills, had more than three times the percentage of
minority residents as areas without such facilities. 50 Additionally,
CRJ discovered a significant correlation between socioeconomic
variables and the location of commercial facilities: mean household
income and home values were considerably less in areas containing
hazardous waste facilities than in the surrounding counties.5 1
Similarly, the study found that people of color were slightly
more likely than whites to live in an area containing an uncontrolled
hazardous waste site; that is, either closed and abandoned dumps,
disposal facilities, factories, or warehouses that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) identified as posing a potential threat to
the environment and public health. 52 Approximately fifty-four percent of all whites live in such an area, while about fifty-seven percent

norities have one facility in their community, although minorities make up only 127 of
the nation's population, does not exclude the possibility that most facilities are located
in urban areas, where minorities constitute about 24% of the population). See also Hird,
supra note 39, at 333 n. 18 (finding that when only urban counties were studied, race was
not a statistically significant predictor of the location of NPL sites). For a description of
the NPL, see infra note 52.
50 CRJ, supra note 46, at 13. See also Hird, supra note 39, at 333 (finding that counties with higher percentages of people of color have more NPL sites than other counties). For a description of the NPL, see infra note 52.
51 CRJ, supra note 46, at 41, 43. See alsoJAY M. GOULD, QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS: LEVELS OF AFFLUENCE, Toxic WASTE, AND CANCER MORTALITY IN
RESIDENT.AL ZIP CODE AREAS (1986) (finding that the amount of toxic waste generated

was lowest in communities with the highest incomes); Zimmerman, supra note 39 (percentage of population with incomes below the poverty line was somewhat higher in communities with NPL sites than in other communities, but income, median house value and
median rents in the NPL communities were comparable to national and regional averages). Cf CLEAN SITES, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES AND THE RURAL POOR: A PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT vi (1990) (poor rural counties contain disproportionately few hazardous
waste sites: although 15% of the nation's counties are rural and poor, those counties
contain only four percent of the CERCLIS sites, two percent of the RCRA facilities and
two percent of the NPL sites in the nation). But cf Hird, supra note 39, at 333 (finding
that wealthier counties are more likely than poorer counties to have NPL sites). RCRA
facilities are those that have received final or interim licenses for the treatment, storage,
and disposal of hazardous waste under the procedures established by the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1992). For descriptions of CERCLIS and NPL, see infra note 52.
52 CRJ, supra note 46, at 3-4, 53. The sites were derived from the EPA's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System
(CERCLIS). Id. at 67. CERCLIS includes data on sites that have been identified by the
EPA, pursuant to the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1992), as containing hazardous
substances that require cleanup or that may require cleanup now or in the future. The
CERCLIS sites that exceed a specified score on the EPA's hazard ranking system are
determined to require priority cleanup, and are placed on the National Priorities List
(NPL).
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of all African Americans and Latinos live near an uncontrolled hazardous waste site. 53
Several local studies buttress the findings of the nation-wide
CRJ study.5 4 For example, a study of New Jersey communities
found that those with the greatest number of hazardous waste sites
tended to have more poor, elderly, young and African American residents than other communities. 5 5 A Texas study of municipal incinerators and municipal and private landfills revealed that although
African Americans made up only twenty-eight percent of Houston's
population in 1980, six of the city's eight incinerators, five of the six
municipal landfill sites permitted by the state, and all five of the unpermitted municipal landfill sites were located in predominantly African American neighborhoods. 5 6 Additionally, a Louisiana study of
the hazardous waste incineration facilities in the Baton Rouge area
found that minority communities had an average of one such site for
every 7,349 residents, while white communities had only one site
per 31,110 residents. 57 A study of the three counties surrounding
metropolitan Detroit found that people of color were almost four
times more likely to live within one mile of a waste facility than
whites were. 58
Similarly, the Los Angeles County zip code area with the largest
amount of chemical discharge (an indirect measure of the location
53 GRJ, supra note 46, at 53. See also Zimmerman, supra note 39 (finding that African
Americans are about 50 percent more likely to live in a community with a NPL site than
is the population as a whole).
54
In addition to the studies discussed in the text, see Kusum Ketkar, Hazardous
Waste Sites and Property Values in the State of New Jersey, 24 APPLIED ECON. 647, 653 (1992)
(analysis of 64 municipalities in seven urban counties in New Jersey "implies that the
municipalities that have high property tax rates and a greater proportion of minorities
also have a larger number of [hazardous waste] sites").
55
MICHAEL R. GREENBERG & RICHARD F. ANDERSON,
THE CREDIBILrTY GAP 158-59 (1984).

HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES:

56 Robert Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY
273 (1983). Of the three sites in non-Black neighborhoods, one was located in a neighborhood undergoing transition from a white to an African American community, and
one was located in a Hispanic neighborhood. Only one site was adjacent to a predominantly white community. Id. at 279-82.
57 Harvey L. White, Hazardous Waste Incineration and'Minority Communities, in INCIDENCE, supra note 23, at 126, 132.

58

Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in

IN-

CIDENCE, supra note 23, at 163, 172. Another analysis of Detroit found that forty-one of

the city's top air polluters, twenty-five of the area's thirty-three most contaminated sites,
and four of Detroit's five licensed hazardous waste treatment and storage facilities are
located in neighborhoods with average per capita incomes of less than $10,000. Pfaff,
supra note 6, at 14A. The analysis did not reveal the racial makeup of the host communities. A subsequent article profiling the Delray area of Detroit (the neighborhood that
suffers the worst air pollution in Michigan), revealed that 447 of the neighborhood's
population had incomes below the federal poverty level, but that the neighborhood is
predominantly white. Dennis Pfaff, Pollution and the Poor, THE DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 27,

1989, at IA, 6A [hereinafter Pfaff II].
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of noxious facilities) is fifty-nine percent African American, even
though the county's population is only about eleven percent African
American. 59 Furthermore, in Saint Louis, a study of chemical discharge showed that a random sample of census tracts that were at
least seventy-five percent African American had forty-six percent
more chemical emissions than a comparable sample of census tracts
60
that were at least seventy-five percent white.
These studies focused on land uses, such as waste treatment,
storage and disposal facilities, that are or may become significant
polluters. Evidence also suggests that land uses that are not noxious but nevertheless pose threats to the safety, character, and value
of neighborhoods are also sited disproportionately. For example, a
1989 study of programs for the homeless in New York City showed
that the two zip code areas in central Harlem have more than thirty
programs each. In contrast, zip code areas on the Upper East Side
and in Murray Hill, Greenwich Village, SoHo and Tribeca had five
or fewer programs each.6 1 Similarly, studies of group homes for the
mentally disabled reveal that such homes often are clustered together in the same neighborhoods. 62 Community correctional facil-

59

Jane Kay, Minorities Bear Brunt of Pollution, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, April 7,

1991, at Al, A12 [hereinafter Kay, Minorities]. The population of the "dirtiest" zip code
is 38 percent Hispanic, which mirrors the population of the county as a whole. See also
Jane Kay, Ethnic Enclaves Fight Toxic Waste, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, April 9, 1991, at Al
[hereinafter Kay, Ethnic Enclaves]. See also CITIZENS FOR A BErTR ENVIRONMENT, RICHMOND AT RISK: COMMUNITY DEMOGRAPHICS AND TOXIC HAZARDS FROM INDUSTRIAL POLLUTERS 2, 121-22 (1989) (residents of Richmond, California census tracts closest to

polluting industrial facilities are disproportionately people of color and the poor).
60 Kevin L. Brown, Environmental Discrimination: Myth or Reality 16-18 (1991)
(unpublished student paper on file with author).
61
Susan Chira, New York's Poorest Neighborhoods Bear the Brunt of Social Programs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 16, 1989, at 1, col 1., 25 col. 5-6.
62 See, e.g., Martin Jaffe & Thomas P. Smith, Siting Group Homes for Developmentally
Disabled Persons, 397 AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE 1113 (1986) (in survey of planners, responses from large cities provided evidence of clustering); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND OTHER
PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED 3, app. I, at 19 [hereinafter GAO II] (national survey of group homes found that
more than one-third were located within two blocks of some other special population
facility, and more than half of those were near two or more such facilities); Jeffrey L.
Davidson, Location of Community-based Treatment Centers, 55 SoC. SERV. REV. 221, 228
(1981) (of the 108 census tracts in New Castle County, Delaware, only 15 hosted the
county's 25 community based treatment centers, two census tracts hosted four centers
each, and another four tracts hosted two centers each); Stuart A. Gabriel & Jennifer R.

Wolch, Spillover Effects of Human Service Facilitiesin a Racially Segmented HousingMarket, 16J.
URB. ECON. 339, 344- 45 (1984) (finding that the predominantly minority neighborhoods
in Oakland, California housed 50% of the City's population, but over 75% of the City's
human service facilities).
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ities, such as halfway houses for ex-offenders, also tend to be
63
concentrated in relatively few neighborhoods.
The communities in which such social service facilities are clustered often are predominantly minority6 4 or low income neighborhoods. 6 5 Further, the more undesirable the social service facility,
the more likely it is to be located in a poor or minority community.
Studies reveal, for example, that community residential facilities
serving client populations considered undesirable neighbors (such
as ex-criminal offenders) 66 are located in neighborhoods with
higher percentages of minorities and with lower education and income than neighborhoods that host facilities serving more sympa67
thetic populations, such as the mentally retarded.
There is, therefore, significant evidence of disproportionate siting. The evidence is flawed, however, in several important respects.
First, the evidence does not establish that the siting process, rather
than market forces such as residential mobility, caused the disparity.
That criticism will be addressed in Part II's discussion of general
objections to fair siting proposals.6 s Second, the evidence does not
establish that siting decisions intentionally discriminated against
people of color or the poor. That criticism is relevant only to those
theories of fairness that require proof of discriminatory intent. The
criticism therefore will be addressed in Part III's discussion of the
progressive siting and intentional discrimination theories.6 9
Finally, the strength of the evidence is limited by the imprecision of the studies' definition of the neighborhoods compared. In
examining the distribution of LULUs, some studies define neighbor-

63 Kevin Krajick, 'Not on My Block: Local OppositionImpedes the SearchforAlternatives, 6
CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE 15, 16 (1980). For instance, the south end of Boston had one

halfway house bed for every 55 residents, while the rest of the city had one bed for every
847 residents. Id.
64 See, e.g., Chira, supra note 61 (homeless shelters clustered in central Harlem,
which is predominantly minority).
65 See, e.g., GAO II, supra note 62, at App. III, p. 62 (majority of those living near
group homes for the mentally disabled were blue collar workers, and 85% had average
family incomes below $25,000 in 1980 and 1981; information about the race of neighbors was not solicited); Krajick, supra note 63.
66 For discussions of public attitudes toward various client populations, see DEAR &
TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 27; Dear, supra note 3, at 291; Solomon, supra note 4, at 363-64.
67 Davidson, supra note 62, at 230-35; Marc B. Goldstein et al., Public Preferences and
Site Location of Residential Treatment Facilities, 17J. COMMUNrrY PSYCHOL. 186 (1989); Marc
B. Goldstein et al., Where the Group Homes are Found, 72 Soc. & Soc. RES. 55, 56 (1987)
[hereinafter Group Homes]; R. Sundeen & S. Fiske, Local Resistance to Community-Based Care
Facilities, 6 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING, SERV. & REHABILITATION 29 (1982).
68
69

See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 247-62, 323-36 and accompanying text.
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hood as broadly as a municipality, 70 while others use census tracts 71
or zip code areas, 7 2 and some draw concentric circles around LULUs. 7 3 The researchers disagree about which unit of analysis best
describes the neighborhood affected by a siting, 74 and about which
definition of neighborhood ensures that the areas studied are comparable in terms of non-demographic factors, such as land area, that
75
might bear on the number of facilities sited.
Despite those flaws, the evidence surveyed is more than sufficient to require legislatures to address the fairness of the distribution of LULUS. The question of how to site LULUs fairly is
important regardless of whether siting decisions in the past were
discriminatory in either intent or effect. Whatever their race or
class, the residents of any area chosen today to host a LULU legitimately may ask, "Why us?"'7 6 The government must find a satisfactory answer, or else society will find itself in the stalemate that
planners refer to as the "build absolutely nothing anywhere near
anybody" (BANANA) dilemma.

II
FAIRNESS NEED NOT APPLY-INITIAL OBJECTIONS TO FAIR
SITING PROPOSALS

Before turning to the specific theories of fairness that mightjustify fair siting proposals, four general objections to fair siting must
be addressed. The first two concern the role that residential mobility plays in the distribution of LULUs. The first, called the "causation" objection, questions whether the disproportionate burden
that people of color and the poor now bear resulted from the siting
70 See, e.g., GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 131, 158-59; Zimmerman,
supra note 39, at 7-8.
71 Brown, supra note 60; see also East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Assn. v. MaconBibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 896 F.2d
1264 (11 th Cir. 1989) (using census tract as unit of analysis, despite plaintiff's contention that focus should be on a larger area); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp.,
482 F.Supp. 673, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (using
census tract as unit of analysis).
72 CRJ, supra note 46, at 61-62; Kay, Minorities, supra note 59; White, supra note 57,
at 128.
73 Mohai & Bryant, supra note 58, at 170-72.
74 Compare Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 7-8 (entire municipality is the best unit of
analysis) with CRJ, supra note 46, at 61-62 (five digit zip code areas are best unit of
analysis).
75 Zip code areas, for example, may vary significantly in the land area included, and
those variations limit the usefulness of comparisons between zip code areas. See CRJ,
supra note 46, at 62.
76 Studies of public opinion regarding siting proposals reveal that questions of equity are frequently raised by residents of the communities in which sites are proposed.
See Helen C. Latham et al., PublicAttitudes Toward Siting of High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories, 46 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. NUCLEAR Soc'y 600, 603 (1984) (meeting abstracts).
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process or from the dynamics of the housing market. 7 7 The second,
called the "mobility" objection, questions whether fair siting programs will ultimately make any difference in the distribution of LULUs, given a free market in which some individuals will be better
able to move away from LULUs than others. 78 The third, the "aggregation" objection, asserts that any attempt to site LULUs fairly
cannot consider the burdens that LULUs impose in isolation. 79 Instead, fair siting programs must also take into account the scores of
other benefits and burdens that society regularly allocates among its
citizens. The fourth, called the "free market" objection, argues that
environmental quality should be distributed by the free market, just
as most other environmental amenities are.8 0
A.

The Causation Objection

Fair siting proposals seek to change the LULU siting process in
order to distribute LULU burdens more fairly. However, the evidence surveyed in Part I does not establish that siting choices
caused the disproportionate impact LULUs now have on people of
color and the poor. Most studies compare the current socio-economic characteristics of communities that now host various LULUs
to those that do not host LULUs. In doing so, they fail to examine
the communities' demographics at the time the facility was sited.,
Accordingly, they leave open the possibility that the LULUs were
not disparately sited in poor and minority neighborhoods, but that
the dynamics of the housing and job markets led people of color and
the poor to move to areas surrounding LULUs because those neigh82
borhoods offered the cheapest available housing.
See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
79
See infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
81 Many hazardous waste facilities were sited after the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988), was enacted in 1976. The CRJ study,
which focuses on the demographics of communities as of the 1980 census, therefore
comes fairly close to linking demographic data to the date of the siting. Because a significant number of hazardous waste facilities permitted after 1976 were operating before
that date, or were converted from other undesirable land uses, such as on-site waste
storage facilities, however, even the CRJ study cannot prove whether the facilities were
located in neighborhoods that were minority communities at the time of the siting. See
Vicki Been, LULUs in Minority Neighborhoods: Discriminatory Siting or Changing
Demographics? (Feb. 5, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (replicating
several of the studies using demographic data from the census closest to the actual siting
date).
82 An exception to the literature's lack of attention to whether siting decisions impose a disproportionate burden on people of color and the poor is Professor Hamilton's
Politics and Social Cost, supra note 6. Hamilton examined the relationship between the
socioeconomic characteristics of counties reported by the 1980 census and the planned
capacity changes of existing hazardous waste processing facilities as of 1987. Because
77
78
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Market dynamics may have significantly contributed to the current disparity in the location of LULUs in a number of ways. Many
factories and other sources of hazardous waste were traditionally located in the center city because of greater access to transportation
and markets.8 3 In some cities, developers provided cheap housing
for workers in the surrounding areas. As workers moved away,
either because factories closed 8 4 or because more desirable housing
became affordable elsewhere,8 5 the cheap housing in the center cities became disproportionately populated by the poor and by people
of color.8 6 In other areas, the presence of industry reduced surrounding land values, creating prime locations for low income housing.8 7 Under both scenarios, the poor and minorities are burdened
with the legacy of industrial development not because LULUs were
sited in their neighborhoods, but because of a complex dynamic in
which poverty, residential segregation, zoning laws, the unavailability of low and moderate income housing, and the proximity ofjobs
and public services led them to move to host neighborhoods.8 8
Professor Hamilton's analysis examined expansion decisions made five to six years after
the census, and because expansion decisions share some of the same characteristics as
initial siting decisions, his analysis provides some evidence of the correlation between
siting decisions and the characteristics of affected communities near the time of those
decisions. Professor Hamilton concluded that when other factors were controlled, the
percentage of a county's population that was minority was not a statistically significant
factor in the expansion decisions of the hazardous waste processing facilities. Race was
a statistically significant determinant of the facilities' plans to reduce capacity, however:
as the percentage of a county's minority population increased, the likehood that the
facility planned to reduce its capacity decreased. In addition, Professor Hamilton compared 1970 census data regarding the counties in which surveyed facilities were sited in
the 1970s and early 1980s to census data for all counties in the United States. He found
that both race and median household income were statistically significant predictors of
sitings during the 1970's and early 1980's. Id. at 122.
Hamilton's study has several limitations: the sample included only those facilities
sited in the 1970s and early 1980s that were still in operation in 1987; the data examined
was for entire counties rather than the tracts or county subdivisions in which the facility
was actually located; and the 1970 census data was used even for siting decisions made
in the early 1980's. See Been, supra note 81.
83 Pfaff, supra note 6, at IA, 14A.
84 GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 156.
85

See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
283-84 (1985).

UNITED STATES

86

Cynthia Hamilton, Industrialand Environmental Racism: The Denial of SocialJustice,

in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 25, 26 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai

eds., 1991).
87 Austin & Schill, supra note 7, at 70.
88 See, e.g., BULLARD, supra note 8, at 6-8; LINEBERRY, supra note 9, at 58-60; Collin,
supra note 11, at 508-09; Elson, supra note 6, at 47; Kay, Ethnic Enclaves, supra note 59, at
Al; Pfaff,supra note 6, at 14A; Hawley Truax, Minoritiesat Risk, ENvmL. AcTIoN,Jan./Feb.
1990, at 19-20. To the extent that siting disparities are correlated more with a neighborhood's racial demographics than its income, the explanation that the availability of
cheap housing surrounding LULUs is the cause of the disparity is seriously undermined.
See Marianne Lavelle, The Minorities Equation, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
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By failing to examine the role that market dynamics have played
in creating the current disparity in LULU sitings, proposals for reform target the siting process without first establishing that it is the
cause of the problem.8 9 In response, the mobility objection argues
that more careful study of the cause and effect relationship between
siting decisions and the disproportionate burden LULUs impose
upon people of color and the poor is required before siting reform
is attempted. 9 0
While study of the role mobility plays in distributing the burdens of LULUs is essential to a complete understanding of both the
cause of distributional inequities and the solutions for those inequities, many reforms of siting processes need not await that study.
Most of the theories of fairness discussed in this Article do not depend upon a finding that siting decisions in the past had a disproportionate effect. 9 1 Unless these theories are rejected, it is
appropriate to consider how to ensure that current siting decisions
are fair even before research is completed on the cause of existing
inequities in LULU distribution.
B.

The Mobility Objection

The mobility objection simply asks whether siting decisions will
have any enduring distributional effect, given the dynamics of the
housing and land markets. 9 2 For example, assume that on a given
date, all LULUs then needed were dispersed "fairly" throughout society. Wealthier individuals would respond to the distribution by
moving away from the LULUs. 9 3 Consequently, sites located in
wealthier areas would eventually be surrounded by a ring of land
deserted by wealthier families. The LULU would cause property
values in that ring to be lower than in surrounding areas. The ring
89

Both the CRJ and the GAO studies admit that they do not show cause and effect.

See CRJ, supra note 46, at 11; GAO, supra note 41, at 3. For discussions of the failure to
prove causation, see Hamilton, supra note 6, at 17-18; Lazurus, supra note 11, at 802
n.56.
90 Examination of the role siting decisions played in the current siting pattern
should include attention to "expulsive zoning" practices. See Collin, supra note 11, at
509; Jon C. Dubin, FromJunkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in
Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 744-64 (1993); Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM:
PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 101 (Charles M. Haar &Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).

91 Only the compensatory justice theory, discussed infra at notes 248, 260-61, and
accompanying text, rests on a finding that past siting decisions were unfair.
92 See Michael O'Hare, "Not on My Block You Don't"." Facility Siting and the Strategic
Importance of Compensation, 25 PuB. PoL'Y 407, 454 (1977).
93

For a survey of the evidence that residents chose a community in part because of

the amenities it offers, or disamenities it avoids, see Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton
Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
473, 517-28 (1991).
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would then become a ghetto of lower income households. 94 In
short, the pattern of disproportionate siting would be re-created. 95
This dynamic could only be prevented by prohibiting people from
moving, an infringement upon personal liberty and the market that
few would espouse. Accordingly, the argument concludes, what is
the point of fair siting proposals?
Four significant answers can be offered. First, as a matter of
theory, the mobility objection is based on several assumptions about
the real estate market that are not universally true. For example, the
96
objection assumes that wealthy individuals will always flee LULUs.
In fact, the wealthy will move away only if the negative impact of the
LULU is greater than the costs of relocating. 97 Relocation costs include the lost value of any remaining advantages of the property, 98
the costs of locating, buying, and moving to a new residence, 99 as
well as any psychological costs of leaving a home and neighborhood
to which the mover has grown attached.100 Many LULUs will not
impose a negative impact sufficient to outweigh those costs.' 0 ' Consequently, wealthier families will not necessarily flee every LULU,
nor will all wealthy families in the neighborhood necessarily flee a
particular LULU. 10 2 Similarly, individuals will refuse to buy in the
neighborhood only if they believe that the negative impact of the
LULU is greater than the difference between the price of the house
94 Some of the lower income people moving to the area surrounding the LULU will
have been displaced from their old neighborhoods through gentrification. Wealthy people fleeing LULUs will be attracted to LULU-free neighborhoods occupied by the poor,
and will be able to outbid the neighborhood's current residents for housing. O'Hare,
supra note 92, at 454.
95 Even if this readjustment dynamic could be prevented or tempered, the poor
might gain environmental quality but lose on other measures of well-being. Because the
siting program, absent readjustment, would result in a more diffuse pattern of siting, the
difference between the land values in poor or minority neighborhoods and other neighborhoods might decrease, forcing tenants in poor or minority neighborhoods to pay
higher rents. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 247 (2d ed. 1988).
96 See O'Hare, supra note 92, at 454.
97 For models of the decision to move away from a disamenity, see P.W. Abelson,
The Policy Problems and Economics of Aircraft Noise, 11 TRANSP. RES. 357, 358-59 (1977);
Chris Zeiss, MunicipalSolid Waste IncineratorImpacts on Residential Property Values and Sales in
Host Communities, 20J. ENVrL. Sys. 229, 235-36 (1990-91).
98 For example, the wealthy often are unwilling to forego the amenities of living in
the center city, despite the disadvantages of greater pollution in the city. See THE SOCIAL
BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 587 (Brian J.L. Berry ed., 1977).
99 Zeiss, supra note 97, at 235.
100 Id.
101

Id. at 252.

The negative impact of a LULU is unlikely to be the same for all families because
their sensitivity to the negative impacts of a LULU will differ, depending upon their risk
aversion, health, lifestyles, and tastes. See Zeiss, supra note 97, at 236. Even assuming
that the negative impact of a LULU is the same for all families in a neighborhood, relocation costs will differ, causing some to stay even if others move.
102
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and the prices of comparable available houses that are not near a
LULU.' 0 3 Not all LULUs will have such a significant impact.
Furthermore, under some conceptions of fairness, a fair distribution of LULUs would require that all neighborhoods bear some
LULU burden.1 0 4 Under such a siting program, the incentive to
move away from a LULU would be reduced because no community
would be immune from LULU siting.
The argument that LULUs decrease the market value of property also assumes that buyers and sellers of affected properties have
perfect information about the negative impacts of a LULU. 10 5 That
assumption is usually invalid, given the difficulty of assessing the
risks posed by LULUs. 10 6 Where market participants do not have
perfect information, property values may fall either more or less as a
07
result of a LULU than if perfect information was available.'
A second, less theoretical, answer to the mobility objection is
that no solid factual foundation exists for the assertion that a LULU
lowers surrounding property values significantly. Evidence regarding the impact of LULUs on neighboring property values is quite
mixed.' 0 8 Several studies show that hazardous waste sites have a
103
Abelson, supra note 97, at 359; Hays B. Gamble & Roger H. Downing, Effects of
Sanitary Landfills on Property Values and Residential Development, in SOLID AND LIQUID
WASTES: MANAGEMENT, METHODS AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 350, 357 (Shyamal K. Majumdar & E. Willard Miller eds., 1984).
104 See infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
105 See Zeiss, supra note 97, at 233.
106 See, e.g., DEAR & TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 98-99, 115 (reporting that the vast majority of survey respondents were unaware that a mental health facility was near their
home); Abelson, supra note 97, at 359 (reporting that 80% of those who had recently
moved into a neighborhood plagued by aircraft noise believed that they had underestimated the noise in making their moving decisions, and that over 20% regretted their
decision because of the noise); Gary H. McClelland, et al., The Effect of Risk Beliefs on
Property Values: A Case Study of a Hazardous Waste Site, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 485, 492 (1990)
(finding that 62% of recent purchasers were not aware of a nearby site when they
bought their homes, despite local requirements for information disclosure to
purchasers).
107 If people react to uncertainty by overestimating the risks of a LULU, property
values may fall by more than if perfect information about the risks were available.
108 The studies reported here have focused on the property value effects of specific
LULUs. More generally, studies of the effect of air pollution (often associated with noxious LULUs) on neighboring property values show some decline in property values as
air pollution increases. See, e.g., RobertJ. Anderson, Jr. & Thomas D. Crocker, Air Pollution and Property Values: A Reply, 54 Ruv. ECON. & STAT. 470 (1972) (presenting results of
six different empirical studies, all of which found statistically significant negative relationships between air pollution and property values); Douglas B. Diamond, Jr., The Relationship Between Amenities and Urban Land Prices, 56 LAND ECON. 21, 29 (1980) (finding that
higher levels of air pollution will depress land values); A. Myrick Freeman III, Hedonic
Prices, Property Values and Measuring EnvironmentalBenefits: A Survey of the Issues, 81 SCANDINAVIANJ. EcON. 154 (1979) (finding that in 13 of the 15 studies reviewed, property values were affected by air pollution, but criticizing the technical precision of all of the
studies); Jonathan H. Mark, A Preference Approach to Measuring the Impact of Environmental
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statistically significant adverse impact on neighboring property values, 10 9 while other studies have found little or no evidence of adverse impact."t 0 Furthermore, the evidence regarding the effect
that nuclear power plants and nuclear waste transport routes and
storage sites have on neighboring property values tends to indicate
that such LULUs do not significantly depress neighboring property
Externalities, 56 LAND ECON. 103 (1980) (reviewing studies and finding that level of air
pollution has a negative impact on property values); Hugh 0. Nourse, The Effect of Air
Pollution on House Values, 43 LAND ECON. 181 (1967) (finding that higher levels of air
pollution generally will depress property values). But see V. Kerry Smith & Timothy A.
Deyak, Measuring the Impact of Air Pollution on Property Values, 15 J. REGIONAL Sci. 277
(1975) (finding no statistically significant relationship between air pollution and median
property values or rents in 85 cities). Similarly, water quality, which is also related to the
presence of noxious LULUs, has been found to affect property values. Elizabeth L.
David, Lake Shore Property Values: A Guide to Public Investment in Recreation, 4 WATER RESOURCES REs. 697 (1968).
109 Ketkar, supra note 54, at 653 (finding presence of a hazardous waste site in a
municipality to be negatively correlated with property values in municipality); Janet E.
Kohlhase, The Impact of Toxic Waste Sites on Housing Values, 30 J. URB. ECON. 1, 11-19
(1991) (finding that prior to public announcement that a site had been placed on the
EPA's National Priorities List for cleanup, the site either had no effecf or a positive effect
on nearby property values, but that after the announcement, the proximity of the site
was significantly correlated with lower house values); McClelland, supra note 106, at 49394 (finding a correlation between neighborhoods' assessments of the risk posed by a
nearby landfill and property values); R. Gregory Michaels & V. Kerry Smith, Market Segmentation and Valuing Amenities with Hedonic Models: The Case of Hazardous Waste Sites, 28 J.
URB. ECON. 223 (1990) (finding a statistically significant relationship between a house's
distance from a publicized hazardous waste site and its price when data for an entire city
housing market was studied, but finding no such relationship when the data was analyzed by submarkets); GERALD E. SMOLEN & GARY MOORE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS ON SURROUNDING

REAL ESTATE VALUES IN TOLEDO, OHIO

(Ohio State Univ., Center for Real Estate Education & Research, Feb. 1991) (finding a
strong negative relationship between proximity to a toxic waste landfill and sales price,
for as far as five and three quarter miles from the site). See also V. Kerry Smith & William
H. Desvousges, The Value of Avoiding a LULU: Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 68 REV.
ECON. STAT. 293, 298 (1986) (using survey of suburban Boston households, rather than
hedonic studies, to estimate that distance from a hazardous waste disposal site is valued
at $330 to $495 per mile per year).
11O See David E. Clark & Leslie A. Nieves, An Interregional Hedonic Analysis of Noxious Facility Impacts on Local Wages and Property Values 20 (Nov. 1991) (unpublished
paper on file with author) (finding that housing prices increased with the presence of
hazardous waste sites). R. Gregory Michaels and V. Kerry Smith describe several studies
finding no effect on housing prices, although their own study reaches the opposite conclusion. See Michaels & Smith, supra note 109, at 227-28 (reporting that KJ. Adler et al.,
The Benefits of Regulatory Hazardous Waste Disposal: Land Values as an Estimator
(1982), found only limited evidence of a relationship between distance to a hazardous
waste site and price in Pleasant Plains, New Jersey, and found no evidence of such a
relationship in Andover, Minnesota); Michaels & Smith, supra note 109, at 228 (reporting that W. SCHULZE ET AL., IMPROVING ACCURACY AND REDUCING COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS (1986), found a statistically significant relationship
between distance from a hazardous waste site and price for one site, but found mixed
results for two other sites); see also Michaels & Smith, supra note 109, at 234-35 (finding
no statistically significant relationship between a house's distance from a publicized hazardous waste site and its sales price for several of the housing submarkets in the Boston
area).
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values. I ' Additionally, studies of the property value impacts of mu12
nicipal solid waste incinerators and landfills are inconclusive."
The majority of studies about the effects that social service LULUs
have on surrounding property values reveal no significant detrimental impact on surrounding property values,"13 or neighborhood
111 See, e.g., Hays B. Gamble & Roger H. Downing, Effects of Nuclear Power Plants on
Residential Property Values, 22 J. REGIONAL Sci. 457, 463-69 (1982) (finding no evidence
that nuclear power plants had any measurable effect on single family housing prices
within 20 miles of four plants; finding that in the area surrounding the Three Mile Island
plant, property values did show some relationship to distance from the plant, but that
relationship was probably the result of variable misspecification; and finding that the
Three Mile Island accident had no effect on housing values in the area in the nine
months following the accident); Jon P. Nelson, Three Mile Island and Residential Property
Values: Empirical Analysis and Policy Implications, 57 LAND ECON. 363 (1981) (finding no
decline in prices, or slowdown in appreciation rates, in the property near the Three Mile
Island plant in the nine months following the accident at the plant). But see Clark &
Nieves, supra note 110, at 20 (finding that nuclear power plants have a strong negative
influence on local housing prices); Smolen & Moore, supra note 109, at 17-20 (finding
that an announcement that a low level radioactive waste landfill would be sited had a
significantly adverse impact on neighboring property values); James R. Webb, Nuclear
Power Plants: Effects on Property Value, 48 APPRAISAL J. 230 (1980) (in interviews of 26
residents living within five miles of a nuclear power plant following the Three Mile Island accident, 57% reported that they thought the accident had lowered their property
values, and 54% thought that others would hesitate to buy the property).
See also Hays B. Gamble et al., Community Growth Around Nuclear Power Plants, 8J. AM.
REAL EST. & URB. ECON. 268 (1980) (finding that, at least until 1976, nuclear power
plants had a positive impact on the host communities' rates of growth); Ronda K. Hageman, Nuclear Waste Disposal: Potential Property Value Impacts, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 789
(1981) (interviews with experts in 17 states with nuclear facilities or waste transport
routes revealed only a few instances in which neighboring property owners claimed that
the facility lowered their property values, and disclosed several instances in which either
empirical studies or expert opinion had found no effect, or positive effects on neighboring property values).
112
Six case studies concluded that incinerators and landfills significantly decrease
property values in the surrounding neighborhood, but eight case studies found no demonstrable effects on property values, and one study found that the LULU had a positive effect on neighboring property values. See Zeiss, supra note 97, at 238-39 (reviewing
the studies). Zeiss' own study of the property value impacts of an incinerator in Marion
County, Oregon, found that the incinerator had no significant effect on the sales prices
of homes within the area even after one and one-half years of operation.
113
See MENTAL HEALTH LAw PROJECT, THE EFFECTS OF GROUP HOMES ON NEIGHBORING

PROPERTY: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1-4, 7, 10-12 (1985) (surveying the litera-

ture, and indicating that group homes and community residential facilities do not
adversely affect neighbors' property values or destablilize neighborhoods.). But see
Gabriel & Wolch, supra note 62, at 346-47 (finding that residential facilities for adults
and nonresidential mental health facilities have a substantial negative effect on the values of neighboring properties in white neighborhoods, and that both residential and
nonresidential facilities for adults had a significant negative effect on property values in
minority neighborhoods).
Some studies have found that group homes increase neighboring housing prices
when the group home is located in areas with below average socioeconomic status. See,
e.g., Stephen Farber, Market Segmentation and the Effects of GroupHomes for the Handicappedon
Residential Property Values, 23 URB. STUD. 519 (1986) (finding a statistically significant increase in the price of houses when a group home opened in below average socioeconomic areas with weak housing markets); Gabriel & Wolch, supra note 62, at 346-47
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demographics.' 14 Even community correctional facilities have not
been shown to decrease neighboring property values.1 15 Therefore,
the current evidence does not establish that the fair siting of LULUs
will cause a sufficient decrease in property values 1 6 to encourage
the reappearance of disproportionate siting patterns."17
(finding that nonresidential facilities for children have a positive effect on housing prices
in both white and minority neighborhoods, and that residential facilities for children and
youth increase housing prices in minority neighborhoods).
The other social service LULU that has been studied extensively is low and moderate income housing. A recent survey of the literature found 11 published studies regarding the effect of subsidized housing on neighboring property values; all but one
found no negative effects, and many found positive price effects. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HoUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, THE EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIZED AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON PROPERTY VALUES: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH (1988).

114 See GAO, supra note 41, at App. III, p. 62. In this national survey of group homes
for the mentally disabled, 74% of the respondents reported that there had been little or
no change in the number of residents leaving the neighborhood since the group home
was established, and only 10o reported that there had been a moderate, great or very
great change in migration. Additionally, 76% reported little or no change in the
number of minority residents, and 88% reported little or no change in the number of
blue collar workers in the neighborhood. The GAO study did not distinguish between
survey responses of those group homes located in neighborhoods that already had a
similar facility and those that were the first in the neighborhood; therefore, it is possible
that the first home in a neighborhood may be associated with greater changes in migration or neighborhood demographics than subsequent homes. Cf. Michael Dear, Impact of
Mental Health Facilities on Property Values, 13 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 150 (1977)
(finding that the housing turnover rate increased after the opening of several mental
health centers in Philadelphia, but that an expected decline in property values did not
materialize).
115 See, e.g., Krajick, supra note 63, at 17.
116
The evidence also does not disprove a relationship between noxious LULUs and
lower property values. There are several reasons why existing studies may have failed to
capture significant property value effects of noxious LULUs. The depressing effect on
property values that some LULUs might have could be counterbalanced by increased
competition for housing, if the LULU increases local employment or brings many new
residents into the area. Hageman, supra note I 11, at 792, 803-04. The negative effect
nuclear waste facilities or nuclear power plants may have on neighboring properties may
be counterbalanced by residents' expectations of compensation under the Price Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(b) (1973 & 1993 Supp.), in the event of an accident. Hageman, supra note 111, at 803-04, 806; Nelson, supra note 111, at 370-71. Also, some of
the studies were performed in the 1970s, before the public became sensitive to the environmental risks of noxious LULUs, and their results might be different if replicated today. Gamble & Downing, supra note 103, at 362. Alternatively, the indicators that the
studies commonly use in measuring facility impacts, such as distance from the site, may
be inappropriate. See Michaels & Smith, supra note 109, at 236; Zeiss, supra note 97, at
239, 253-55. The models used for the statistical tests also may be flawed. See Hageman,
supra note 111, at 797-98; Michaels & Smith, supra note 109, at 239-4 1; Zeiss, supra note
97, at 253-55.
117 Even studies that support the argument that LULUs lower neighboring property
values fail to support the next step in the mobility argument, which asserts that property
values will decrease enough to alter the demographics of the neighborhood. Ketkar's
study of the effect of hazardous waste sites on neighboring property values found that
the value of the property decreased by only about two percent. Ketkar, supra note 54, at
653. Kohlhase's study found that the value of an average house would increase by
roughly $2369 if it were located one mile further away from a hazardous waste site. This
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Third, the short term benefits of fair siting might make it appropriate to site LULUs more fairly, regardless of the possibility that
the dynamics of the real estate market might eventually counteract
the initially fair distribution. As just described, existing evidence
provides little guidance on whether a LULU will cause neighborhood change; it provides even less guidance on the timing of such
change."1 If the market is slow to change in response to a LULU,
the advantages of a fair distribution over the short run might outweigh the potential long-term futility of the program.
Finally, even if the evidence showed that fair siting programs
would be undermined by the market, the government may have a
moral obligation to site LULUs fairly. Discrimination in the employment market against people of color does not relieve the government of its obligation to provide schools free from
discrimination. 19 Analogously, if the government has an obligation
to distribute LULUs fairly, that obligation is not waived because
some of the benefits of fair treatment will be dissipated by the unfairness of the private sector.
In sum, the mobility objection to fair siting is important because it suggests that siting strategies need to consider the dynamics
of the real estate market in order to effect lasting changes in the
distribution of LULUs. The objection does not, however, defeat the
strength of the call for fairer siting programs.
C.

The Aggregation Objection

The aggregation objection asks why the burden of LULUs
should be viewed in isolation, without giving consideration to other
burdens and benefits that neighborhoods suffer and enjoy. 120 A
amount, if annualized to reflect the typical mortgage, would yield a difference of about

$310 in yearly payments. Kohlhase, supra note 109, at 20. Those changes in values are
unlikely to convert a middle class neighborhood into a low income ghetto.
118 The introduction of a LULU could immobilize a neighborhood for some time,
because the existing residents may be unable to sell their homes for their expected price,
and thus may choose to remain in their homes longer than planned. Wealthier residents
will be more able to move away before selling their homes, however.
119 See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972)
(fact that desegregating schools would lead to "white flight" does not relieve school
district of its obligation to "uproot[]" the district's dual public school system."); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (while market for nurses
was such that 98% of all nurses are women, school could not exclude men from its
program). Cf Barrows v.Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253-54, 259 (1953) (while private discrimination in housing market is beyond the reach of the Equal Protection Clause, the
government has an obligation not to enforce or sanction that discrimination); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (same).
120
Cf BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 242-46 (1980)
(deciding whether two individuals are asked to make an equal sacrifice involves an "aggregation problem" because the question may not be answered solely by "see[ing] how
those competing citizens fare in any single power domain."); Herman B. Leonard &
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neighborhood burdened by a LULU may have better park facilities
than non-host neighborhoods, or may have property taxes assessed
at a lower percentage of actual value than non-host neighborhoods. 2 1 Indeed, the neighborhood may be advantaged or disadvantaged, relative to other neighborhoods, by any number of the
decisions that local, state and federal governments12 2 make about
the delivery and financing of public services and the location of public facilities. 123 The aggregation objection asserts that the determination of whether a LULU has been sited fairly has to consider the
24
aggregate effect of all those other benefits and burdens.'
Such a requirement would paralyze any attempt to ensure fair
siting. There are, however, several answers to this objection. First,
it may be that some of the communities chosen to host LULUs are
disadvantaged by all other government decisions as well, such that
they receive no benefits that might offset unfair siting decisions. On
those facts, as Bruce Ackerman has argued in an analogous context,
"it is as easy as pie to add up each particular disadvantage into one
25
outrageous violation" of principles of fairness.'
Second, if most communities do not fit the simple model just
described, the fairness of the overall distribution of benefits and
burdens may be a matter of process, not mathematics. As long as
the process by which each benefit and burden is distributed is fair, it
is unnecessary to calculate and compare the net benefit or burden of
RichardJ. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in

VALUES AT RISK 31, 39-41 (Douglas Maclean ed., 1986) (advancing reasons that distributional issues should be handled on a systemic, aggregated basis).
121 A Texas study revealed that as the socioeconomic status of a San Antonio neighborhood increased, the difference between assessed value and actual value of property
decreased, and effective tax rates were accordingly higher. Conversely, as the percentage of minority residents in the neighborhood increased, the difference between assessed and actual value increased, making effective tax rates lower. LINEBERRY, supra
note 9, at 94-102.
122 A neighborhood also can enjoy benefits or suffer burdens that are only indirectly
attributable to the government. Ifa neighborhood is plagued by crack houses or suffers
from a higher crime rate, for example, then that neighborhood might reasonably claim
that the decreased quality of life should be considered in determining the LULU burden
it should bear.
123

See S.M. MILLER & PAMELA A. ROBY, THE FUTURE OF INEQUALrrY 84-108 (1970);

LINEBERRY, supra note 9, at 14-15; David M. Smith, Who Gets What Where, and How: A

Welfare Focusfor Human Geography, 59 GEOGRAPHY 289, 294 (1974).

For reviews of the

evidence regarding the fairness of the distribution of public services, see LINEBERRY,
supra note 9, at 41-42; Shoup, supra note 9, at 112-16.
124 The aggregation objection is implicitly concerned with the legitimacy of removing a particular allocative decision from the majoritarian political process. That concern
might counsel against judicial attempts to impose fair siting programs, absent a decision
that the Constitution guarantees some minimal level of environmental quality or that it
forbids disproportionate siting. The focus of this Article, however, is on legislative fair
siting proposals.
125

ACKERMAN, supra note 120, at 242.
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each community. To be fair, however, the process might have to
vary depending upon the type of benefit or burden at issue. This
answer to the aggregation objection could draw upon recent thinking about when just compensation should be paid for those burdened by government regulation. 12 6 These theories suggest that
distributive decisions affecting large numbers of individuals might
appropriately be made through the usual legislative process, subject
perhaps to constraints upon the power of special interests.1 27 Individuals affected by such broad-based allocation proposals could join
28
with others and engage in log-rolling to protect their interests.'
On the other hand, decisions that disadvantage a small group of
people who are unable to protect themselves by joining coalitions
may require a process that is more solicitous of the interests of the
group. 29 Siting decisions may well require such constraints.
Full development of these answers to the aggregation objection
is beyond the scope of this Article. The remainder of the Article
therefore assumes that further examination will persuasively rebut
the aggregation objection.
D.

The Free Market Objection

This final objection asserts that the benefit of living far from
LULUs should be allocated through the free market, just as the benefit of living near pristine mountain lakes or beautiful city parks is
allocated. Similarly, it asserts, the burden of living near a LULU
should be allocated through the same market that allocates the burden of working in relatively unsafe or otherwise undesirable jobs.
Some burdens imposed by the legislative and executive
branches are not allocated through the free market, however. Jury
duty is an example, as is military service under a draft. 130 Similarly,
the government does not allocate some benefits, such as health care
and education, solely through the free market, recognizing instead
126 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, EconomicAnalysis andJust Compensation, 12 Ir'LREV. L.
& ECON. 125 (1992); William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Effident Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI-KErr L. REV. 865, 887-94 (1991); Saul
Levmore, Takings, Torts, andSpecial Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1355-60 (1991) [hereinafter, Levmore, Takings]; Saul Levmore, Just Compensation andJust Politics, 22 CONN. L.
REV. 285 (1990).
127 Levmore, Takings, supra note 126, at 1355. For a review of the literature regarding the power of special interest groups to capture the legislature or administrative
agency and impose costs broadly on the majority, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 12-37 (1991).
128 See Fischel, supra note 126, at 893; see also Frank I. Michelman, PoliticalMarkets
and Community Self-Determination: CompetingJudicialModels of Local Government Legitimacy, 53
IND. LJ. 145, 158-77 (1977-78).
129 See Fischel, supra note 126, at 893; Levmore, Takings, supra note 126, at 1356.
130 See infra note 146 and accompanying text; see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 100-03 (1983).
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that either some minimal level of benefit must be allocated to those

who could not purchase the benefit in an unregulated market, or

that the allocation must be removed from the market entirely.13 1

One way to counter the free market objection, then, would be to
draw upon the justifications given for those exceptions to the market.1 3 2 In order to reach the issue of how different conceptions of
fairness translate into siting programs, this Article will assume arguendo that compelling justifications for regulating or supplanting the

market can be found in those analogies.
III
THE MEANING OF FAIRNESS-THE THEORETICAL BASES
FOR FAIR SITING PROPOSALS

Having addressed the general objections to the goal of siting
reform, it is now appropriate to discuss the theoretical bases for that
goal. This Section attempts to articulate and analyze the most plausible theories about what fairness requires in the context of siting. 133 Most of the theories discussed have not been specifically
espoused by proponents of fair siting proposals. Environmental
justice advocates have been very vague about the theories of fairness
underlying their calls for fair siting. 134 Accordingly, while some of
131 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 34-44, 83-127, 186-89
(1978).
132 The issue here is not whether the Constitution requires that the burden of LULUs be allocated through a non-market mechanism. Instead, this Article focuses on legislative proposals for siting reform. Unless such legislation would effect a taking of
property, or violate the requirement of equal protection, the Constitution would not be
implicated in legislative decisions to eschew or regulate the market in the allocation of
the burden of LULUs.
133 I do not survey accounts ofjustice that are too indeterminant to guide fairness in
siting, such as theories of highest total or average utility. For a discussion of the general
difficulty of evaluating specific policies from a utilitarian premise, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OFJUSTICE 90-91 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 112-15 (1979). In the siting context, utilitarianism is generally associated with the assumption that fairness concerns are satisfied if the site chosen for a LULU is the scientifically and technologically best site possible. See, e.g., MARY
R. ENGLISH, SITING Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES 130-31, 150-51

(1992). This application of utilitarianism assumes that the designation of the technologically best site is a value-free, apolitical process, and that all appropriate measures of
utility are included in the technological siting criteria. Neither assumption bears any
relationship to the reality of the siting process.
134 Calls for "fair" siting may be deliberately vague because the rhetorical force of
the calls may be compromised by attempts to specify their content. See supra text accompanying note 22. Alternatively, advocates may view the principled basis for the call as
"self-evident." See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Searchfor Environmental Rights, 6J. LAND USE
& EN rL. L. 93, 96 (1990) ("When assertions of environmental rights are made, the
assumption often seems to be that the principled basis for them is self-evident and need
not be identified or explained. The result is to leave an aura of ambiguity around most
such declarations.").
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the theories discussed can be inferred from the advocates' general
statements, they cannot be directly attributed to the advocates. On
the other hand, some of the theories of fairness that provide logical
support for fair siting proposals have been disavowed by environmental justice advocates as a matter of principle.13 5 For purposes of
organization, the fairness arguments are clustered around three different aspects of LULU distribution: the pattern of the distribution;
the efficiency of the distribution; and the procedure by which the
1
distribution was effected. 36
A.

Fairness in the Pattern of Distribution
1. FairnessRequires Equal Division-A Per Capita or Proportional
Distributionof the Burdens of LULUs

A broad conception of fairness in siting would require that a
LULU's burdens be spread on a per capita or proportional 3 7 basis
over society as a whole.' 38 This fairness concept is implicit in the
contention that LULUs are inequitably sited if the percentage of
LULUs in minority neighborhoods is disproportionate to the percentage of minorities in the nation's population. 3 9 It is also inherent in the calls by the environmental justice movement demanding
that people of color receive an "equitable distribution of 'healthy'
physical environments"' 140 and that no neighborhood bear more
4
than its proportionate share of LULUs.' '
135

See infra note 202 and accompanying text.

Cf NICHOLAS RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVEJUSTICE 87 (1966) (discussing the facets of
distribution an adequate theory of distributive justice must address).
137
A proportional distribution could be based on ability to pay, or on the extent to
which the payor's activities created the need for the LULU. For discussions of the differences between per capita and proportional distributions, see WESTEN, supra note 22, at
52-56, 150-53. The term "proportional distribution" is used in the remainder of this
article to capture both notions of distribution.
138
The environmental justice movement does not call for "equal pollution," but
focuses on preventing pollution and achieving equity in siting LULUs that cannot be
avoided at acceptable cost. See, e.g., Deeohn Ferris, A Challenge to EPA, 18 EPA J. 28
(1992) ("The keystone of this quest for justice is equal protection, not equal pollution.");
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 39, at S2 (The environmental justice movement "calls not
for 'equity' in the face of pollution, but for prevention and equal protection."). The
equal division theory, therefore, assumes that the LULUs being sited are a necessary
evil.
139
See, e.g., CRJ, supra note 46, at xiv (siting process unfair because three of five
largest commercial hazardous waste landfills are located in predominantly black or Hispanic communities); Bullard & Wright, supra note 12, at 306 (siting process unfair because more than three-fourths of Houston's solid waste sites were located in black
neighborhoods, even though African Americans made up only one-fourth of the
population).
136

140
141

Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Equity, LAND USE FORUM, Winter 1993, at 6, 11.
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENW-

EquITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 6-7 (1992) [hereinafter
E.P.A. WORKGROUP REPORT I] (Draft, Feb. 1992) (William Reilly, Administrator of the
RONMENTAL
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There are strong and weak versions of the equal division con-

ception of fairness. Under the strong version, fairness demands a
proportional distribution of benefits.1 4 2 Because exemptions from
social burdens are benefits, it follows that burdens such as LULUs
should be proportionally distributed. t43 No individual or commu-

nity of individuals is more deserving of the benefit of living in a
LULU-free neighborhood than any other, so fairness requires that

44
all receive that benefit equally.'
A weaker version of the theory asserts that fairness requires a
proportional distribution of burdens, even if benefits are not allocated proportionally. 14 5 The United States embraces this view regarding societal burdens, such as jury duty and military service

under a draft. 146 This version of the theory assumes that an objec-

tive distinction can be drawn between burdens and the absence of
benefits, and that the distinction mandates an equal division of bur147
dens regardless of the distribution of benefits.
EPA has stated as "official EPA policy" that "[t]he consequences of environmental pol-

lution should not be 'borne disproportionately' by any segment of population."). For
academic suggestions that siting decisions should be based upon a proportionality theory of fairness, see Roger E. Kasperson et al., Confronting Equity in Radioactive Waste Management: Modest Proposalsfor a Socially Just and Acceptable Program, in EQurrY ISSUES IN
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 331, 335 (Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983) [hereinafter
Egurry ISSUES].
142 See Charles Taylor, The Nature and Scope of
EQUALrY HERE AND Now 34, 52-67 (Frank S. Lucash

DistributiveJustice, in JUSTICE AND
ed., 1986) (discussing the difficul-

ties of strict egalitarianism).
143 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 Soc. SCe. INFO.
483, 484 (1988) (social benefits include the benefit of being exempt from a social
burden).
144 Another version of this strong claim asserts that every individual is entitled to a
minimum level of the benefit; therefore, distribution must be equal until that minimum
is attained, but may be unequal thereafter. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 134, at 95 (efforts to
establish environmental rights seek to assure some level of freedom from environmental
hazards).
145
The argument that burdens should be distributed fairly may take at least two
forms. One argument is consequentialist-burdens should be distributed fairly because
people are more likely to bear their fair share if they believe that others similarly situated
are doing the same. GEORGE KLOSKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 180-84 (1992). A second argument is deontological-burdens should be distributed fairly because it is immoral to enjoy the benefits of a cooperative venture without
bearing a fair share of the burdens. Id. at 33-35.
146 See JAMES FALLOWS, NATIONAL DEFENSE 126-34 (1981); CALABRESI & BOBBIr,
supra note 131, at 157-67; RAWLS, supra note 133, at 380-81; Thomas J. Bradley, Note,
The All Volunteer Force, Conscription, and OtherAlternatives, 7J. LEGIS. 125, 130 (1980). The
United States espouses the principle that military service is an obligation that should be
shared by all men in society, but the draft was far from representative during the Vietnam war. FALLows, supra, at 130. Today's all volunteer force remains unrepresentative.
Charles C. Moskos, Making the All-Volunteer Force Work: A National Service Approach, 60
FOREIGN AFF. 17, 19-22 (1981).
147
For discussions of the difficulty of distinguishing between benefits and burdens
in the analogous area of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence, see Donald W. Large,
The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The Searchfor a Better Rule, 18 ENvrL L. 3, 15, 29-
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It is unnecessary to tackle the strong version of the theory here,
because if the burdens of LULUs are proportionally distributed, the
concomitant benefit of being free of those burdens will necessarily
be proportionally distributed. 148 This article thus focuses on the
narrower argument that the burden of living next to LULUs must be
proportionally distributed.
Several means of distribution are plausible under the proportional distribution of burden theory. One scheme would impose a
physical proportional distribution: LULUs themselves would be distributed equally among neighborhoods. This distribution could be
either equal expost or equal ex ante. In an expost scheme, the facilities
and the harms that they pose would be distributed proportionately
among neighborhoods. For example, if New York City requires facilities for 10,000 homeless individuals and has 100 neighborhoods,
all holding some land suitable for a facility, each neighborhood
would receive one facility housing 100 individuals. In an ex ante
scheme, each neighborhood has an equal chance of being selected
for the site through a lottery process.1 4 9 For example, if New York
City requires a sewage sludge treatment plant, each of the 100
neighborhoods would have a 1/100 chance of being selected for the
site. The ex ante physical distribution scheme is particularly wellsuited to situations in which there are economies of scale in building
and operating fewer but larger LULUs. Some types of hazardous
waste, for example, are stored most efficiently in large, centralized
facilities. To accommodate such efficiency considerations, most
neighborhoods should be spared the burden of having the facility
nearby.1 50 A lottery procedure can ensure that although most
neighborhoods will not have to host the site, all have an equal
chance of being selected as the host site. The lottery accordingly
15
achieves equality of opportunity before the actual distribution. '
34 (1987); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'yust Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1196-201 (1967); Jeremy Paul,
The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1438-65 (1991); Joseph L.
Sax, Takings and The Police Power, 74 YALE LJ.36, 48-50 (1964); Roger B. Stoebuck, Police
Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1061-62 (1980).
148
The theory that fairness requires an egalitarian distribution of benefits is more at
odds with the free market objection discussed supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text
than any of the other theories surveyed in this Article.
149
For an explanation of the concepts of ex ante and ex post equity, see Donald T.
Hornstein, Reclaiming EnvironmentalLaw: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 595 (1992); L. Robin Keller & Rakesh K. Sarin, Equity in Social
Risk: Some Empirical Observations, 8 RIsK ANALYSIS 135 (1988).
150 For discussions of the problem of indivisible goods, see RESCHER, supra note 136,
at 93-95.
151
Id. at 94. For a discussion of what form such a lottery would have to take to
ensure that it provided an equal chance to each of the neighborhoods, see Komhauser &
Sager, supra note 143, at 485-92. For discussions of the fairness of using lotteries, see
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Instead of either ex ante or ex post physical equality, a distribution might seek "compensated" equality. In this distribution
scheme, all individuals or communities that gain a net benefit from a

particular LULU must compensate those who suffer a net loss. 15 2

For example, if a sludge treatment plant imposed costs upon a
neighborhood, each of the neighborhoods that benefitted from the
plant, but did not suffer the detriment of close proximity, would
have to pay a proportionate share of the costs. 15 3 Compensated

equality can operate either ex ante or expost. In an ex ante scheme, the
siting neighborhood would be compensated for the expected loss
that the site might inflict, even though the loss might never occur.
In an ex post scheme, the siting neighborhood would be compensated only as injuries occurred. Compensation could be in the form
of cash, 154 neighborhood amenities, insurance, or indemnification. 155 Compensation also could include "risk substitution," involving commitments to reduce some other burden borne by the
community, such as a landfill developer's promise to clean up existing waste dumps.' 56 The amount and nature of the compensation
would be determined either by a government authority, such as an
157
administrative agency, or by the affected neighborhood itself.
The conceptual and practical problems with both the physical
and the compensated proportional schemes are formidable. The
difficulties with the proportional siting schemes are examined first.
43-77 (1992); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note
143, at 492-509; Allan Mazur, PeerReview, Lettersfrom Readers, 32 SCIENCES 5 (1992) (proposing lottery of LULUs).
152
For a discussion of the role of compensation in ensuring fairness, see ROBERT
NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 78-84 (1974).
153 The compensated equality mechanism could apply in all sitings, or could be limited to disproportionate sitings. For example, if nine out of the relevant 10 neighborhoods already have one homeless shelter, the tenth neighborhood would not be
compensated for taking a shelter that would bring it to the same level as the others. But
if two shelters were located in the tenth neighborhood, so that it then had more than any
other neighborhood, it would be entitled to compensation.
154
See, e.g., Herbert Inhaber, Of LULUs, NIMBYs, and NIMTOOs, 107 PUB. INTEREST
52, 63 (1992) (Modern Landfill Incorporated offered all citizens of Lewiston, New York
$960 each annually for a period of twenty years for the right to expand a landfill).
155 For descriptions of forms of compensation other than cash, see Arthur M. Sullivan, Victim Compensation Revisited, 41J. PUB. EcON. 211, 211-12 (1990); Zeiss, supra note
97, at 237-38.
156 PORTNEY, supra note 3, at 137-59; Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of
Siting and Cleaning Up of Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay
the Monster?, 19 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 273-74 (1991).
157 If the government determined the compensation, the host community would enjoy liability rule protection of its right to compensation. If the host community determined the compensation, it would enjoy property rule protection of that right. For
discussion of the merits of each rule, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972).
BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTrERY
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a. Physical Dispersion of Sites
Both ex post and ex ante physical dispersion schemes are flawed in
three major respects. First, they focus on the rights of neighborhoods and ignore the rights of individuals within them. Second, the
fairness they offer may unravel if some communities lack suitable
land for the LULU being distributed. Third, they pose extraordinary difficulties of measurement and definition.
i.

The Rights of Individuals

Physical distribution schemes distribute LULUs among neighborhoods, not among individuals. Therefore, people living right
next to a LULU will bear a greater share of the burden than
others, 158 even though their neighborhood's share of LULUs is considered fair. 15 9 Advocates of physical distribution schemes must explain to those individuals who are disproportionately affected why
they lack the right to a fair distribution of burdens, even though a
16 0
neighborhood has that right.
ii.

The Availability of Suitable Land

Physical distribution schemes assume that every neighborhood
contains some land equally suitable for the LULU. In reality, some
communities contain land that is less suitable than that found in
other neighborhoods. 16 1 Those qualitative differences in available
land create opportunities for unfair distribution. Determining the
suitability of a potential site for a particular kind of LULU involves
articulating the criteria for evaluating the sites and specifying the
158
It could be argued that physical distribution schemes may violate individual
rights by reducing the value of some of the property purchased or rented prior to the
implementation of such a scheme. If a LULU affects neighboring property values (but
see supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text), the price of property should be based in
part upon the market's assessment of the risk that a LULU will be sited near the property. People who bought property in neighborhoods at low risk for LULUs therefore
will lose part of their investment if a physical siting scheme is implemented and the
probability that the neighborhood will be asked to host a LULU increases. The reduction in value is unlikely to be considered a violation of the Fifth Amendment'sJust Compensation Clause, however, except in the unlikely event that the change to a physical
siting scheme would completely destroy the value of a property. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992). For an analysis suggesting that no compensation should be paid for such a reduction in value, see Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509, 527-32, 602-06
(1986).
159 See LINEBERRY, supra note 9, at 36-37; Janet K. Boles; Urban Equality: Definitions
and Demands, in THE EGALITARIAN CITY: ISSUES OF RIGHTS, DISTRIBUTION, ACCESS, AND
POWER 4 (Janet K. Boles ed., 1986).
160 For discussion of the theory of group rights against discrimination, see Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-77 (1976);
Vernon Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 607 (1975).
161 See, e.g., GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 214-22.
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weight of each criterion. 16 2 The siting decisionmaker then must apply the criteria to specific sites and determine how to rank the potential sites. Neighborhoods obviously would seek exclusion from
the list of potentially suitable sites by attempting to influence either
the substance or weighting of the criteria used to exclude or rank
the sites, or the manner in which the criteria are applied. 16 If such
politicking were allowed, the current siting distribution would be
replicated, because the same groups that currently have political
power sufficient to avoid sites could skew the process of identifying
suitable sites to their advantage.lA
iii. Problems of Measurement and Definition
Both the ex ante and ex post mechanisms for physically distributing LULU burdens face significant problems of definition and measurement.' 65 Such problems alone do not completely discredit the
physical distribution of burden theory. The theory of equal physical
distribution may be worth pursuing even if it requires line-drawing
that is somewhat arbitrary, and even if it relies upon measurements
that are primitive. The definitional and measurement problems,
however, illuminate the requirements of the theory and specify what
needs to be done to make the theory workable.
First, what criteria should be used to compare the burdens of
the LULUS to be distributed? 166 Depending upon the basis of comparison, even the same type of facility may impose different types or
levels of burden upon various communities. Two neighborhoods
hosting identical hazardous waste treatment plants, for example,
John A.S. McGlennon, A Model Siting Process and the Role of Lawyers, 17 NATURAL
463, 464-65 (1984). For an illustrative description of the types of criteria
that might be used in determining the suitability of land for low and moderate income
housing, see DAVID LISTOIlN, FAIR SHARE HOUSING ALLOCATION 58 (1976). For the criteria used to determine suitability of land for hazardous waste sites, see GREENBERG &
ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 175-78.
163
For a description of the contentiousness of the application of criteria to determine sites appropriate for radioactive and nuclear waste facilities, see ENGLISH, supra
note 133, at 120, 122-23, 134; Richard H. Bryan, The Politicsand Promisesof Nuclear Waste
Disposal: The View From Nevada, 29 ENV'T, Oct. 1987, at 14, 16-35. For examples of communities that have gained exclusion from consideration for sites, see, e.g., Denise
Provost, The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act: What Impact on Municipal
Power to Exclude and Regulate?, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 715, 721 & n.43 (1982-83).
164 THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME 212 (Audrey Armour ed., 1984).
165
For a discussion of the need for definitional rules and measurement procedures
to assess the fairness of any system of distribution, see MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE 3-4, 33-34 (1985); WESTEN, supra note 22, at 14-15. For a discussion of the
difficulty of measurement in the analogous area of urban service delivery, see
LINEBERRY, supra note 9, at 69-70.
166 In order to compare burdens, it must be possible to assess the burden of each
LULU by some standardized procedure. For a discussion of this difficulty, see infra note
198 and accompanying text.
162
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might bear different burdens if the basis of comparison is health
risk, because the geology or transportation networks or composition
of the workforce of one area could make one plant somewhat riskier
than the other.' 6 7 Some criteria, such as health risk or loss in property value, are obvious grounds for comparison. But others, such as
psychological harms or interference with social networks, are

controversial. 168
When the LULUs being compared are different, such as a
prison and a sludge treatment plant, 16 9 comparisons will require
agreement on how different criteria are to be weighted or reduced
to some common metric such as dollar loss. 170 Whether and how to
translate burdens such as health risks to monetary terms is also a
17 1
controversial issue.
Second, how should "neighborhood" be defined for the purposes of calculating how burdens are distributed? The political jurisdiction allocating the burden 172 could apportion the burden on a
per person basis; by land area; according to political boundaries; on
the basis of who benefits from the LULU; or through a formula that
attempts to capture all these measures.' 7 3 Each of these definitions
167 See, e.g., Inhaber, supra note 154, at 58 (each LULU is a "unique combination of
calculated risks, geology, nearby population, [and] engineering design").
168 See Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of DistributiveJustice,
15 ENVT'L AFF. 437, 471-94 (1988); Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting
of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis 100-01 (Jan. 21, 1993) (unpublished draft, on file with author).
169 One approach to the problem of measuring the burden of various LULUs would
be to survey a random sample of individuals about their perception of the LULUs' relative undesirability. One problem with that approach, however, is the fluctuation in people's views over time. Attitudes toward people with AIDS and the decreasing sympathy
shown the homeless are two recent examples. See Dear, supra note 3, at 291. Any distribution of LULUs based on "public opinion polls" about the acceptability of different
LULUs thus would require frequent readjustments. Additionally, the acceptability of
various facilities often depends upon such facility characteristics as size, appearance, operating procedures, and reputation of the sponsoring agency. Id at 292-93; DEAR &
TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 27;Jaffe & Smith, supra note 62, at 10-11. Unless survey respondents were given information about such characteristics, the survey's ranking of burdensomeness would be inaccurate.
170 See ACKERMAN, supra note 120, at 240-42 (discussing the problems of "particular
comparison").

171 See, e.g., MargaretJ. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1879-86
(1987).
172 Determining the appropriate political entity to allocate the burden raises difficult
questions about the relative efficiency, accountability, competitiveness, and representativeness of different levels of government. Les Daniels, The Role of Governments as Suppliers of Neighborhoods, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEIGHBORHOOD 147, 149-50 (David Segal ed.,

1979); John E. Jackson, Public Needs, Private Behavior, and Metropolitan Governance: A Summaiy Essay, in PUBLIC NEEDS AND PRIVATE BEHAVIOR IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 1, 26-28
(John E. Jackson ed., 1975).
173 See LISTOKEN, supra note 162, at 180 (describing the housing allocation plan of
the Pueblo (Colorado) Area Council of Governments).
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of neighborhood has advantages and disadvantages in terms of
74
fairness.'
In addition, some LULUs do not confine their impact to a particular location, but impact several political jurisdictions. 75 This
further complicates the definition of neighborhood. Further, a definition of neighborhood that is appropriate for a land use that benefits a state or large region may be inappropriate for a land use that
benefits a few square blocks within a city. Accordingly, what constitutes a "neighborhood" depends upon the type of LULU at issue.
Third, what type of equality is required: equality of treatment
or equality of results? Assume, for example, that an incineration
facility is needed to dispose of 1000 units of medical waste, and two
neighborhoods have suitable sites. The sites are identical except
that one of the neighborhoods is predominantly African American
while the other is predominantly white. Proportional division would
require that each community host a facility with a capacity of 500
units. The predominantly African American community might argue, however, that formal equality is insufficient because African
Americans have statistically poorer health than whites. 17 6 Therefore, the added risk posed by the facility has a greater impact upon
the African American community than upon the white community.' 77 Equality of result would require that the impact of the siting
be equal, even if that means inequality of treatment. 78
Fourth, how should issues of need affect the distribution of burdens? To illustrate, if a neighborhood has a disproportionate
174 For an illustrative discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of various definitions of region for the purpose of allocating low and moderate income housing, see id.
at 31-39.
175 See, e.g., ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 134 (describing the disputes within the
Southeast Compact regarding the problems presented when a facility located near the
border of one state has spillover effects in other states).
176 For discussions of the health status of African Americans, see STEPHANIE POLLACK & JOANN GROZUCZAK, REAGAN, ToxiCS AND MINORITIES 1 (1984); E.P.A. WORKGROUP REPORT I, supra note 141, at 11-12; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
ENVIRONMENTAL EQurrY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, VOL. 2: SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT 4-6 (1992); Cole, supra note 7, at 630-3 1; Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Effects
of OccupationalInjury, Illness and Disease on the Health Status of Black Americans: A Review, in
INCIDENCE, supra note 23, at 114.
177 For examples of this argument by environmental justice advocates, see CRJ,
supra note 46, at 7. See also E.P.A. WORKGROUP REPORT I, supra note 141, at 27-28
(recommending that the EPA target high risk populations for special enforcement and
rulemaking attention).
178 This formal equality versus result equality debate is analogous to the equality of
resources versus equality of welfare debate in the literature concerning distributions of
benefits. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AiF. 185, 186-87 (1981). It also resembles the equality of inputs versus equality of
outputs debate in the literature concerning educational financing. See, e.g., LINEBERRY,
supra note 9, at 31-33;James Coleman, The Concept of Equality of EducationalOpportunity, 38
HARV. EDUC. REV. 7, 18-22 (1968).
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number of a city's AIDS victims, is that neighborhood's fair share of
AIDS service facilities greater than that of a neighborhood with
fewer residents infected with the disease? The neighborhood with a
greater need might consider the facility a benefit rather than a burden. Indeed, the neighborhood might consider it unfair to locate
the facility elsewhere because of the inconvenience and expense to
residents served by the facility. On the other hand, considerations
of need are likely to relegate many social service LULUs to poor
communities, where a disproportionate number of clients live. 17 9
Those communities may argue that they are no more responsible
for the plight of those needing social services than residents of
wealthier neighborhoods, and, therefore, should bear no more of
the burden of helping those people. In addition, imposing a greater
LULU burden on neighborhoods because of their greater need may
encourage communities to exclude the poor or other needy
residents. 18 0
It may seem more justifiable to take need into account when
siting LULUs such as landfills, but even that approach is controversial. Communities with factories that produce large amounts of
waste may legitimately argue that their goods provide widespread
benefits, so that they alone should not bear the burden of disposal.' 8 ' Additionally, taking need into account in siting waste disposal facilities may perpetuate the unfair effects of earlier siting
decisions, because the generators of waste often are disproportionately located in low income and minority communities. 8 2
Fifth, should the benefits that a neighborhood receives from a
LULU be considered in assessing the burdens the LULU imposes?
Some LULUs employ neighborhood residents or purchase goods or
179 See LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 56-57. Similarly, the siting of correctional facilities based upon measures of "need" (such as the prior residence of prisoners) may skew
the distribution of facilities towards certain communities. For a revealing discussion of
California's fair share parole legislation, which requires that prisoners be paroled only
to the county in which the crime was committed, see Walter L. Barkdull, Parole and the
Public: A Look at Attitudes in California, 52 FED. PROBATION 15, 15-16 (1988).
180
The desire to avoid the burden of supplying facilities to meet the needs of the
poor is one explanation for the practice of exclusionary zoning. See DUANE WINDSOR,
FISCAL ZONING IN SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES 84-90, 151-53 (1979); Edwin S. Mills & Wal-

lace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscaland
Zoning Behavior, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 1, 6-8 (Edwin S. Mills &

Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Barbara Sherman Rolleston, Determinants of Restrictive Suburban Zoning: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 21 J. URB. ECON. 1, 2, 18-19 (1987).
181 For a report on the Southeast Compact's efforts to take need into account in
siting a low level radioactive waste disposal facility within its member states, see ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 120, 123, 127-28. Even if communities agree that need should
be a consideration in siting a LULU, the Southeast Compact's experience shows how
controversy can surround questions of how to calculate need. Id. at 122-24.
182

Austin & Schill, supra note 7, at 70.
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services from local businesses. 183 Others pay taxes to the community.1 4 Some, however, contribute very little to the local economy
or tax base.18 5 In comparing the burdens that are borne by different
neighborhoods, it seems odd to ignore the benefits a LULU brings
to its host community.'8 6 But those benefits may not accrue to the
same people who bear the burdens. Local business owners may not
live in the neighborhood, for example. Those burdened by a LULU
are unlikely to feel that a distribution is fair just because benefits to
18 7
their neighbors reduce the community's "net" burden.
A related question is whether the equal distribution of burden
requires that the burdened neighborhood enjoy at least some of the
benefit of the activity necessitating the LULU. Assume, for example, that a jurisdiction has chosen not to use nuclear power for any
of its energy needs and that it does not enjoy any benefit from the
generation of nuclear power elsewhere. Arguably, such a jurisdiction should not be considered when determining how to dispose of
the spent nuclear fuel rods from nuclear power plants in other
jurisdictions.18 8
Similarly, should preferences or levels of risk aversion affect the
distribution? 18 9 For example, if urban neighborhood A is more tolerant of air pollution than suburb B, an enclave for persons sensitive
to pollution, how should the burden of an air-polluting LULU be
calculated? If the burden is measured according to the subjective
preferences of neighborhoods A and B, the distribution may favor
already privileged neighborhoods.190 Neighborhoods already beset
by pollution may be hardened to its effects, while those that have
enjoyed clean air will have developed a taste for even cleaner air. 19 1
183
184

185
186

See supra note 5.
Idj

d

Indeed, some argue that fairness requires that those who receive the benefit of
jobs and revenue bear the costs of the facility. See Gerrard, supra note 168, at 113.
187
See supra note 159-60 and accompanying text.
188 See, e.g., Kenneth Reich, Nevada Legislators Say Plan to Bury Nuclear Waste in State is
Unlawful, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1989, at 26 (reporting that many Nevadans object to the
nuclear waste repository proposed for Yucca Mountain because Nevada produces no
commercial nuclear waste). For a discussion of benefits-related equity, see Hornstein,
supra note 149, at 598.
189
People tend to view the justice of a proposed distribution differently when distinctions between individuals are based on their tastes or beliefs rather than needs, even
though the lines between tastes, beliefs and need are hard to draw. M.E. Yaari & M. BarHillel, On DividingJustly, 1 Soc. CHOICE WELFARE 1, 13-15 (1984).
190 See EDELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 186. The problem of preference is analogous to
the problem of class differences in the utilization of such public services as libraries. For
discussion of that problem, see LINEBERRY, supra note 9, at 120-22.
191
For analysis of the relationship between environmental concern and race, social
class, and neighborhood characteristics, see Frederick H. Buttel & William L. Flinn, Social Class and Mass EnvironmentalBeliefs: A Reconsideration, 10 ENV'T & BEHAV. 433 (1978);
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Additionally, low income and minority neighborhoods face pressing
problems that may leave residents less able to focus on the pollution
92
or other risks a LULU poses.'
Differences in preferences will not always favor the privileged,
however. When preferences are based upon assessments of risk,
people's preferences will depend upon such factors as the benefits
that they derive from the risk, their culture, and their family situation. 19 3 Neighborhoods in which many residents work in the industries that generate the need for a LULU tend to be more accepting
of those LULUs than other neighborhoods. 194 At least in those
cases in which preferences do not penalize the poor or minorities, it
is arguably unfair to ignore preferences that would result in a neighborhood receiving a LULU that it considers a benefit, or at worst a
mild nuisance, when other neighborhoods receive LULUs that they
consider a serious burden.
Finally, how should distributional goals be weighed against
other siting considerations? 195 For example, if two sites meet some
minimum threshold of safety, but the site that would result in a
greater dispersion of LULUs is the riskier choice, how should the
goals of safety and fairness be balanced? Or, to take a common
case, assume that two sites are otherwise identical, but the site that
Susan Caris Cutter, Community Concernfor Pollution: Social and EnvironmentalInfluences, 13
ENVT & BEHAV. 105 (1981); G.D. Lowe et al., Public Supportfor Environmental Protection:
New Evidencefrom NationalSurveys, 23 PAC. Soc. REV. 423 (1980); Paul Mohai, Public Concern and Elite Involvement in Environmental Conservation Issues, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 820 (1985);
D.E. Taylor, Blacks and the Environment: Toward an Explanationof the Concern andAction Gap
Between Blacks and Whites, 21 ENV'T & BEHAV. 175 (1989).
192 See John E. Seley & Julian Wolpert, Equity and Location, in Eq.urry ISSUES, supra
note 141, at 69, 76. At least for social service facilities, the single best predictor of
neighborhood opposition to a facility is the income of neighborhood residents. Dear,
supra note 3, at 293. Apparently, the more affluent are much more sensitive to the burdens of LULUs than the less affluent, but it is difficult to imagine how a distribution
scheme that responded to such "tastes" could be considered fair.
193 See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RiSK AND CULTURE 14 (1982); William Hallman & Abraham Wandersman, Perception of Risk and Toxic Hazards, in
PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF HAZARDOUS Toxic WASTE DISPOSAL ON COMMUNITIES 31
(Dennis L. Peck ed., 1989).
194 See Gerrard, supra note 168, at 146-48.
195 Among the considerations that might influence the siting choice are: the inherent physical characteristics of the site; the price of the land; the site's proximity to clients
or customers; the availability of necessary infrastructure and support services; the
number of people harmed or put at risk by the siting; the nature of the injuries, illnesses
and deaths that the site may impose; the site's potential impact on the market value and
income potential of property in the neighborhood; the site's potential effect on the community's economic structure; the costs the site will impose on those who the facility
displaces; the site's potential impact on the community's social structure and social and
cultural institutions; and the effect the site will have on the availability and quality of
governmental services such as transportation, sewage, sanitation, and water supply. For
a description of a variety of fairness concerns relating to these considerations, see Seley
& Wolpert, supra note 192, at 70-80.
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would result in greater dispersion of LULUs is twice the cost of the
other. In such a case, at what point, if any, should the goal of cost
minimization outweigh fairness issues?' 96 For some types of
LULUs, concentrating the facilities in one jurisdiction may be a
more efficient use of land and resources than spreading them evenly
throughout society. 19 7
These difficult problems of measurement and definition highlight an even more serious practical problem with the physical distribution of burden theory. In order to compare burdens, define
affected neighborhoods, measure need, or address any of the other
issues raised, society must be able to identify the winners and losers
of a particular siting decision, as well as to calculate their gains or
losses with some precision. Unfortunately, the techniques of
cost/benefit analysis have not achieved the requisite level of
sophistication. 198
Even if gains and losses could be calculated accurately, siting
processes incorporating such complex and contestable calculations
introduce significant opportunities for delay. For example,
although the task of correlating a neighborhood's need with its fair
share of the burden requires a single formula, the decision will involve many difficult judgments about how to measure and project
need. 199 When that calculation must be performed for each LULU
196 The cost versus equity tradeoff can'be severe, both because land may be cheaper
in poor and minority neighborhoods and because the government may own much of the
land in those neighborhoods through tax foreclosures. Indeed, one study of the choice
of sites and transportation networks for hazardous waste treatment facilities in the Albany, New York region revealed that the choice that minimized the cost of the siting
increased the inequity of the siting by 110%o. Inequity was measured by the siting's
ability to minimize the maximum risk any neighborhood faced. George List & Pitu Mirchandani, An IntegratedNetwork/PlanarMultiobjective Modelfor Routing and Sitingfor Hazardous Materials and Wastes, 25 TRANSP. SCI. 146, 153-54 (1992).
197 See, e.g., THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 164, at 173 (discussing
the advantages of large scale, centralized hazardous waste facilities over a more diffuse
siting of smaller facilities); Ronald Pushchak & Ian Burton, Risk and Prior Compensation in
Siting Low-Level Nuclear Waste Facilities: Dealing with the NIMBY Syndrome, 23 PLAN CANADA
68, 71 (1983) (same).
198 For discussions of the particular problems of measuring and comparing the costs
of siting decisions, see THE VALUATION OF SOCIAL COST 8-31 (D.W. Pearce ed., 1978);
Roger E. Kasperson & Barry L. Rubin, Siting a Radioactive Waste Repository: What Rolefor
Equity, in EQurry ISSUES, supra note 141, at 118, 120-22, 126-28; Robert W. Kates &
Bonnie Braine, Locus, Equity, and the West Valley Nuclear Wastes, in EqurrY ISSUES, supra
note 141, at 94; Douglas MacLean, Social Values and the Distribution of Risk, in VALUES AT
RISK, supra note 120, at 75, 77-88; Allen V. Kneese et al., Economic Issues in the Legacy
Problem, in EQUITY ISSUES, supra note 141, at 203, 203-05; Douglas MacLean, Radioactive
Wastes: A Problem of Morality Between Generations,in Equrrvy ISSUES, supra note 141, at 17583; Seley & Wolpert, supra note 192, at 76-84. See also infra note 215 (discussing the
special difficulties of cost assessment).
199 For an illustration of the difficulty of calculating a community's need for low and
moderate income housing, see LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 41-51.
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and every neighborhood, legal challenges could delay siting for
20 0
years.
While theoretically appealing in many ways, the equal physical
distribution of burdens theory does not offer a practical solution to
disproportionate siting. Although that does not necessarily disqualify the theory, it does illustrate the importance of determining exactly what fairness means to advocates of fair siting proposals. Only
by confronting the demands of the equal physical distribution of
burdens theory can society develop the tools and reach consensus
on the value judgments that the theory requires.
b. Compensation Schemes
Compensation schemes are academics' favorite solutions to siting problems. 20 ' Such proposals are rejected by many environmental justice advocates, however, on the ground that it is immoral to
"pay those who are less fortunate to accept risks that others can afford to escape." 20 2 In addition, compensation schemes pose a variety of practical problems.
i. Moral Objections
Although environmental justice advocates have not been specific about the grounds for their assertion that compensation
schemes are immoral, several arguments could be offered. One argument against compensation schemes would focus on the immorality of commodifying certain matters involving life, health and safety,
or human dignity. Just as society does not allow the poor to sell
their kidneys, or to sell themselves into slavery, society should not
200

For a description of the delays created by an analogously elaborate screening

process prescribed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10101-10336
(1988), see LUTHERJ. CARTER, NUCLEAR IMPERATIVES AND PUBLIC TRUST 401-16 (1987).
201 See, e.g., MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 67-87
(1983); Bacow & Milkey, supra note 5, at 279-305; Bernard Holznagel, Negotiation and
Mediation: The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. 329
(1986); Kasperson et. al., supra note 141, at 348-49; Paul R. Kleindorfer, Compensation
and Negotiation in the Siting of Hazardous-Waste Facilities, 51 Sm. TOTAL ENV'T 197 (1986);
Howard Kunreuther et al., A CompensationMechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities: Theory and
ExperimentalDesign, 14J. ENvTL ECON. & MGrgrr. 371 (1987); Mank, supra note 156, at 247;
O'Hare, supra note 92, at 428-30; Arthur M. Sullivan, Victim Compensation Revisited: Efficiency Versus Equity in the Siting of Noxious Facilities, 41 J. PUB. ECON. 211 (1990).
202 BULLARD, supra note 8, at 91. The current land market includes a form of compensated siting to the extent that the poor and minorities pay lower rent or housing
prices because of the disamenities LULUs impose upon the neighborhood. The compensation is the difference between rent or land values before and after the siting. It is
not clear that LULUs reduce property values, however. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
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allow people to sell their health or their right to equal respect and
20 3
concern.
An additional argument could assert that compensation
schemes take unfair advantage of the existing unequal distribution
of wealth. 20 4 If the poor have a right to proportional distribution of
the burdens of LULUs those burdens should not be allocated
through a market mechanism that allows existing inequalities of
wealth to determine which community receives a LULU. 20 5 To put
the argument somewhat differently, the morality of compensation
schemes depends in part upon whether the host community accepts
the compensation voluntarily. 20 6 When a community suffers severe
disadvantage from existing inequalities of wealth, the voluntariness
20 7
of its agreement to host the LULU is questionable.
Finally, compensation schemes might be challenged as taking
advantage of the inability of communities to assess accurately the
risks for which compensation is demanded. 20 8 Under general notions of compensatory justice, a neighborhood would be considered
fully compensated if it believes itself no worse off from the compensated siting than from no siting.20 9 That applies, however, only if
there is no significant reason to doubt the neighborhood's judgment. 21 0 One ground for concern is that information imperfections
often will prevent the neighborhood from accurately assessing the
losses it will suffer.2 11 In addition, a community may not consider
all the costs to future generations of its agreement to host a
LULU. 21 2
203 For general discussions of the inalienability theory, see Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293,
1389-90 (1984); Radin, supra note 171, at 1903-37; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability
and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1985). Society does allow people
to work in high-risk jobs, and allows the commodification of services such as surrogacy
that may compromise an individual's health or dignity. See KRISTEN S. SHRADER-FREcHETrE, RISK ANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFIC MErHOD, 100-19 (1985) (discussing the ethics of

allocating undesirable work through the market); Radin, supra note 171, at 1921-36 (discussing morality of surrogacy contracts). The anti-commodification argument against
compensation schemes would have to distinguish those situations.
204 This argument obviously sweeps quite broadly-the labor market might be immoral under similar reasoning. See SHRADER-FRECHE'rE, supra note 203, at 105, 108-11.
205 See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
206 See THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 164, at 188; Kornhauser &
Sager, supra note 143, at 508-09.
207 ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 136-37.
208 Id at 137-38; Gerrard, supra note 168, at 154.
209 ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 139.
210 See NozIcK, supra note 152, at 58-59.
211 See THE NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 164, at 179, 185. For an
analogous criticism of the theory of compensating wage differentials for hazardous work,
see SHRADER-FRECHE'rE, supra note 203, at 105-06.
212 See, e.g., ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 98; Sax, supra note 134, at 102-05. For discussions of how the rights of future generations might be considered in siting decisions,
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A full evaluation of these arguments is beyond the scope of this
article. Proponents of compensatory siting schemes must address
the issue, however, if compensation is to be considered more than
mere "bribery."
ii. Pragmatic Objections
Compensatory schemes face a variety of pragmatic hurdles.
The most important hurdle is the difficulty of translating the risks of
a LULU into monetary terms. As a first step, the proponents of the
facility, regulators, and those affected by the facility must reach
some consensus about the probability and expected consequences
2 13
of the hazards posed by the facility.
Such a consensus is unlikely for at least three reasons. First, the
regulatory systems for many noxious LULUs, such as hazardous and
radioactive waste facilities, are premised on the notion that current
technology can eliminate all but de minimis health risks.2 14 Given
that mindset, facility proponents and regulators are likely to believe
that a proposed LULU that meets regulatory standards imposes no
serious harms. Second, even if the proponents of the facility were to
concede that the facility imposes a significant risk, the science of risk
assessment cannot yet define the precise degree of risk posed by
many LULUs. 2 15 Third, even if a scientific assessment of risk were
possible, such assessments may vary significantly from the public's
see Guy KIRSCH, SOLIDARITY BETWEEN GENERATIONS: INTERGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE POLICY IN DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL-RESOURCE POLICY 381 (Allan Schnaiberg et al. eds., 1986);
Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAN. L. REV. 267, 289-300 (1993); Roger E. Kasperson, Social Issues in Radioactive Waste Management: The NationalExperience, in EourrY ISSUES,
supra note 141, at 24, 50-52; Kneese et al., supra note 198, at 203, 210-24; MacLean,
supra note 198, at 176-88.
213 See ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 94.
214 See Christopher J. Daggett et al., Advancing Environmental Protection Through Risk
Assessment, 14 COLUM.J. ENvTL. L. 308, 320 (1989).
215 John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in
Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALEJ. ON REG. 277, 282-87 (1992); ENGLISH, supra note 133, at
97-99. Some of the difficulties of assessing risk stem from several information gaps.
First, accurate information about the health effects of various hazardous substances is
not always available. John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 266, 277-94 (1991); Mary L.
Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication andLegitimacy: An Introduction to the Symposium,
14J. ENVT'L L. 289, 289 (1989) [hereinafter Lyndon, Risk]; Mary L. Lyndon, Information
Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV.,
1795, 1801-25 (1989). Second, information is sometimes lacking about the effectiveness
of various technologies in controlling leaks or other releases. Charles E. Davis &James
P. Lester, Hazardous Waste Politics and the Policy Process, in DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE POLITICS AND POLICY 18 (Charles E. Davis &James P. Lester eds., 1985). Additional difficulties stem from disagreements among scientists about how to evaluate and
extrapolate from data. Lyndon, Risk, supra, at 291.
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perceptions of the risk involved. 2 16 Accordingly, all of the parties
would have to agree upon the weight to be given to the public's
perceptions of risk.
Even if all affected could agree on the harms and risks that a
proposed LULU imposes, compensation schemes would require
those harms and risks to be quantified in monetary terms. Techniques for measuring the value (or more aptly, disutility) of the risks
and harms fall into two categories: indirect market approaches,
such as hedonic property value studies, and expressed preference or
contingent valuation techniques, such as surveys. 2 17 None of these
techniques is capable of assessing the full costs of environmental
threats. 2 18 This is especially true for LULUs involving hazardous
wastes and other environmental pollutants that may pose risks for
hundreds or thousands of years. 2 19
Negotiation-based assessments of costs also are inadequate, because a neighborhood's demands are likely to be different from the
actual costs incurred by the neighborhood. 220 A neighborhood
might demand too little if it had imperfect information about a site's
risks,221 or if its poverty or relative inexperience in negotiation
placed it in a disadvantageous bargaining position. 2 22 Conversely,
216 DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 193, at 14; SHRADER-FRECHE=rE, supra note
203, at 106; Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards TechnologicalRisks and Benefits, 9 POL'Y Sci. 127 (1978); Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1070-85 (1990).
217 For an overview of the methods used to value the costs of disamenities such as
pollution from a LULU, see Cropper & Oates, supra note 39, at 703-21.
218 For discussions of the problems with using indirect market methods to assess the
cost of environmental degradation, see Cropper & Oates, supra note 39, at 703-09, 71415, 718-20; Phil Graves, et al., The Robustness of Hedonic Price Estimation: UrbanAir Quality,
64 LAND ECON. 220 (1988); Hageman, supra note 111, at 797-98; Michaels & Smith, supra
note 109, at 234-36, 239; M.E. Paul, Can Aircraft Noise Nuisance Be Measured in Money?, 23
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 297 (1971); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Air Pollution and Property Value Debate, 57 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 100 (1975); Zeiss, supra note 97, at
252-55. For discussions of the limited utility of contingent valuation studies, see THE
NOT-IN-MY-BACKYARD SYNDROME, supra note 164, at 165-66; Cropper & Oates, supra note
39, at 710-11, 714-15, 717-19.
219 See Cropper & Oates, supra note 39, at 725-27; MacLean, supra note 198, at 18083.
220 For an interesting discussion of the use of contingent market mechanisms to
force communities to reveal their actual expected costs, see David Goetze, A Decentralized
Mechanism for Siting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities, 39 PUB. CHOICE 361 (1982).
221 For discussions of the information problems involved in asking residents to value
the risk of a site, see SHRADER-FREcHETrE, supra note 203, at 106; Fischoff, supra note
216. For empirical studies of the accuracy of consumers' evaluation of the risk of hazardous waste sites, see Kohlhase, supra note 109, at 19 (finding market unable to distinguish the severity of the risk posed by different sites on the EPA's national priorities
list).
222 For analysis of the difficulties neighborhoods have in negotiating against developers, see Goetze, supra note 220, at 369. For examples of neighborhoods that have
negotiated poor deals because they lacked bargaining skill or information, see Jeff Bai-
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neighborhoods might demand too much as a matter of strategic bargaining, or might reject the notion of compensation altogether because either they do not believe that the risks are compensable or
223
they oppose the project on principle.
An alternative method of assessing injury to a host neighborhood would base compensation on the amount that a wealthy neighborhood would pay to avoid having the LULU. 2 24 Unless the threat
of siting is credible, however, residents of the wealthy neighborhood
would strategically under-report their unwillingness to host the
LULU. 2 25
Compensation mechanisms also raise difficult questions about
who should receive compensation: residents, property owners, the
neighborhood itself, or some combination of the three. Residents
would claim that they bear the most immediate risk and injury.
Landlords, however, would assert that they absorb at least some, if
not all, of the tenants' damages through lower rents. Moreover, if
residents received compensation, the rights of future residents
would have to be considered because they undoubtedly would bear
part of the risks.226 For residents who benefit from the LULU (by
obtaining employment at the facility, for example) difficult questions will arise about whether those benefits sufficiently offset any
damages that those residents also incur. 2 27 Additionally, compensation paid to the neighborhood itself would raise questions about
how to define the affected neighborhood 2 28 and whether to spend
the money to mitigate the harms caused to individual residents. 2 29
ley, Some Big Waste Firns Pay Some Tiny Towns Little for Dump Sites, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
1991, at Al.
223 See PORTNEY, supra note 3, at 37-41; Kunreuther et al., supra note 201, at 373;
O'HARE ET AL., supra note 201, at 89-98.

224 The amount a community would pay to avoid a LULU assigned to it may be less
than the amount it would accept as compensation for hosting the LULU not assigned to
it, because of the offer/ask disparity: one generally wants more to compensate for a
reduction in an entitlement than one would pay for an increase in the entitlement.
225
Kunreuther et al., supra note 201, at 373. The problem of avoiding strategic
behavior by wealthy neighborhoods under this scheme is analogous to the problem of
forcing taxpayers to reveal their true preferences for public goods.
226
See Kneese, et al., supra note 198, at 203-204, 213-14.
227
Compensation accordingly raises the problems of how to account for need and
preferences that were discussed in connection with physical siting schemes. See supra
notes 179-82, 189-92 and accompanying text.
228 See Mank, supra note 156, at 284 (describing how states that have adopted compensated siting programs have attempted to address disputes about which communities
are entitled to participate in negotiations and receive part of the compensation).
229
The issue of how neighborhoods should use the compensation received is analogous to the question of how municipalities should spend exactions received from developers. Under Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), local
governments must tailor exactions to remedy the harm the development imposes on the
neighborhood. That requirement provides some protection to the individuals most affected by a development, but its primary purpose is to protect developers. Thus, it may
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Furthermore, negotiated compensation would raise problems
regarding the negotiation process. State or local officials or representatives of the neighborhood would probably conduct the negotiations. 2 30 While it may be practical to use such officials, they or
their predecessors may have been involved in the siting decisions
that led to the current disproportionate allocation of burdens. Understandably, neighborhoods may be reluctant to turn the negotiations over to such people. Or local officials simply may not be
representative of the public on the issues raised by the compensation proposal. 23 ' Similarly, individual residents may be wary of
neighborhood representatives. One solution might be to submit a
proposed compensation agreement to a referendum process. That
process would raise difficult questions about who could vote, and
what percentage of voters must ratify the agreement. 23 2 Alternatively, compensation could be determined through an administrative or judicial process, rather than through negotiation. But
problems of accountability, expertise, conflicts of interest, and spe23 3
cial interest influence are likely to vex any such process.
Another practical problem with compensation schemes is their
potential for inefficiency. 23 4 Assume, for example, that a particular
neighborhood is ideal for a toxic waste dump because of its superior
geological characteristics. Further assume that the dump will cause
$100,000 of damage to the immediate neighbor, 23 5 if that neighbor
continues to behave as usual. No damage will result, however, if the
neighbor takes simple precautionary measures costing $1000. Unless limited to $1000, compensation for damages would be socially
inefficient because it would give the neighbor no incentive to be the

not be the most appropriate way to protect the neighbors' interests. Been, supra note
93, at 504-06.
230
In Massachusetts, for example, communities proposed to host hazardous waste
facilities are required to form a negotiating committee consisting of the town's chief
executive officer, the chairpersons of the town's board of health, conservation commission and planning board, the chief of the fire department, and residents of the town.
Mass. Gen. Ann. ch. 21D, § 5 (1981 and Supp. 1993).
231
See ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 76, 138.
232
See ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 57, 74, 138-39; Gerrard, supra note 168, at 21718.
233
See Gillette & Krier, supra note 216, at 1042-99.
234
The specific forms compensation takes may make compensation socially inefficient as well. Risk substitution as compensation, for example, may devote resources to
clean-ups that are not the most socially desirable. Stephen T. Washburn & Robert H.
Harris, Necessary Evils, 8 IssuEs IN Sci. & TECH. 86, 87 (1991) (reviewing PORTNEY, supra
note 3).
235
Both fairness and efficiency concerns would raise questions about whether and
how to account for individual tastes or unusual sensitivities to a LULU's activities in
calculating damages. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
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least cost avoider. 23 6 Of course, the facility could attempt to negotiate some compensation short of the entire $100,000 to encourage
the neighbor to take the precaution, but that solution creates
holdout problems and other transactions costs.
Despite these shortcomings, compensated siting schemes avoid
several of the problems that plague physical distribution plans.
Compensation schemes that directly make reparations to harmed individuals allow a fair distribution of burden among individuals, not
just neighborhoods.2 37 They also avoid the need to determine
whether a neighborhood has suitable land for a facility. 23 8 Moreover, compensation schemes avoid the need to compare the bur23 9
dens that LULUs impose on different communities.
Compensation schemes spread the burden of LULUs without com2 40
promising the efficiency or safety of the siting.
Compensated siting schemes share some of the other problems
of physical distribution programs, however. They too rest on assessments of cost and risk that are inaccurate and incomplete at
best. 24 1 They too require difficult choices about how to define the
affected neighborhood 2 42 and how to account for neighborhood differences that might make equal compensation lead to unequal utility.2 43 Furthermore, they raise difficult questions about who should
determine or negotiate the level of compensation and how to make
2 44
those decision-makers accountable to the affected individuals.
More importantly, for many people, no amount of money can sufficiently compensate for certain risks and losses. 245 Where the losses
are compensable, compensated siting raises the specter of the
2 46
wealthy paying the poor and minorities to be their mercenaries.
To gain acceptance as a solution to the problem of disproportionate
siting, compensation schemes must overcome these serious
problems.
236
See WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS 96-104 (1986); R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1, 31-34 (1960); Cropper & Oates, supra note 39, at 680-81.
For a discussion of the potential inefficiency of analogous compensatory schemes for
governmental takings of private property, see Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 592-97 (1984);
Kaplow, supra note 158, at 536-50.
237 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.

243

See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
See ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 82; Gerrard, supra note 168, at 153. See also supra
note 203 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
244
245
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2. FairnessRequires Progressive Siting
One could argue that a fair distribution of LULUs would require advantaged neighborhoods to bear more of the burden that
LULUs impose than poor and minority neighborhoods. Such a distribution could involve either a physical siting scheme in which advantaged neighborhoods receive a disproportionately greater
number of LULUs or a compensated siting scheme in which advantaged neighborhoods pay a greater share of the cost of LULUs. 2 47 One rationale for such "progressive" siting would be
compensatory justice:2 48 advantaged neighborhoods should bear
more of the LULU burden in order to redress or remedy past discrimination against poor and minority neighborhoods.
Although the compensatory argument for progressive siting is
backward-looking, at least four forward-looking justifications exist.
First, progressive siting may be necessary to achieve equality of results, or equal impact of the burdens of LULUs. 24 9 Because residents of poor and minority neighborhoods suffer from numerous
disadvantages, such as poor health and barriers to mobility, 250 a
LULU in a disadvantaged neighborhood will have a greater impact
than one in a more advantaged community. Thus, to achieve the
same level of impact, advantaged communities must bear a greater
share of the burden of LULUs. The environmental justice move247
A progressive scheme requires the same measurements and comparisons that
pose problems for the equal division theory of fairness. See supra notes 165-200 and
accompanying text.
248
While the environmental justice movement calls for future siting decisions to
account for the existing distribution of LULUs, it usually does not frame that call as one
for compensatory justice. Indeed, some environmental justice advocates appear to have
eschewed such an approach. See, e.g., Ferris, supra note 138, at 28 ("The keystone of this
quest forjustice is equal protection, not equal pollution."); Terry Ow-Wing, Have Minorities Benefitted ... ? A Forum, 18 EPA J. 32, 35 (1992) ("Because the air we breathe is
shared equally by all, we must work together to cleanse our Earth for everyone and not
waste energy on past inequities."). But see Dorceta Taylor, The EnvironmentalJusticeMovement, 18 EPAJ. 23, 24 (1992) ("The movement seeks remedies for these past injustices
and seeks to promote fairness in future environmental actions."). Advocates use notions of compensatory justice and redress when calling for sites to be closed or cleaned
up. See generally GRJ, supra note 46, at 23 (because of the "inordinate concentration of
uncontrolled toxic waste sites in Black and Hispanic communities," the cleanup of those
sites "should be given the highest possible priority"); Ferris, supra, at 29 (EPA's compliance and enforcement activities "should target facilities and sites that foster the adverse
conditions occurring in minority communities").
249
One could also argue that a minority neighborhood's "need" to avoid the harmful effects of LULUs is greater than other neighborhoods. A need-based distribution
would therefore require placing more LULUs in non-minority neighborhoods. For discussion of a need-based system of distribution, see DEUTSCH, supra note 165, at 42-43.
250
For discussions of the health status of African Americans, see sources cited supra
note 176. See alsoJohn 0. Calmore, To Make Wrong Right: The Necessary and ProperAspirations of FairHousing in National Urban League, The State of Black America 1989, at 77, 88-100
(1989) (discussing the mobility barriers facing minorities).
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ment's focus on tailoring risk assessments and regulatory activities
to account for the special health risks faced by low income or minor25
ity communities reflects this argument. '
Second, if the marginal utility of environmental quality declines
as neighborhoods receive more environmental amenities, LULUs
would impose less disutility upon advantaged neighborhoods than
upon poor and minority neighborhoods. 2 52 Thus, progressive siting would induce equal sacrifice from all neighborhoods and impose
the least damage to society as a whole.2 53 Third, progressive siting
could maximize total utility if putting more LULUs in advantaged
neighborhoods encouraged society to reduce 2 54 the number of LU255
LUs it requires.
Fourth, John Rawls' difference principle 25 6 might justify progressive siting. Rawls' theory of justice does not directly apply to
siting controversies because it addresses the design of fair institutional structures, not the fairness of individual distributional
choices. 25 7 Nevertheless, on a micro-level the difference principle
requires the siting process to yield the greatest benefit, or the least
burden, to the least advantaged.2 58 A progressive siting scheme is
justified, in other words, if such siting would be more likely to im251
See, e.g., Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, The Michigan Conference: A Turning Point, 18
EPAJ. 9, 10 (1992) (Federal agencies should "ensur[e] that a racial and socioeconomic
dimension is overlaid on present and future geographic studies of environmental risk.");
Ferris, supra note 138, at 29 (arguing that current risk assessment practices ignore the
increased exposure and special vulnerabilities of minorities); see also WORKGROUP REPORT I, supra note 141, at 8-9 (environmental equity requires that enforcement actions
and compliance monitoring in minority and low-income communities reflect the degree
of risk in those communities).
252
See Gabriel & Wolch, supra note 62, at 346-48 (suggesting that social service facilities have a greater negative effect on nonwhite neighborhoods than on white
neighborhoods).
253 The "equal sacrifice" theory for progressive siting is analogous to a justification
for the progressive income tax: because of the declining marginal utility of income,
equal sacrifice in the payment of taxes requires the wealthy to pay more. Similarly, the
"least damage to society as a whole" argument is reminiscent of the "minimum sacrifice" justification for progressive taxation: because of the declining marginal utility of
money, progressive taxation minimizes the sacrifice required of all. For the classic exposition and critique of these arguments for progressive taxation, see Walter J. Blum &
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Casefor ProgressiveTaxation, 19 U. GHI. L. REv. 417, 455-79
(1952).
254 This argument assumes that the reduction in the number of LULUs resulting
from progressive siting is efficient.
255 This argument is the converse of the proposition that wealth inequalities provide
incentives for productivity, innovation, and risk-taking, which then lead to a bigger pie
for society as a whole. For a discussion of that argument, see RESCHER, supra note 136,
at 102-04.

256
257

RAWLS, supra note 133, at 75-83.
Id. at 54-60, 64, 108-17. See also THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 109 (1979).

258 See RAWLS, supra note 133, at 60-62, 75-80. The difference principle derives from
the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty. Id. at 152-55.
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prove the condition of the poorest members of society than one that
either distributed the burden of LULUs equally or imposed the bur2 59
den disproportionately upon the poor and minorities.
All four of these justifications for progressive siting are problematic. The compensatory justice rationale for progressive siting
requires evidence that sites were placed in particular neighborhoods
because of the poverty or race of their residents. As discussed in
Part II, however, most of the research fails to examine the socioeconomic characteristics of host communities at the time the LULUs
were sited, and therefore proves nothing about the intent or initial
2 60
impact of the siting decisions.
If future research proves that siting decisions were based on
discriminatory intent or had disparate initial impact, some form of
remedy for the past discrimination would be warranted. 2 6 1 The
question would be whether a progressive siting scheme is an appropriate remedy. Many of the moral arguments for and against "affirmative action" in the context of employment or education would
apply. 2 62 Additionally, a remedial siting program might perpetuate
the legacy of the previous unfair siting by making it more difficult to
site future LULUs, and thereby creating additional pressure for existing LULUs to continue or even expand their operations.
The equality-of-results argument is analogous to debates about
educational financing, and many of the critiques of the argument in
that context apply here as well. 263 Additionally, this line of argument avoids the central question of whether society should use its
resources to address directly differences among communities in
health, mobility, and other quality of life measures, rather than imposing the indirect remedy of a progressive siting scheme.
The argument that progressive siting is appropriate because of
the declining marginal utility of environmental amenities lacks a fac259
For an illustrative application of these principles to siting, see R. L. Hodgart,
OptimizingAccess to Public Services: A Review of Problems, Models and Methods of Locating Central Facilities,2 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 17, 27 (1978); List & Mirchandani, supra
note 196.
260
See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
261
The right to be free of discrimination based on wealth now has no constitutional
basis. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This discussion
therefore pertains only to progressive siting schemes offered to remedy past racial
discrimination.
262
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); EQUALrrY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977);
KENT GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (1983); REVERSE DisCRIMINATION (Barry R. Gross ed., 1977); MICHAEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
JUSTICE (1991); Ellen Frankel Paul, Set-Asides, Reparations, and CompensatoryJustice, in COMPENSATORYJUSTICE 97 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991).
263
See LINEBERRY, supra note 9, at 31-33; Coleman, supra note 178.
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tual basis. Indeed, the opposite relationship may exist. After a
neighborhood becomes host to one or more LULUs, the marginal
impact of an additional LULU may be far less than the impact that
the first LULU imposes upon any neighborhood. 2 64 Thus, further
research is necessary to clarify the nature of the utility function.
Similarly, the incentive effects of imposing additional LULUs
upon wealthier neighborhoods require further study.265 A progressive siting plan based on the incentives argument also would require
further thinking about how to prevent the wealthy from escaping the
siting of a LULU. Unless Congress prohibited the shipment of the
nation's waste to other countries, for example, the problem of unfair siting would simply shift from neighborhoods in the United
States to poor nations. 2 66 Some escape routes cannot be closed easily, however. Within the United States, the wealthy could move to
those states or towns that do not impose progressive physical siting
schemes, or that impose the least progressive taxes. 2 67 Even if Congress imposed a national progressive siting program, the wealthy
could still escape progressive physical siting schemes by moving as
far away from the LULUs as possible. 2 68 Indeed, areas physically
unsuitable for various LULUs might become enclaves for the
2 69
wealthy.
Seley & Wolpert, supra note 192, at 85.
Rather than providing an incentive for the wealthy to find better answers to
problems such as waste disposal, progressive siting schemes might provide disincentives
for productivity. Just as a military draft based on high income levels would seriously
erode incentives for productivity (or for honest disclosure of income), a siting plan that
tied income to the distribution of LULUs could reduce productivity.
266
For discussions of the practice of dumping wastes in poor countries, see, e.g.,
264
265

ELLI LouKA, THE TRANSNATIONAL

MANAGEMENT

OF HAZARDOUS

AND RADIOACTIVE

WASTES 1-6 (Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law
School Occasional Paper No. 1, 1992); THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WASTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY (Jim Vallette ed., 1990); Denis Smith & Andrew Blowers, Here Today,
There Tomorrow: The Politics of Hazardous Waste Transport and Disposal,in WASTE LOCATION:
SPATIAL ASPECTS OF WASTE MANAGEMENT, HAZARDS AND DISPOSAL 208, 212-13, 215-24
(Michael Clark et al. eds., 1992); Cole, supra note 7, at 645 & n.89; Teresa A. Wallbaum,

Note, America's Lethal Export: The Growing Trade in Hazardous Waste, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
889, 891-95.
267 For discussions of how redistributive tax policies may cause the wealthy to flee a
jurisdiction, see DAVID N. KING, FISCAL TIERS: THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-LEVEL GovERNMENT 32-37 (1984); GARYJ. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 163-89, 196-202 (1981); EDWIN S. MILLS & BRUCE W. HAMILTON,
URBAN ECONOMICS 313-22 (4th ed. 1989); David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, Suburban Exploitation of Central Cities and Governmental Structure, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH
PUBLIC CHOICE 43, 51-60, 65-71, 84-86 (Harold M. Hochman & George E. Peterson
eds., 1974).
268 Of course, fleeing a jurisdiction or moving away from a LULU imposes costs;

therefore, the wealthy may have an incentive to develop alternative solutions to siting
problems that are cheaper than moving.
269 Some LULUs, such as group homes, do not require particular geological or geographic characteristics, so the wealthy might be unable to escape an obligation to host
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In addition to their questionable factual bases, both the marginal utility and incentive arguments are basically utilitarian arguments, and must respond to the well-rehearsed criticisms of
utilitarianism. 2 70 Fundamental difficulties with Rawls' difference
principle also have been stated eloquently elsewhere. 2 7 1 In the specific context of progressive siting, the principle is especially problematic. At first glance, progressive siting seems more
advantageous to poor and minority neighborhoods than other siting
schemes. Under a progressive scheme, those neighborhoods would
continue to enjoy the benefits of LULUs, but bear less of the burdens. 272 That analysis depends, however, upon whether a progressive scheme would site the same number of necessary LULUs as
other siting schemes. 273 If a progressive or equal distribution
scheme results in fewer sitings of necessary LULUs, 2 74 the poor and
those LULUs. But many of the least desirable LULUs, such as waste dumps, could be
avoided by buying land deemed geographically unsuitable for such uses.
270 For general critiques of utilitarianism, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RiGrs SERIOUSLY 234-37, 269, 274-77 (1977) [hereinafter DWORIN, TRS]; NozICK,
supra note 152, at 32-33; RAWLS, supra note 133, at 22-33, 90-92, 180-83, 187-88;J.J.C.
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 77-150 (1973). For
discussions of utilitarianism in the context of environmental decisions, see ENGLISH,
supra note 133, at 150-51; PETER S. WENZ, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 181-209 (1988).
271 For general critiques of Rawls' theory, see, e.g., READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OFJUSTICE (Norman Daniels ed., 1975); Symposium: A Theory of
Justice, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 588-674 (1975). Writings about Rawls, which number in
the hundreds, are usefully catalogued in J.H. WELLBANK ET AL., JOHN RAWLS AND His
CRrIcS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1982). For discussion of Rawls' theory in the
context of environmental decisions, see ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 150-51; WENZ, supra
note 270, at 245-53.
272
This assumes that all neighborhoods define well-being in the same way, which
may not be accurate. Kleindorfer, supra note 201, at 203. It also assumes that the residents of poor or minority neighborhoods belong to the "worst off" group. That assumption is probably wrong. Those adversely affected by the siting of LULUs at least
have homes; the worst off are likely to be homeless. If an equal distribution scheme
makes it more difficult to site those social service LULUs that benefit the poorest, such a
scheme may disadvantage the worst off. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?
Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 339-42 (1981) (discussing the
difference principle's insensitivity to such problems).
273 Rawls' theory of justice has been criticized as too indefinite to yield useful insights about specific social programs precisely because it requires empirical evidence
about the disincentive effects of egalitarian policies. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 118-19 (1979).
274
The number of LULUs sited could decrease under a progressive or equal distribution scheme for several reasons. Wealthier voters could refuse to fund the agencies
that site social services LULUs or demand that the services be restructured to decrease
the need for sites within the jurisdiction, by favoring institutionalization over small
group homes for the mentally retarded, for example. This scenario seems to have occurred in New York City after the city adopted "fair share criteria" to try to distribute
LULUs more fairly. Mayor Dinkins proposed to replace large homeless shelters with 24
smaller service-intensive facilities spread throughout the city in accord with the criteria.
The outcry of the targeted neighborhoods was extremely negative. Joseph B. Rose, A
Critical Assessment of New York City's Fair Share Criteria, 59 AM. PLAN. AsS'N J. 97, 98-99
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minorities in fact may be worse off than they would be under a disproportionate siting scheme. 2 75 For example, social service LULUs
serve large numbers of the poor, and fewer sitings of such services
may disadvantage those clients. Additionally, if sitings become
more difficult, LULUs presently sited in poor and minority neighborhoods might have to expand their operations, further disadvantaging those neighborhoods. Moreover, if progressive siting
encourages wealthier residents to move from the jurisdiction, then a
jurisdiction's tax base and political influence may decline, again to
2 76
the disadvantage of the poor and minorities.
In sum, arguments for progressive siting face philosophical objections that scholars have raised in other contexts. Applied specifically to siting questions, the compensatory justice, marginal utility
and incentive arguments all rest upon unproven factual premises.
Moreover, neither the compensatory justice nor the difference principle argument refutes the possibility that progressive siting might
harm the interests of the poor and minorities by making it more
difficult to site necessary LULUs.
3.

FairnessRequires an Equal Initial Split and Competitive Bidding

A much different conception of fairness can be drawn from
Ronald Dworkin's work on the meaning of equality. 277 In exploring
the ideal of equality of resources, Dworkin asks how resources
should be distributed among shipwreck survivors washed up on a
desert island. 2 78 Dworkin's thought experiment is far removed from
the problems of siting LULUs, but his analysis helps illuminate the
notions of fairness inherent in several recent proposals that LULUs
be "auctioned" among communities. 2 79 Dworkin posits that equal(1993). The Mayor quickly backed down by appointing a panel to assess the city's homeless policy. That panel recommended that the city stop providing homeless shelters
altogether, and instead leave the task to private non-profit agencies, in part because
those agencies would have more freedom than the city in siting their services. COMMIsSION ON THE HOMELESS, THE WAY HOME: A NEW DIRECTION IN SOCIAL POLICY 106-09

(1992).
275 A progressive siting scheme might lead residents of the targeted suburbs and
other communities to move back to the city. That might make housing in the suburbs
more affordable and available to minorities and the lower middle class. Alternatively,
the housing might not "trickle down," and the urban gentrification would then further
disadvantage the poor and minorities.
276 See sources cited supra note 267.
277 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
185 (1981) [hereinafter Equality of Welfare]; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2:
Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) [hereinafter Equality of Resources];
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IowA L. REV. 1 (1987);
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1987).
278 Equality of Resources, supra note 277, at 285-90.
279 See Herbert Inhaber, A Market-Based Solution to the Problem of Nuclear and Toxic Waste
Disposal, 41J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. Ass'N 808 (1991); O'Hare, supra note 92, at 438-39.
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ity of resources would result if each shipwreck survivor were assigned initially an equal share of clamshells that she could use to bid
competitively for resources. 28 0 He argues that a distribution is fair if
no individual prefers the distribution that some other individual obtains. Competitive bidding among those with initially equal bidding
28
currency will produce such a distribution. '
Applied to the siting context, Dworkin's scheme requires that
communities be given an equal number of bargaining chips with
which to bid against LULUs. Society would decide which LULUs it
would need for some period of time and put them on the auction
block. Each community would then receive chips to buy its way out
28 2
of particular LULUs-essentially a currency of vetos.
For example, suppose there are five communities of equal population and land area and there are fifteen LULUs, ranging from a
home for juvenile delinquents to a low-level radioactive waste
dump. Each community would be allocated ten veto chips. 28 3 The
auctioneer would begin by announcing that a particular LULU
would be randomly distributed among the communities, but the
highest bidder could remove itself from the eligible pool. If community A bids two chips to avoid it, B bids three, and C bids four, C
"wins" the veto, paying four of its chips to disqualify itself from the
selection process. Communities A, B, D, and E are still eligible, unless one wants to bid again. Suppose that A and E each again bid
two, and B bids three; B is then eliminated, and so on, until none of
the eligible communities wishes to veto the LULU. It is then randomly distributed among them. The process repeats for the next
LULU. Once a community spends its ten veto chips, it is eligible for
all remaining LULUs. The auction ends once all LULUs have been
distributed.
280

Equality of Resources, supra note 277, at 283-90. For similar conceptions of fair-

ness, see BAUMOL, supra note 236, at 15-50; Duncan Foley, Resource Allocation and the Public Sector, 7 YALE EcON. ESSAYS 45, 73 (1967); Hal Varian, DistributiveJustice, Welfare
Economics, and the Theory of Fairness,4 PHIL. & PUB. ArF. 223, 240-47 (1975); Yaari & Bar-

Hillel, supra note 189, at 4.
281

Equality of Resources, supra note 277, at 286-87.

282 Rather than distributing equal shares of currency with which to bid against LULUs, a siting mechanism could allow communities to bargain over the LULUs they
would have to take, with the threat of equal assignment if no agreement results. Assume, for example, that society must provide shelter for 150 homeless individuals and
detoxification services for 150 drug addicts, and that society generally values the burden
of each service equally. Under this scheme, communities A and B would bargain over
how to allocate the burden, both knowing that if they do not reach an agreement, they
each must host 75 beds for the homeless and 75 for drug addicts. If community A be-

lieves that the homeless shelter would impose less of a burden on its residents, it might
offer to host the homeless shelter, in exchange for community B hosting the drug treatment center.

283 Each community's share of currency could be based upon the community's population, land area, or some other measure. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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If communities change their minds about the LULUs they prefer, they may trade their LULUs with other willing communities.
Suppose that through the auction community A receives a large oil
refinery and a prison, while community B receives a low-level radioactive waste storage facility. If community B believes that its geographical characteristics and the qualifications of its work force
would enable it to host the oil refinery and prison more efficiently
than the radioactive waste facility, community B could seek to trade
with community A.
Under this conception of fairness, an auction for LULUs involves an equitable distribution of veto power. Proposals to hold
reverse auctions, in which the siting agency or developer offers to
pay a specific sum of money to the first community that agrees to
accept the LULU, then increases the amount until some community
steps forward with an acceptable site, 28 4 are not fair under this conception because they take advantage of any inequalities of wealth
2 s5
that existed prior to the auction.
This Dworkinian conception of fairness relies upon the bidding
process to reveal communities' individual preferences regarding
LULUs. In contrast, proposals like Professor Popper's would assign points to different types of LULUs, allocate the total points
among communities, then allow trading among the communities to
determine the various packages of LULUs that would satisfy the
communities' responsibilities. 28 6 Such proposals avoid the costs of
an auction. By relying on a point system to establish the relative
desirability of different kinds of LULUs, however, these proposals
raise all of the difficulties of comparing burdens that plague the
physical distribution schemes outlined previously. 28 7
The veto by auction theory obviates the need to compare LULUs, but nevertheless suffers from some problems of definition and
measurement, because it requires society to allocate the LULU veto
power equitably. That allocation involves definitions of neighborhood. 2 8 It also requires decisions about whether a neighborhood
that is more responsible for generating a need for the LULU should
receive less veto power than other neighborhoods. 28 9 Similarly, it
requires decisions about whether communities without land suitable
284
285

See Inhaber, supra note 279, at 812.
Similarly, Michael O'Hare's early proposal to have communities bid the mini-

mum amount they would accept as compensation for a LULU would favor richer com-

munities, whose advantages could enable them to demand more than poorer
communities and avoid LULUs altogether. O'Hare, supra note 92, at 438-39.

286
287
288
289

Popper's proposal is described in Marshall, supra note 6, at 316-17.
See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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for a particular LULU should have to use their veto chips to be ex2 90
cluded from eligibility for the LULU.
The auction model also requires projections about the number
and types of LULUs needed in the future. Such projections are difficult to make and prone to error.2 9 1 That potential for error may
undermine the fairness of the auction. Unless auction prices factor
in the potential for error, those neighborhoods that "buy" LULUs
that never materialize will receive a windfall compared to those that
"buy" LULUs that do materialize. Indeed, communities will probably lobby the relevant authorities to cancel the projects they received in the auction. Additionally, the fairness of a LULU auction
would depend upon whether communities had equal knowledge
about the risks and harms the LULUs would impose, and had equal
bargaining power in the post-auction trading. Even if one could
solve those problems, the auction mechanism might remain impractical because of the time, information, and expense needed to con2 92
duct the auction.
The idea of a LULU auction and market is appealing because it
recognizes that communities, like people, have differing tastes, abilities, and characteristics, and that those differences may make a
LULU that is repugnant to one community much less bothersome to
another. To be operational, however, the idea requires enormous
advances in society's ability to predict needs, to both measure and
communicate about risk, and to design a cost-effective auctioning
mechanism.
B.

Fairness As Cost-Internalization

Many environmental justice advocates argue that fairness requires those who benefit from LULUs to bear the cost of the LULUs. 2 93 Forcing the internalization of costs leads to greater fairness
in two ways. First, it is fairer to hold individuals responsible for
their actions than to let costs fall on innocent bystanders. Second,
forcing the internalization of costs results in greater efficiency, and
greater efficiency is likely to mean fewer LULUs. Purchasers of
products that generate waste will reduce consumption once the
See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the difficulty of projecting the need for low and moderate
income housing, see LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 48-51.
292
Stephen K. Swallow et al., Siting Noxious Facilities: An Approach that Integrates Technical, Economic, and PoliticalConsiderations, 68 LAND ECON. 283, 285 (1992).
293
See, e.g., John H. Adams, The Mainstream Environmental Movement, 18 EPA J. 25
(1992) (disproportionate impact results because costs of consumption and pollution are
borne by minorities and the poor rather than internalized by polluters and society as a
whole).
290
291
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prices of the products reflect the true cost of waste facilities.2 9 4 In
turn, producers will develop more efficient means of production,
given the cost of disposing the waste generated.2 95 The number of
LULUs will thereby decrease to the socially optimal level-the level
at which the marginal utility of the product necessitating the LULU
2 96
equals its costs.
Such a "user pays" approach is not always possible because it
requires a precise matching of benefit and burden. Additionally,
some LULUs, such as homeless shelters, result more directly from
political decisions about how to allocate society's resources than
from personal consumption choices. In those circumstances, fairness as cost-internalization requires that the burdens be spread
throughout society, so that all are forced to confront the costs of
society's choices 297 and to make better decisions. 2 98 One member
of a commission that struggled to ensure fair siting in New York
City, for example, expressed the hope that siting homeless shelters
in areas of the city that had none might make residents of those
294 Some environmentalists hope that forcing consumers to bear the full cost of
products will eliminate some LULUs. As one advocate stated: "People think we're
NIMBYs (Not in My Backyard). But we're not. We're NOPEs (Not on Planet Earth)."
William K. Reilly, The Green Thumb of Capitalism, 54 POL'y REv. 16 (1990).
295 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Remedies for EnvironmentalRacism: A View from the Field, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1996 (1992) (opposition to proposed sitings has "forced industry to
move from a pollution control to a pollution prevention mode of operation."); Nicholas
Freudenberg & Carol Steinsapir, Not in Our Backyards: The Grassroots EnvironmentalMovement, in AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 27, 34 (Riley E. Dunlap & Angela G. Mertig eds.,
1992) (opposition to LULUs has created new political and economic pressures for pollution prevention); Marshall, supra note 6, at 318 (quoting Professor Albert Matheny as
saying that opposition to proposed hazardous waste sites will pressure industry to "cure
the cause instead of the symptoms"). Robert W. Lake suggests another way of looking
at the effects of spreading the burden of LULUs more broadly: siting LULUs "constitutes a locational solution to an industrial production problem ([such as] hazardous
waste generation) ... that concentrates costs on host communities, as compared to the
alternative strategy of restructuring production so as to produce less waste, which concentrates costs on capital." Lake, supra note 1, at 5.
296 For discussion of the efficiency of forcing the internalization of the costs of LULUs, see Bingham & Miller, supra note 5, at 479.
297
Robert W. Lake suggests that opposition to facilities such as homeless shelters
serves a useful function for the government: it is "politically easier to castigate community opposition" than to "re-examine a political economy that perpetuates poverty so
that we have to create places for poor people to live." Lake, supra note 1, at 90. Under
Lake's formulation, forcing all communities to bear their share of the burden of LULUs
would deprive the government of the opportunity to blame NIMBYism for the failure of
its policies. Lake asserts this would increase the pressure on the government to develop
structural solutions to homelessness and poverty. Id. at 91.
298 The argument is similar to one made about the advantages of a draft over a
volunteer military: drafting from the middle and upper classes gives those classes a
significant stake in government decisions about whether and how a war is waged, and
thus ensures that they will seek to constrain the use of military force. See FALLOWS, supra
note 146, at 136-37; Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1494 (1969); Bradley, supra note 146, at 133-34.
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communities more willing to support social
programs addressing
2 99
the underlying causes of homelessness.
The cost-internalization conception of fairness requires that
those who consume a product or make an allocation decision bear
the product's or decision's full costs.3 0 0 To attain that goal, the
manufacturer whose product generates the need for a LULU could
compensate the host neighborhood for the full damages that the
LULU inflicts, and then pass that cost forward to the consumers of
the product.3 0 1 However, those who advocate cost-internalization
as a means of combatting disproportionate siting generally oppose
compensatory schemes.3 0 2 Instead, they either support programs to
physically distribute LULUs more evenly across all neighborhoods
or favor blocking all LULUs to encourage pollution prevention that
30 3
would make LULUs unnecessary.
A physical distribution scheme would be less effective than
compensation, however, at forcing the full internalization of the
product's costs.3 0 4 It would be nonsensical to distribute one LULU
to each consumer; therefore, a physical distribution of sites would
always allow most consumers to avoid the full costs of their consumption decisions.3 0 5 Additionally, a physical distribution scheme
would usually be both overinclusive and underinclusive: some residents of the host neighborhood might never consume the product

299
F.A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Address at the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York's Panel on New York City's Fair Share Criteria, April 15, 1992. Mr. Schwartz
served on the Charter Revision Commission that drafted the provisions of the current
New York City charter requiring city facilities to be sited in accord with "fair share criteria." For further description of the charter and the fair share criteria, see infra notes
412-26 and accompanying text.
300
The "cost-internalization" conception of fairness requires only that the producers and consumers of the product take into account all the costs of its production and
disposal. A further theory is required to explain why those costs, or damages, should be
paid to the victims of the siting. Generally, damages are paid to the victims of a harm,
rather than to the general treasury. This is done to prevent victims from acting inefficiently, by taking too many precautions against the damage, for example. Here, that
rationale would certainly justify payment of damages directly to the victims of a siting.
301 The payment to the affected community would serve to internalize costs in the
same way that nuisance damages or land use exactions force consumers to bear the full
cost of a land use. See Been, supra note 93, at 482-83 & n.53.
302
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
303
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 7, at 644-45.
304
If compensation is considered immoral, it would not matter whether it effectively
forces cost internalization. See supra note 202-12 and accompanying text.
305
Similarly, a lottery system in which all consumers of a product stood an equal
chance of being selected to live near the waste facility would fail to force consumers to
bear the full costs of their consumption decisions. The cost that the lottery would impose on each consumer would be the expected loss discounted by the probability of
"winning" the lottery.
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in question, yet bear its burdens, while heavy users of the product
30 6
outside the host neighborhood would bear no burden at all.

Compensation schemes may be the most effective means of
forcing cost internalization, 30 7 but compensation would still pose
many of the problems noted in connection with the theory of compensation as equal division of burden. For example, some of the
moral arguments against compensation remain. 30 8 Even if all costs
are perfectly internalized, asking some, but not others, to be a
LULU's victims (albeit compensated ones) may be wrong. In that
sense, the cost-internalization theory is too narrow in its focus. Fairness usually is thought to mean something more than, or perhaps
even something inconsistent with, efficiency.3 09 Accordingly, costinternalization may be a necessary condition for fairness, but it is
insufficient to fully explain our uneasiness about disproportionate
siting patterns.
The practical problems of calculating the full costs of a LULU
3 10
and determining who should receive compensation also remain.
The problem of ensuring that all costs are accounted for is especially troubling. Compensation set at a negotiated level, for example, would undermine the goal of full internalization unless
negotiations were carefully structured to ensure that the community
did not settle for insufficient compensation.3 1 1 The community
might undervalue the cost of illnesses or injuries caused by the facility, for example, if current residents believed that such incidents
would be covered by Medicare, employer's insurance policies, or
Social Security disability benefits. Also, the community might undervalue the cost of a particular risk because it has less information
about the risk than the site developer, or is less able to translate risk
into dollar terms. Furthermore, the process by which the community negotiates a compensation package may undervalue the inter306 The overinclusiveness of a physical distribution scheme would be particularly
problematic if the immediate neighbors of the LULU, who would suffer the greatest
harm from the siting, were not consumers of the product. See supra notes 158-160 and
accompanying text.
307
Some of the harms imposed by a LULU, such as the risk of death or injury, are
difficult to translate into monetary terms, and therefore difficult to charge for in a compensation scheme. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. This problem also
may plague physical distribution schemes, however, if those schemes require that disparate measures of burden, such as health risk and property damage, be reduced to a
common metric such as dollar value. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
308
See supra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
309 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value, 9J. LEGAL SruD. 191 (1980).
310 See supra notes 213-29 and accompanying text.
311 A community might demand more than its actual damages, but that would not
interfere with the internalization function of compensation. Of course, if all communities demanded too much for the facility, thereby blocking its siting, the compensation
scheme would fall apart.
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ests of a particular subgroup within the community.3 1 2 Protecting
3 13
against such bargaining failures would be costly and difficult.
Similarly, the mechanism for assessing the compensation level
would have to ensure that compensation did not encourage inefficient behavior, for example, by making it unnecessary for victims to
31 4
take inexpensive cost avoidance measures.
Finally, proponents of the internalization theory must confront
the possibility that the resulting siting patterns may harm the nonenvironmental interests of poor and minority neighborhoods.
Some people may lose jobs if the efficient level of production of a
particular product is lower than the current level.3 15 If the siting
program is not instituted uniformly in all relevant jurisdictions,
those industries within the jurisdiction adopting the program may
suffer from a competitive disadvantage.3 16 Similarly, if industries
may escape the internalization mechanism of the siting program by
going elsewhere, the jurisdiction may lose jobs and other benefits
afforded by the industry.3 17 The price of goods or services may rise
significantly as a result of the internalization program, and that price
increase may fall heavily upon the poor, depending upon consumption patterns.3 1 8
Thus, the internalization theory fails to capture much of the
sense of unfairness felt by a community selected as the host for a
312
See, e.g., Vicki Been, Neighbors Without Recourse: Inconsistencies in the Political Theory of Compensated Siting (unpublished manuscript on file with author, 1993);
Gerrard, supra note 168, at 217-18.
313
Been, supra note 312. For situations in which communities settled nuisance disputes with polluters in a manner unlikely to have forced internalization of the full costs
of pollution, see, e.g., BULLARD, supra note 8, at 65-69.
314
See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
315
See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 250-52. Of course the jobs lost in the
siting industry may be made up in other industries that respond to demand for substitute products or that produce pollution control technology. Id. at 251.
316 BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 251.
317 Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1212 (1977). For a
critical appraisal of Professor Stewart's theory, see Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationalefor FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992).
318 BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 95, at 252-53. For examples of environmental controls whose costs are regressive because of the consumption patterns or living situations
of the poor, see DAVID HARRISON, JR., WHO PAYS FOR CLEAN AIR 81-83 (1975); Nancy S.
Dorfman & Arthur Snow, Who Will Pay for Pollution Control?-The Distribution by Income of
the Burden of the NationalEnvironmentalProtection Program, 1972-1980, 28 NAT'L TAXJ. 101
(1975); Robert Dorfman, Incidence of the Benefits and Costs of Environmental Programs,67 AM.
EcoN. ASS'N PAP. & PROC. 333, 334 (1977); A. Myrick Freeman III, The Incidence of the Cost
of ControllingAutomotive Air Pollution, in THE DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 163
(F.T. Juster ed., 1977); Leonard P. Gianessi & Henry M. Peskin, The Distribution of the
Costs of Federal Water Pollution Control Policy, 56 LAND ECON. 85, 95 (1980); Henry M. Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distributionof Benefits and Costs, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 144, 159 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1978).
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LULU. Even if the costs of the LULU were perfectly internalized by
those benefitted by the LULU and the host community were fully
compensated for its injuries, the community could still legitimately
ask why it was forced to serve as society's sacrifice zone. As a component of a theory of fairness, however, the notion that those who
consume a product or make a decision about the distribution of society's resources should be forced to bear the entire cost of their
choices has obvious attraction. Nevertheless, like several of the
other theories discussed, the internalization theory requires significant advances in society's ability to determine the true cost of
319

LULUs.

C.

Fairness as Process

Rather than focusing on the distribution of burdens to determine whether the siting process is equitable, the fairness as process
theory focuses on the procedures by which the burden is distributed. The most obvious theory of fairness as process would assert
that a distribution is fair as long as it results from a process that was
3 20
agreed upon in advance by all those potentially affected.
8
2
1
Although there are examples of interstate siting compacts
and re3
2
2
gional intrastate siting agreements,
in which all participants voluntarily agree to a particular siting process, most LULUs are sited in
communities that had no opportunity to remove themselves from
the selection process. Therefore, this Section focuses on theories of
fairness as process that do not rest upon voluntary agreement for
their legitimacy.
1. FairnessRequires A Lack of IntentionalDiscrimination
A siting decision motivated by hostility toward people of a particular race is unfair under almost any theory of justice, and would
not be considered fair under the Constitution.3 23 Under the intentional discrimination theory, fairness requires that a decision to site
See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text.
See ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 130-31, 134-37.
321
See, e.g., id. at 117-25 (describing the Southeast Compact's efforts to chose a state
to host a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility).
322 See, e.g., Morell, Siting and the Politics of Equity, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 117, 129-33 (discussing the activities of the regional Southern
California Hazardous Waste Management Project).
323
This analysis ignores discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, national
319

320

origin, age, or sexual preference because claims of discriminatory siting focus primarily
on the race and class of the neighborhoods chosen for LULUs. See, e.g., the studies
discussed supra notes 39-67 and accompanying text. See also E.P.A. WORKGROUP REPORT
I, supra note 141, at 2 ("while there are many types of equity.., this report [on environmental equity] focuses on racial minority and low-income populations.").
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a LULU be made without any intent to disadvantage people of
3 24

color.

The first problem with an intentional discrimination theory is
the difficulty of proving intent. Many in the environmental justice
movement charge that developers and siting officials "deliberate[ly]
target[] people of color communities for toxic waste facilities. ' 325
Siting opponents have yet to prove that charge to the satisfaction of
a court.3 26 Their efforts have been stymied, in part, by the general
difficulty of proving the intent of a legislative or administrative
body.3 2 7 That difficulty is compounded in the siting context because siting choices tend to involve a series of decisions by a variety
3 28
of multi-member entities.
But the failure of proof also stems from specific gaps in the disproportionate impact evidence that environmental justice advocates
have used to support the claim of intentional discrimination. As dis324
Disparate impact is not presented here as an independent theory of fairness. To
the extent that disparate impact allows an inference that the siting decisionmaker acted
with discriminatory purpose, the disparate impact theory is simply a tool to flush out
intentional discrimination. If, on the other hand, the disparate impact theory is viewed
as an assertion that a practice that is not intentionally discriminatory is nevertheless
wrong because of its disparate impact upon one race or social class, a further theory
about why a disparate impact is unfair is required. The disparate impact theory thus
does not stand on its own, but must be linked to either the intentional discrimination
theory or one of the other theories outlined here.
For discussions of whether disparate impact alone should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., LAURENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIriONAL LAW 1514-21 (1988);
Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36, 42-83 (1977);John Hart Ely, Legislative andAdministrative
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L. J. 1205, 1255-63 (1970); Owen M. Fiss, A
Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 265-81 (1971).
325
Grossman, supra note 8, at 31 (quoting Rev. Benjamin Chavis, former Executive
Director of the Commission for Racial Justice, and one of the founders of the environmental justice movement); David Lapp, The Reverend JesseJackson: Fightingfor the Right to
Breathe Free, E MAG., May/June 1992 at 10 ("They have put these poisonous wastelands
nearest the black, the brown and the poor-the line of least resistance" (quoting Rev.
JesseJackson)); Have MinoritiesBenefitted ... ? A Forum, 18 EPAJ. 32, 36 (1992) ("[P]oor
communities have been less likely to forge successful battles of resistance against federal, state, and local agencies and industries who target their communities for the siting
of undesirable 'but necessary' polluting facilities.") (quoting statement of Beverly
Wright)); The Grassroots Movement for EnvironmentalJustice, EvERYONE'S BACKYARD, Feb.
1993, at 3 ("Low-income, blue collar, rural, and people of color communities were singled-out as ideal territories to pollute for profit.").
326 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
327 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional LegislativeMotive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 119-24; Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 44-53 (1988);
J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 953, 973-78 (1978); Eisenberg, supra note 324, at 114-17; Ely, supra note
324, at 1212-17, 1275-79; Joseph Tussman &Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 359 (1949). See also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
328 See Brownstein, supra note 327, at 46-47.
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cussed in Part II, the evidence fails to establish that siting decisions
have an immediate disproportionate impact because most studies do
not examine the demographics of communities at the time the siting
decisions were made.3 29 In addition, the evidence often is flawed by
its failure to control variables other than race that may explain the
330
distribution of LULUs.
If further research remedies the gaps in the evidence that the
siting of LULUs has a disproportionate impact on poor and minority
communities, the discriminatory intent theory must then specify
what explanations for the disproportionate impact can undermine
the inferences of discrimination that it raises.
For example, should a disproportionate impact that results
from considerations of need in the siting process give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose? To return to an earlier example,
assume that AIDS hospices were considered LULUs and that AIDS
victims in a particular city were disproportionately people of color.
It seems appropriate to site more of the hospices in neighborhoods
whose residents are suffering the most, but those neighborhoods
may assert that the care of particular residents is a burden that society as a whole should shoulder. Similarly, a disproportionate impact
may result from considerations of cost, proximity to customers, clients or related services, existing land use restrictions or disparities
329
330

See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
Most of the studies do not, for example, control for the neighborhoods' political

power. The two exceptions reach inconclusive results. ProfessorJames Hamilton found
that a county's potential for political action (as measured by the percentage of its voting
age population that voted in the 1980 presidential election) correlated with whether a
hazardous waste facility reported in 1987 that it planned to expand its waste processing
capacity within that county, while the race and income of the county were not significant
predictors of expansion plans. Hamilton, supra note 6, at 118. Professor Hamilton
found, however, that race was a significant predictor of where hazardous waste facilities
located in the 1970s, while political action was not. Id at 122. Professors Greenberg
and Anderson found that the presence of hazardous waste sites in NewJersey's communities did not correlate with political variables such as distance from the county seat,
existence of planning boards and staffs, or strength of the community's government.
GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 157.
Other variables that may confound the correlation between the location of LULUs
and neighborhood demographics include the propensity of hazardous waste facilities to
locate in urban areas, the costs of land, labor, and siting processes in different communities, differences in proximity to adequate transportation networks and to customers or
clients, physical characteristics of available land, and prior land use patterns. See id. at
156-60; Gelobter, supra note 49, at 71-72; Gerrard, supra note 168, at 119-23. Some of
the existing studies attempt to control for some of these variables. See GRJ, supra note
46, at 10 (analyzing the correlation between the location of LULUs and proxies for costs
and proximity to customers); GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 156-60 (analyzing the correlation between the location of hazardous waste sites and measures of cost,
proximity to customers and transportation, land use patterns and geological
characteristics).
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in neighborhood political power. 3 3 ' Determining which of those
considerations may defeat an inference of intentional discrimination
arising from a disproportionate impact raises many of the same conceptual problems that vex the equal treatment theory discussed
3 2
earlier. 3
Even if these problems regarding evidence of disproportionate
impact can be resolved, disproportionate impact alone will rarely
suffice to prove intentional discrimination.3 3 3 Further, even if proof
of intentional discrimination can be developed, the theory of intentional discrimination nevertheless will be too narrow to address the
problems of disproportionate siting. Some contend that poverty is
not as significant a predictor of the location of LULUs as race,3 3 4 but
significant evidence exists that poor communities also bear a disproportionate share of the burdens of LULUs.3 3 5 Even if poor communities were not currently overburdened, any theory of fairness in
siting that protected only members of racial minorities would lead
to a disproportionate number of LULUs in poor white
336
communities.
A theory of fairness limited to the absence of intentional discrimination is too underinclusive to solve the problem of disproportionate siting. As a component of a broader theory of fairness,
problems of proof will limit its usefulness in the siting context. In
addition, when used to evaluate the appropriateness of a siting decision, the theory must address the issue of what siting concerns are
legitimate counters to inferences of racial discrimination.
2.

Fairness Requires Treatment as Equals

Even if discrimination is unintentional or based upon characteristics that do not trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause,3 3 7 disproportionate siting arguably would be inappropriate
if it stemmed from a siting process that failed to treat people with
331
In deciding whether to allow explanations such as political power to rebut an
inference of discriminatory intent, it would be important to evaluate the relationship
between racism and those seemingly neutral factors. The fact that minority communities tend to have less political power than white communities, for example, is attributable largely to roadblocks whites have put in the path of political participation by people
of color.
332
See supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
333
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
334
CRJ, supra note 46, at 13; Mohai and Bryant, supra note 39.
335
See CRJ, supra note 46, at 13; GAO, supra note 41, at 4; Pfaff, supra note 6, at 14a;
sources cited supra note 67.
336 See sources cited supra note 6.
337 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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"equal concern and respect," 338 instead valuing certain people less
than others. 339 Under this theory, if a siting process is more attentive to the interests of wealthier or white neighborhoods than to the
interests of poor or minority neighborhoods, that process illegiti3 40
mately treats the poor and people of color as unequal.
Thus, if two potential sites were otherwise identical but one was
in a poor neighborhood and one was in a wealthier neighborhood,
society could not take note of the costs that the siting would impose
on the wealthy, ignore the costs it would impose on the poor, and
consequently site the LULU in the poor neighborhood. Nor could
the siting decision consider the impact that the LULU would have
on the poor, but discount that impact on the ground that the value
of being free from certain kinds of risks or harms is worth less to
poor people. 34 1 Instead, the siting decision would have to consider
the interests of the poor just as fully and sympathetically as it considered the interests of the more wealthy. 34 2 If the decision-maker
then concluded that both neighborhoods faced equal risk or loss,
the choice between the two neighborhoods would have to be made
3 43
with the flip of a coin or some other lottery mechanism.
338

DWORKIN,

TRS, supra note 270, at 273; see also

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE

305, 408 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 121 (Stu-

art Hampshire ed., 1978).
339 Professor Wright calls this a "stigmatic" injury. R. George Wright, Hazardous
Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777, 784-87,
790 (1991).
340 Treating people or neighborhoods as equals does not demand that they receive
equal treatment of the kind required by the equal division theory discussed earlier. See
supra notes 137-57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the difference between
the concepts of treatment as equals and equal treatment, see WESTEN, supra note 22, at
4-6. In short, the treatment as equals notion of fairness provides an "entitlement[] to
process or rationale, not to an outcome. .. " Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 143, at
495.
341 See DWORKIN, TRS, supra note 270, at 273 (government must not "constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler
or superior to another's.").
342 To treat the interests of people of color or the poor as equal to those of white or
wealthier neighborhoods, the decisionmaker might need to consider whether the poor
or minority neighborhood is in a subordinate position because of prior acts of discrimination and exploitation, and whether the siting of the LULU would perpetuate that subordination. That factor might tip the balance and require the site to be placed in the
white, wealthier neighborhood. The justification for taking the poor or minority neighborhood's status into account, even though favoring the white, wealthier neighborhood
because of its privileged status would be illegitimate, could lie in the notion of equality
of welfare, see Dworkin, supra note 178, at 186-87, 240-44, or in what Professor Tribe
has referred to as the antisubjugation principle. TRIBE, supra note 324, at 1515-21. See
also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 111617 (1991); Fiss, supra note 160, at 157-60.
343 Lotteries are not the only just way to decide how to allocate a burden among
similarly situated communities entitled to treatment as equals. The alternative, an impersonally arbitrary choice between the two communities, is impractical in this context,
however. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 143, at 502-03.
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If the two potential sites were not identical, treatment as equals
would require only that the harm that a site would cause to the poor
be considered in exactly the same manner as the harm that a site
would cause to the more affluent.3 4 4 Thus, if siting the LULU in the
poor neighborhood would expose five neighbors to a particular risk,
while siting it in the wealthier area would expose twenty-five neighbors to risk, society would be justified under this theory in choosing
the site in the poor neighborhood.
The notion that fair siting requires treating all potential host
communities as equals is extremely difficult to implement on a practical level. The most plausible way to ensure that decision makers
accord equal concern to all communities is through an "impact
statement" requirement. This would require decision makers to
consider all of the effects that a siting might have on a neighborhood, including its impact on health, the environment, and the
neighborhood's quality of life.3 4 5 Theoretically, by forcing decision
makers to examine the possible effects of a siting, the process would
ensure that the decision reflects equal consideration for both communities. In reality, impact statements may give only the illusion of
neutrality in their analysis of a facility's potential effects. Further,
decisionmakers required to think about such effects may give only
the illusion of consideration.
a.

The Illusion of Neutrality

Like several other theories of fairness, the treatment as equals
theory rests on the problematic premise that the costs and benefits
that a LULU imposes upon communities are measurable, and that
3 46
different costs and benefits can be reduced to a common metric.
Even if that premise were true, impact statements detailing the potential effects of a siting still would not necessarily show equal concern for the interests of the poor and minorities.
For example, unequal concern could pervade the impact study
through seemingly neutral cost/benefit analysis. Consider a study
of the costs and benefits of two alternative sites that found only one
difference: the proposed site in the wealthy neighborhood would
cost twice as much as the site in the poor neighborhood. If that cost
difference reflected the spectacular ocean view enjoyed by the
wealthy neighborhood, then the decisionmaker could choose the
less expensive site without showing unequal concern for the inter344

DWORKIN, TRS, supra note 270, at 227, 273. Of course, the sacrifice of the five

individuals might be considered wrong on other grounds.
345
See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321. See also
infra notes 376-85 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 165-71, 198, 215-20 and accompanying text.
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ests of the poorer neighborhood. But assume that the properties
are identical in all respects, except for the racial and socioeconomic
characteristics of their residents. Assume further that these racial
and socioeconomic differences offer the only explanation for the different market values of the neighboring properties. Accordingly,
unless land values were excluded from the cost/benefit analysis, that
analysis would inject society's prejudice against the poor and minorities into the siting process.
Similarly, unequal concern could infiltrate the impact study
through the criteria used to determine the sites suitable for consideration.3 4 7 A common siting criterion, for example, is the absence
of any impact upon designated historical landmarks.3 48 To ensure
that siting decisions based on that criterion were fair under this theory, one would have to establish either that buildings in wealthy
neighborhoods are no more likely to be landmarked than buildings
in poor neighborhoods, or that any disparity in landmarking is
caused by factors other than unequal concern for the poor. Unequal
concern could also creep into the process through the weight given
to the criteria. If disruption of relationships among community
members is given relatively low weight, for example, ethnic communities whose cultures emphasized such social networks would be afforded less concern than other communities.
b.

The Illusion of Consideration

Impact statements have been used as a decision making tool
since the adoption of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
in 1970349 and the subsequent enactment of dozens of state "little

NEPAs." 3 50 The experience under these statutes has fostered great
dissatisfaction with the impact statement as a tool for "making bureaucracies think."' 3 5' There is no reason to believe that the tool
347 Cf Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 143, at 507 (discussing the potential for allocations based upon seemingly neutral social values to exacerbate pre-existing injustices).
348
See, e.g., GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 184 (describing criteria for
siting hazardous waste facilities in New York); Karl S. Coplan, ProtectingMinority Communities with Environmental, Civil Rights Claims, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 20, 1991, at 1 (discussing use
of National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq., to oppose siting
proposals).
349
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1988).
350 For a survey of state "little NEPAs", see 2 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.08 (1992).

351 The phrase is from SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK (1984). For
criticisms of NEPA, see Lynton K. Caldwell, A ConstitutionalLaw for the Environment: 20
Years With NEPA Indicates the Need, 31 ENVIRONMENT, Dec. 1989, at 7; Daniel A. Dreyfus &
Helen M. Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 243, 251-53 (1976); Thomas France, NEPA-The Next Twenty Years, 25
LAND & WATER L. REV. 132, 135 (1990);James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson,
Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM.
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will work any better in forcing siting authorities not only to think,
but to think fairly.
To say that impact statements have not been successful at
changing the way regulators think is not to say that they have been
useless. Impact statements often give opponents of facilities ammunition to defeat a project 35 2 and sometimes lead developers to modify their proposals to avoid a particular environmental impact.
Similarly, community impact statements will give some communities
another tool with which to fight a siting. But unless all communities
have equal resources to use such legal tools, the availability of impact statements is unlikely to result in a fairer distribution of
LULUs.
Nor is it likely that developers will use impact statements to
modify their projects to avoid an unfair impact. Avoiding unfairness
is not equivalent to avoiding, for example, the destruction of an endangered species habitat. Society has a general notion of what it
means to save wetlands, but has no shared conception of what it
means to site LULUs fairly.3 53 What, then, is a developer to do
upon learning that a proposed host community already has a noxious LULU, while an acceptable alternative community has no noxious LULUs but six social services LULUs? Rather than agonizing
over the "right" thing to do, developers will seek to minimize their
costs, which usually will mean putting the LULU in the community
least able to use the impact statement to fight the siting. That solution is unlikely to result in a fairer distribution of LULUs; indeed, it
L. REV. 1429, 1462 (1978); Sen. Edmund S. Muskie & Eliot R. Cutler, A NationalEnvironmental Policy: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 25 ME. L. REV. 163, 172 (1973);Joseph L.
Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OxLA. L. REV. 239, 245-48 (1973); Stewart E.
Sterk, Environmental Review in the Land Use Process: New York's Experience with SEQRA, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 2041, 2046-84 (1992). But see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEV-

ENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 23-25 (1976) (citing examples of the influence environmental

impact studies had on federal decisions, and reporting that most federal agencies reported that the EIS process was an important aid in planning and decisionmaking). Taylor's comprehensive study of the effect of NEPA on decisions of the Corps of Engineers
and the Forest Service produced mixed results. Taylor, supra, at 130. It found that "all

districts and forests do better in terms of avoiding environmental damage than they did
before NEPA." But it found that the potential effectiveness of impact statements depends upon a complex balance of conditions. Id. at 295-313. Many of those conditions
would not apply to the siting context. For example, NEPA forced the federal bureaucracy to hire thousands of environmental analysts committed to environment protection
who worked from within to change the way the agencies approached their tasks. Id at
252-53. It is far from clear that requiring an impact statement about the social effects
that a siting would have on a community would lead state and local siting agencies, or
even federal permitting agencies, to add sociologists or environmental justice advocates
to their staffs.
352 See, e.g., Christopher A. Sproul, Comment, Public Participationin the Point Conception LNG Controversy: Energy Wasted or Energy Well-Spent?, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 73, 87 (1986).
353
See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
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is simply another version of the path of least resistance method of
siting that many believe led to the current inequitable siting pattern. 35 4 To achieve real change in the concern that siting deci-

sionmakers show for the effects that LULUs have on poor and
minority communities, the treatment as equals theory will have to
devise a better approach than impact statements.
IV
LEGISLATIvE APPROACHES TO THE DISCRIMINATORY SITING
PROBLEM

Five major legislative strategies for preventing discriminatory
siting have been adopted by state and local governments or proposed for federal legislation.3 5 5 This Part briefly summarizes each
approach, analyzes which conceptions of fairness are embodied by
each approach, and critiques how well each addresses the problems
that Part III raised about those conceptions.
A. The Dispersion Approach
Dispersion ordinances were the first type of legislation that addressed disproportionate siting. Such ordinances stemmed primarily from the deinstitutionalization movement-the shift from
treating the mentally disabled in large institutions to integrating
them into the community through residential group homes. Initially, communities resisted group homes in their neighborhoods by
attempting to zone out such homes by defining "single family resi3 56
dences" as including only people related by blood or marriage.
Eventually, most states pre-empted local zoning regulations and
prohibited discrimination against group homes. 35 7 Many state statutes contain dispersion mechanisms designed to reassure neighborhoods that they will not receive more than their fair share of group
homes and to ensure that municipalities do not create a group home
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
I do not address proposals that seek to prevent any facility siting that would
impose a risk to the environment or to human health and safety. For example, environmental justice advocates in the San Diego area have proposed a "Toxics Free Neighborhood" zoning ordinance amendment that would create a buffer between industry and
residential areas, schools, and churches. Industry currently located in the buffer zones
would be required to either clean up or move out within five years. Kay, Ethnic Enclaves,
supra note 59, at A8.
356 For descriptions of the community resistance to efforts to deinstitutionalize mentally disabled persons, see DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 187-88 (1984); Robert L. Schonfeld, "Not in My Neighborhood:" Legal
Challenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York
State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 288-90 (1985).
357 Jaffe & Smith, supra note 62, at 16-20.
354

355

19931

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

1069

ghetto instead of "mainstreaming" the homes into residential
358
areas.
The dispersion mechanisms often prohibit "undue" or "excessive" concentration of social service LULUs or mandate arbitrary
distances between group homes.3 5 9 A few statutes are more precisely targeted.3 60 New Jersey allows a municipality to disapprove a
group home if the municipality already has more than 50 residents
in existing group homes or if the number of residents in existing
361
homes is more than 0.5 percent of the municipality's population.
Wisconsin requires that the total capacity of group homes not exceed 25 persons or 1 percent of the municipality's population. 36 2
Similarly, Oregon requires that the number of "domiciliary care facilities" within a county be based upon the relationship between the
county's population and the number of persons from the county
needing care.3 63 Alabama, which has adopted the dispersion approach for LULUs other than group homes, prohibits the siting of
more than one commercial hazardous waste treatment or disposal
364
site per county.
The Environmental Justice Act of 1992365 proposed by Congressman John Lewis, while different in form from the group home
ordinances, essentially adopts the dispersion approach. The Act
would require the Environmental Protection Agency to identify the
358

See, e.g., Ann Kennedy Grossman, Community Integration of Persons with Mental Ill-

ness: A Legislative Proposalto Combat the Exclusionary Zoning of Community Residential Programs,
7 LAW & INEQ. J. 215, 219, 252-54 (1989) (discussing Minnesota legislation).
359
For surveys of statutes governing group homes, seeJaffe & Smith, supra note 62,
at 17-19; Lester D. Steinman, The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on the Establishment of Community Residencesfor the Disabled: A NationalStudy, 19 URB. LAW. 1 (1987); DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES STATE LEGISLATIVE PROJECT OF THE A.B.A. COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DisABLED, ZONING FOR COMMUNITY HOMES SERVING DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS

(1978), reprinted in 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 794, 800-02 (1978).
360 In addition to the statutes discussed in the text, see 24 C.F.R. § 880.206 (1992)
(sites for new assisted housing construction projects must avoid "undue concentration"
of assisted housing tenants); 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (1993) (same, for public housing
projects); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 4262-01 (Jan. 13, 1993) (proposing regulations to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. § 770 which define "undue concentration" as areas in which more
than 407o of the population have incomes below the poverty level).
361 N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:55D-66.1 (1990).
362 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(15) (West 1988).
363 OR. REV. STAT. § 443.225 (1991).
364 ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1 (1990). Legislation passed in Michigan in 1987 required
its state hazardous waste management plan to provide for "a reasonable geographic
distribution of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to meet existing and future
needs ....
" but does not actually prohibit concentration of the facilities. MICH. COMP.
LAWs ANN. § 299.509 (2)(f) (West Supp. 1992).
365 H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The EnvironmentalJustice Act of 1993
introduced by Senator Baucus (D-Mont.), S.1161, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993), tracks
Congressman Lewis' proposal in many respects, but does not include a moratorium requirement and therefore does not adopt a dispersion approach.
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100 counties or other geographical units which contain the highest
total weight of toxic chemicals. 3 66 The Act would then require the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the nature and
extent of any acute and chronic health impacts in those 100 areas,
referred to as Environmental High Impact Areas (EHIAs).3 67 If the
study found a significant adverse health impact from pollution in the
EHIAs, then the Act would declare a moratorium on any further
toxic chemical facility permits in the area until pollution is reduced
3 68
to the level necessary to avoid adverse health impacts.
The dispersion approach reflects the equal division notion of
fairness, specifically the notion that the burden of LULUs must be
physically distributed on a proportional basis. But the dispersion
statutes adopt a weak view of what constitutes an equal physical distribution, in that they require the dispersion of LULUs only if a
neighborhood reaches some threshold of saturation. The group
home statutes, for example, say nothing about how the first home
will be distributed.3 6 9 For instance, if a town needs four group
homes, it can place all four in the town's minority neighborhoods.
White neighborhoods would not bear any of the burden unless the
number of homes needed exceeds the number of minority neighborhoods. Similarly, the proposed Environmental Justice Act of
1992 shows no concern for what happens to facilities sited outside
EHIAs. Indeed, the Act could foster a siting pattern in which all of
the facilities turned away from the worst 100 areas will locate instead in the next worst 100 areas.
Because the dispersion approach adopts a weak view of equal
treatment, it does not encounter some of the definitional problems
that the equal physical distribution theory generally entails.3 70 This
is not a virtue, however, because it reflects a simplistic insensitivity
to many factors affecting the fairness of a siting pattern. For example, the group home statutes do not address whether any sites
37
outside the saturated areas are appropriate for group home sites. '
The statutes thus avoid having potential sites eliminated from consideration by political determinations of suitability. The result,
H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 102(B) (1993).
H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 401 (1993).
H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1993). Exceptions to the moratorium
are allowed if there is a need for the facility, and if the facility will implement a comprehensive pollution prevention program and minimize uncontrolled releases. The moratorium applies only to facilities that emit toxic chemicals in "quantities found to cause
significant adverse impacts on human health."
369
See sources cited supra note 359.
370 See supra notes 165-98 and accompanying text.
371
For a discussion of the effect dispersion ordinances may have in reducing the
number of sites available for group homes for the mentally disabled, seeJaffe & Smith,
supra note 62, at 13-16; Grossman, supra note 358, at 253.
366
367
368
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however, may be the selection of sites that are less accessible to
other social services or means of transportation or are less safe,
without any consideration of the divergent goals of fairness, safety
2
and convenient access to support services. 37
Similarly, most of the group home statutes address only the
burden of group homes, and do not require a comprehensive assessment of a neighborhood's burden from all LULUs. 3 73 A service
provider prohibited from locating another group home within a
working class neighborhood may have to locate the home in a minority neighborhood that lacks a group home, but hosts a prison, a
homeless shelter, and a sewage treatment plant. The EnvironmentalJustice Act of 1992 shows a similar lack of concern for the totality
of a neighborhood's burden. Although it declares a moratorium on
the siting of any new toxic chemical facility within the EHIA,3 74 the
Act does not prevent the facility from locating in a neighborhood
overburdened by social service facilities but below the threshold on
other chemical facilities.
The arbitrary thresholds in dispersion statutes also reflect a
simplistic notion of neighborhood. For example, a Texas statute
forbids the location of group homes within one-half mile of another,
with no distinction between high density areas in Houston, and low
density suburban or rural locations. 37 5 Congressman Lewis' proposed Environmental Justice Act's definition of an EHIA also fails to
differentiate between areas that either contain or abut numerous
residential neighborhoods and those that do not. Facilities turned
away from the 100th EHIA might locate instead in the area that is
101st on the list, even though that area has ten times the population
density of the EHIA.
Thus, the dispersion approach reflects an extremely weak notion of equal treatment in the physical distribution of LULUs. The
feebleness of the notion renders the dispersion approach incapable
of protecting neighborhoods other than those already suffering the
most egregious overconcentrations of LULUs. In protecting those
neighborhoods, the approach is insensitive to a host of concerns
that should inform any siting decision.
B.

Impact Statement Approach

The second approach taken by a few states is the impact statement approach. One version of this approach requires the agencies
372 For a discussion of the potential benefits of having social service facilities in close
geographical proximity to one another, see Dear, supra note 3, at 294.
373
See sources cited supra note 359.
374 H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., Ist Sess., § 403 (1993).
375 TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 123.008 (1993 Supp.).
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responsible for proposing sites for group homes to maintain statistics regarding the number and location of other such facilities within
a neighborhood.3 76 These agencies must consider the concentration of uses in choosing or approving sites. 377 The concentration
statistics are available to the public for use in opposing further
3 78
facilities.
Several states have adopted an alternative version of the impact
statement approach that does not mandate an analysis of the concentration of uses, but nevertheless requires decisionmakers to consider the impact a siting will have on the quality of life in the
community. Kentucky, for example, requires licensing agencies to
consider "community perceptions and other psychic costs." 3 7 9
Similarly, the New York and South Dakota versions of NEPA require
environmental impact statements to contain information about a
proposed development's impact on socioeconomic factors such as
"existing patterns of population concentration, distribution, or
38 0
growth, and existing community or neighborhood character."
Several more explicit impact statement requirements have been
proposed. Congressman William Clinger, Jr. (R-Pa.) and Senator
John Glenn (D-Ohio) have sponsored a bill that would require that
the process for granting permits to any new solid waste treatment or
disposal facilities include consideration of a "community information statement." 3 8s ' This statement would be prepared by an independent contractor selected by the developer and the chief
elected official of the community. 38 2 The statement would include
information about the facility's impact on matters such as the community's employment, housing, public safety and health, emergency
38 3
preparedness, transportation systems and recreational amenities.
The statement would also detail the demographic characteristics of

376 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney 1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
§ 863 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 443.422 (1991).
377
See FLA. STAT. ch. 419.001 (1993).
378 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 463-a (consol. 1984); 60 OKLA. STAT. § 863 (1991).
379 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-310 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
380 N.Y. EivrL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 34A-9-1(4) (1992). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 22a-lb (West Supp. 1993);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-2 (1985 & Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-301(b)

(1989).
381

H.R. 495, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); S.533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).

382 H.R. 495 at § 1(a)(b). If the community and the developer could not agree upon
an independent contractor, the permitting authority would select one.
383 Id. at § I(a)(d).
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the host community 84 and the presence of other waste sites within
3 85
the community.
In seeking to ensure that siting authorities consider the burdens
communities already bear and the additional injuries LULUs may
impose, impact statement approaches try to raise concern for poor
and minority communities to the level already shown to wealthier
and white communities. Thus, they reflect the "treatment as
equals" notion of fairness.3 86 Additionally, the impact statement re3 87
quirements adopt a weak notion of equal physical distribution.
Like the dispersion statutes,3 8 they implicitly presume that sites
proposed in communities already bearing some threshold amount
of burden should be scrutinized. Their main concern is not how
facilities are sited generally, but whether some communities have
reached a threshold of concentration.
None of the impact statement requirements adopted or proposed address the many problems of the treatment as equals theory.3 8 9 All are vague about how "concentration" or "impact" is to
be measured. Accordingly, unequal concern can creep into the process through the measurements used. Because the requirements apply only at the final stages of site selection, 390 there is no check on
whether equal concern was afforded to the poor and minorities in
arriving at the short list of suitable sites. Additionally, few of the
384 Id at § 1(a)(d) (4). Similarly, the Commission for Racial Justice called upon the
President to issue an executive order directing all executive branch agencies with responsibility for regulating hazardous wastes to "assess and consider the impact of their
current policies and regulations on racial and ethnic communities, and take such considerations into account when establishing new policies and promulgating new regulations." CRJ, supra note 46, at 24. The CRJ also has suggested that the Environmental
Protection Agency should establish an office to "monitor the siting of new hazardous
waste facilities to insure that adequate consideration is given to the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of potential host communities." Id.
385 H.R. 495, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § l(a)(d)(5) (1993).
386 See supra notes 337-44 and accompanying text.
387 See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
388 See supra notes 356-68 and accompanying text.
389 See supra notes 346-54 and accompanying text.
390 See, e.g., S. 533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § l(a)(a)(3) (1993) (proposed community
information statement about a potential host community shall be considered in final
decision about permitting a hazardous waste treatment or disposal facility; no requirement that statement be prepared for other sites considered for the facility); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 224.40-310 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (in deciding whether to approve
a hazardous waste facility, decisionmaker shall consider the social and economic impact
of the facility on the proposed host community; no requirement that the decisionmaker
consider the impact the facility would have on alternative sites). Environmental impact
statements typically must discuss alternative sites, but the requirement is vague about
how alternatives are to be selected. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. GERRARD ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REvIEW IN NEw YORK § 5.1412][f][i] (1990 & 1992 Supp.). In addition, when

the proposed facility is privately owned, the alternatives need only include other properties owned or optioned by the developer. Id.
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requirements specify how the LULU's impact on the proposed host
neighborhood's quality of life or concentration of burdens should
be weighed against other siting considerations. 39 '
Given the NEPA model, it is not surprising that environmental
justice advocates have endorsed an impact statement approach.
However, the proposed impact statement offers little more than
what already exists in many states. Environmental impact statements have included information about a facility's socioeconomic
impact for years. 39 2 Similarly, many state siting statutes have required decisionmakers to take community impacts into account in
permitting waste facilities.3 9 3 Neither requirement has been shown
to have any effect on the distribution of LULUs.
C.

The Fair Share or Mathematical Formula Approach

A third technique legislatures use to ensure that the burden of a
particular land use is dispersed throughout all communities is the
fair share approach. This approach was made famous by the New
Jersey Supreme Court's Mount Laurel decisions, which attempted to
force exclusive suburbs to open their doors to low and moderate
income housing.3 9 4 Basically, the fair share approach uses mathematical formulas to quantify how low and moderate income housing
should be allocated throughout a region.3 93
The fair share approach strives to ensure the availability of low
income housing in a wide variety of neighborhoods and to foster
391 See, e.g., S. 533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § I(a)(a)(3) (1993) (providing no guidance
about how community impact information is to be weighed against other siting considerations); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-310 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (same); but see
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6A-2, § 361.7 & app. 17 (1986) (assigning weights to
each siting criteria).
392
See, e.g., GERRARD, supra note 390, at § 5.12112] (discussing New York's requirement that environmental impact statements study the effect the facility will have on "existing patterns of population concentration, distribution, or growth, and existing
community or neighborhood character."); DANIEL R. MANDELER, NEPA LAW AND Lrri-

§§ 8.07[6]-8.07[9] (1992) (discussing case law regarding when the federal NEPA
requires consideration of socioeconomic effects); Reich, supra note 11, at 311-13.
393 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1478(2) (West 1989) (hearings on proposed low-level radioactive waste facilities should address the social impact of the proposed facility on the surrounding area); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 3-706 (1989)
(applicant for approval of hazardous waste facility shall submit information to allow consideration of environmental, social, technical, and economic impacts of proposed facility); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-920 (1991) (approval of waste facilities should include
consideration of "social changes resulting from facility impact on population"); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7012(f)(1) (1991) (procedure for licensing of low-level radioactive
waste facilities shall include study of the social and economic impacts on the communities surrounding the proposed facility).
394 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
395 LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 27-28.
GATION
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economic and racial integration. 9 6 To ensure success, however, the
approach also seeks to distribute the burden of such housing fairly.
It adopts the equal division notion of fairness8 9 7 by seeking to physically distribute low and moderate income housing on a proportional
basis.
Fair share plans illustrate the enormous problems of definition,
measurement, and weighing that the equal division conception of
fairness involves. David Listokin's exhaustive survey of fair share
housing allocation plans shows how each of the determinations necessary to allocate low and moderate income housing involves nu98
merous value judgments, data interpretations and measurements.
Listokin explains that existing fair share plans tend to use at least
four major criteria to allocate low income housing: equal share,
need, distribution, and suitability. 9 9 Many plans use additional criteria, such as the area's past performance in providing such housing. 40 0 Plans differ according to the combination of criteria and to
the weight given to each criterion. 40 1 They also differ in the factors
used to assess the general criteria. 40 2 The "suitability" criterion, for
example, may involve an evaluation of cost availability, the nature
and environmental quality of the land, the character of the surrounding environment, the extent of the local fiscal resources, and
the nature and extent of transportation and public and private infrastructure. 40
Each of those factors, in turn, may be measured in
different ways. Local fiscal capacity, for example, may be measured
by real estate value per capita or per school age child, personal in40 4
come, sales tax revenue or revenue-sharing receipts.
Even for a single type of LULU, mathematical determination of
"fair share" is difficult because of the enormous number of value
judgments and measurements that such determinations require.
The need for many judgments about what factors to consider, and
how they should be measured and weighed, introduces the possibility that such judgments will favor one type of neighborhood over
896
397
598
899
400
401

Id. at 1-26.
See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 27-79.
Id. at 51-58.
lI at 58-59.

See id at 173-214 (describing the criteria and weighing procedures used in 25 fair
share plans either proposed or implemented as of 1975).
402 Id at 173-214; see also NEW JERSEY COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING, ISSUE PAPERS 3-6 (Nov. 27, 1990) [hereinafter ISSUE PAPERS] (on file with author) (describing
process for determining need for NewJersey's fair share plans); NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5,
§ 5:92-4.1-5:92-5.14 (1991) (discussing determination of need).
403
See IssuE PAPERS, supra note 402, at 11-14; NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 §§ 5:92-8.15:92-8-6 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of determining land "availability.").
404
LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 58, 173-214.
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another. 40 5 That possibility provides grounds for neighborhoods to
resist the plan by challenging the accuracy of the data, evaluation or
application of specific criteria. Listokin's survey of the implementation of seven fair share plans found a number of examples of such
40 6
resistance and claims of unfairness.
Additionally, Listokin notes a tension between the need to have
the fair share formulas be as comprehensive and technically accurate
as possible and the need to have a formula sufficiently simple and
comprehensible to be credible to all neighborhoods. 40 7 There is an
additional discrepancy between what measurements or definitions
might be fair and the availability of data. 40 8 For example, neighborhoods may find a fair share plan based upon cultural and historical
boundaries more credible than one based upon census tract definitions, but data for the former may not be available. 40 9 Similarly, fair
share plans lose credibility if they are based upon old data, but the
more tailored the data, the more difficult and costly it may be to
4 10
keep current.
While the fair share approach is extraordinarily complex and
riddled with opportunities for subversion, some fair share housing
plans have resulted in modest gains in the dispersion of low and
moderate income housing.4 11 More research is needed, however,
on the long-term effects of fair share housing plans and on whether
such plans result in a greater perception of fairness among host
neighborhoods. Even if that research reveals that fair share housing
plans are successful, it may be difficult to replicate that success for
LULUs posing risks to life and health or in programs involving several types of LULUs.

405
Siting processes have attempted to prevent such skewing by requiring agreement
upon the applicable criteria and weighing before specific sites are at issue. But even
then, those involved in evaluating the criteria may have a general idea about how different schemes would affect particular regions or communities. See, e.g., ENGLISH, supra
note 133, at 129-130 (describing the process used by the Southeast Compact to identify
a host state for a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility).
406 LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 92-98, 118-27.
407 Id. at 74, 134-35.
408 Id. at 74, 134-35.
409 Id. at 31-33. See also supra notes 71-75, 172-75 and accompanying text.
410 LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 135.
411
LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 87-127; Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work:
Affordable Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197, 1258-60 (1989).
But see Michael H. Schill, Deconcentratingthe Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 795, 842

(1992) (number of housing units built under fair share approach is small).
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In 1989, New York City adopted a new city charter containing
two novel provisions intended to ensure that each of its neighborhoods bears its fair share of the burden of LULUs and receives its
4 12
fair share of beneficial public services such as libraries and parks.
The program adopted pursuant to the charter has received much
acclaim in planning circles; for example, the American Planning Association gave New York a special award in 1992 for adopting the
program.

4 13

The first provision, Section 203(a), requires the mayor to propose criteria for the location of new city facilities and the expansion,
reduction in size or services, or closing of existing facilities. 41 4 The
charter directs that these fair share criteria further the "fair distribution among communities of the burdens and benefits associated
with city facilities, consistent with community needs for services and
efficient and cost effective delivery of services and with due regard
for the social and economic impacts of such facilities upon the areas
surrounding the sites." 41
The second provision, Section 204, requires the mayor to prepare an annual "citywide statement of needs" identifying all new
facilities, expansions, reductions or closings that city agencies intend to propose in the next two fiscal years. 4 16 The statement must
also specify the borough, and if possible, the community, in which
the city proposes to site a new or expanded use, and must also specify the criteria to be used in selecting the site.4 17 The mayor also
must provide an "Atlas of City Property" revealing all existing cityowned property and its current use, as well as all state and federal
social service land uses for which information is available to the
city.41 8 Borough presidents, community boards, and the public
must be given notice and an opportunity to comment upon the
statement of needs. 41 9 Additionally, a borough president may suggest alternative sites within the borough for uses proposed by the
412

N.Y. CrrY CHARTER, §§ 203 and 204 (1989). For an overview of the new char-

ter's land use provisions, see William Valletta, Siting Public Facilitieson a FairShare Basis in
New York City, 25 URB. LAW. 1, 3-4 (1993); Barbara Weisberg, One City's Approach to
NIMBY, 59 AM. PLAN.ASS'NJ. 93 (1993); Edward N. Costikyan & Lesze U. Cornfeld, New
York City's New Charter: Land Use Regulations, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 14, 1990, at 1.
413 See Rose, supra note 274, at 97 (decrying the award).
414 N.Y. Crry CHARTER, § 203(a) (1989).
415 Id.
416 Id. § 204(a).
417
Id. § 204(b).
418 Id. § 204(d).
419 Id. § 204(f).
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mayor. 4 20 Section 204 also requires that all proposed sites conform
to the fair share criteria promulgated under Section 203.421
The fair share criteria adopted by the city planning commission 42 2 require that city agencies 4 23 deciding where to site city facilities 4 24 consider factors such as:
a) the facility's compatibility with existing facilities and programs in the neighborhood;
b) the extent to which the neighborhood's character will be adversely affected by a concentration of such facilities;
c) the site's cost-effectiveness; and
d) the site's consistency with the locational criteria that the
4 25
mayor specified in his Statement of Needs.
In addition, depending upon the specific kind of facility, the siting
decisionmaker may be required to consider factors such as the need
for the facility in the proposed community and the proximity of
4 26
transportation and related social services.
Id.
Id. §§ 204(a), 204(e)(2), 204(f) and 204(g).
For a more detailed overview of the fair share criteria, see Valletta, supra note
412, at 8-20; Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, "FairShare" Siting of City Facilities,
N.Y.LJ., June 21, 1990, at 3.
423
The criteria specify that if the proposed site must be approved by the city planning commission (CPC) under the City's Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
(ULURP), the CPC must independently consider whether the proposed site meets the
criteria. Crry PLANNING COMM'N, CRITERIA FOR THE LOCATION OF CITY FACILrTEs art.
4.1(b), 6.1(b), 6.51, 6.53 (Dec. 3, 1990) [hereinafter CRrrERIA]. Many uses will be subject to ULURP, which applies to all rezonings, special permits, capital projects, and
leases or acquisition of land by the city. CrrY PLANNING COMM'N UNIFORM LAND USE
REVIEW PROCEDURE art. 2 (Sept. 1990). If the proposed use is not subject to ULURP,
then the agency must submit statements to the mayor, the affected community boards
and borough presidents, and the Department of City Planning, explaining the agency's
consideration of the applicable criteria. CRITERIA, art. 9.1.
424 The criteria apply only to city facilities proposed by mayoral agencies, not to the
siting of facilities by private entities, state or federal agencies, or independent agencies
within the city. Such organizations will sometimes be indirectly governed by the fair
share criteria, because the CPC must consider their compliance with the criteria if they
should need the CPC's approval in order to site a use. CRITERIA, art. 3a & n.2. If they
can site a use as of right under the City's zoning ordinance, or if, as in the case of some
federal facilities, they are outside the reach of the zoning ordinance, then they will be
unaffected by the criteria.
425 The criteria distinguish between local or neighborhood facilities (those serving
just the community district in which the majority of their clients live and work) and
regional or citywide facilities (those serving several community districts, an entire borough, or the entire city). CRITERIA, arts. 5, 6. The criteria provides an illustrative list of
each type. Branch libraries, fire stations, and senior citizen centers are examples of local
facilities. Sewage treatment plants, landfills, group homes, and jails are examples of
regional facilities. CRITERIA, attachments A & B. For both local and regional facilities,
the agency proposing the site is required to take into account the factors listed in the
text.
426 For local facilities, the siting agency must consider:
a) the need for the facility in the proposed community district; generally, the greater the need, the more appropriate the site;
420
421
422
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The charter provisions and the implementing fair share criteria
adopt a basic impact statement approach, 4 2 7 requiring that neighborhoods receive and decisionmakers consider information about
the distribution of benefits and burdens within the city. New York
City's program reinforces the impact statement approach with several features borrowed from fair share approach. 4 28 First, in establishing separate criteria for local or neighborhood facilities and
regional or citywide facilities, the program recognizes the importance of defining "neighborhood." 4 29 The plan's definitions of
"neighborhood" for the two types of facilities are similar to the denomination of the appropriate allocation region in fair share
plans. 43 0 Second, the criteria recognize that a neighborhood's burden should be related to the needs the neighborhood generates, 43 1
similar to the way in which fair share plans consider a neighborhood's existing low and moderate income population. 43 2 Third, the
plan includes special rules for the siting of residential facilities in
neighborhoods that already have a high ratio of facility beds to population, 43 3 similar to the rules imposed by dispersion requirements
434
and to consideration of existing housing in fair share plans.
b) the site's accessibility to those the facility is intended to serve.
art. 5.1.
For regional or citywide facilities, the siting agency also must consider:
a) the need for the facility;
b) distribution of similar facilities throughout the city;
c) the size of the facility, which should not exceed the minimum size
necessary to meet existing and projected needs;
d) adequacy of streets and transit facilities to handle traffic generated by

CRrrERIA,

the facility.

art. 6.1.
Certain types of uses are subject to additional criteria. For example, for regional
residential facilities, such as homeless shelters:
a) undue concentration of facilities providing similar services or serving
a similar population is to be avoided;
b) necessary support services for the facility and its clients should be
available nearby;
c) if the site is proposed in a community with a high ratio of services to
population, whether the facility could be sited on alternative sites in
districts with lower ratios without adding significantly to the cost of
constructing and operating the facility or impairing service delivery
should be considered.
CRITERIA,

CRITERIA, art. 6.5.
427 See supra notes

376-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 394-97 and accompanying text.
See LUSTOKIN, supra note 162, at 31-33. See also supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
430 See LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 31-33.
428
429

431

See

432

See LISTOKIN, supra note 162, at 56-57.
CRITERIA, art. 6.5.
See LSTOKIN,supra note 162, at 51-58.

433
434

CRITERIA, art.

5.
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The city's program improves upon a few aspects of the impact
statement model. It allows borough presidents to respond to the
mayor's siting proposals with specific alternative sites 4 3 5 and requires that those alternatives receive special consideration in some
instances. 4 3 6 The criteria provide for a "consensus building process" in which representatives of affected interests may convene to
assess alternative sites. 4 3 7 Further, while the program does not
compensate the host community in the form of cash or amenities, it
does specify that the borough president or community board may
request the sponsoring agency to work with the community board to
establish a site monitoring committee. 4 38 Several studies of compensation schemes have indicated that communities consider local
monitoring, or continuing impact review, a more important form of
4 39
mitigation than compensation.
The fair share criteria accordingly reflect both the treatment as
equals 440 and the equal division 4 4 1 theories of fairness, vividly highlighting the problems inherent in each theory. The criteria are
plagued with the problems of definition and measurement attendant
to the equal division theory. 4 42 Furthermore, they incorporate the
added complexity of applying the proportional distribution theory
to multiple LULUs. In comparing the burdens that facilities impose,
for example, the criteria aggregate all facilities with sleeping accommodations under the heading of "residential facility." 4 4 3 Consequently, prisons and drug treatment centers are considered no more
burdensome than residential facilities for children and nursing
homes, 44 4 despite the fact that communities view those uses differently.4 4 5 To assess the extent of the saturation of such facilities, the

criteria specify that the twenty community districts with the highest
ratio of residential facility beds to population will be given special
consideration. 4 46 However, saturation would be more appropriately
measured by the ratio of beds to subgroups of the population, such
as recipients of certain government benefits, because many of the
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443

444

445
446

CHARTER, at § 204(f).
art. 6.53(c).
CRITERIA, art. 6.2.
CRITERIA, art. 6.3.
See PORTNEY, supra note 3, at 34-35.
See supra notes 337-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165-200 and accompanying text.
CRITERIA, at art. 3(c) and attachment C.
Id.

N.Y. CITY
CRITERIA,

See supra note 67.
CRITERIA, art. 6.53.
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facilities draw their clients almost exclusively from these
subgroups. 4 47
The criteria fail to specify how distributional concerns are to be
weighed against other concerns. Many of the factors listed as relevant to the siting decision will probably favor the siting of LULUs in
already burdened neighborhoods. The cost-effectiveness of the
site,4 48 for example, often will warrant siting the facility in low income and minority neighborhoods, where the price of land tends to
be significantly cheaper and where the city already owns much
land. 44 9 Similarly, the "compatibility of the facility with existing facilities" 4 50 and the "accessibility of the site to those it is intended to
serve" 45 1 will point in the direction of siting many social service LULUs in the neighborhoods that already have many such LULUs. In
the absence of any weighing scheme, those factors will quickly overwhelm considerations of fairness.
New York City's program also reveals that the theory of equal
physical distribution 45 2 is difficult to implement on a local level because jurisdictional and political boundaries can wreak havoc on any
attempt to ensure fair siting. Siters may escape the mandates of the
criteria by siting facilities outside the city's boundaries, as many so45 3
cial service agencies have done, and busing clients to the facility.
Additionally, the criteria attempt to reach state and federal facilities
by requiring the city to consider those facilities in making siting decisions, 4 54 but state and federal sitings decisions can quickly upset
the fairness of a distribution.
Finally, the program reveals how the impact statement approach 4 55 provides little assurance that decisionmakers consider
data, rather than merely amass it. The criteria do not require that
city agencies document how or whether they considered the data on
impact, except when the agency's decision is not subject to the city's
land use review process. 4 56 Nor do the criteria require the planning
447

See

CrrIZENS HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED CRrrE-

RIA FOR THE LOCATION OF CITY FACILITIES

448
449

(1990) (on file with author).

CRrrERIA, at art. 4.1(c).

See In re Silver, N.Y.L.J., May 3,

1993, at 28-29 (Sup. Ct., N.Y

County)

("[A]lithough it generally will be more 'cost-effective' for the city to locate its facilities on
city-owned property ....
these are not proper considerations for the selection of a site
under the fair share analysis. To allow respondents to rely on this reasoning in its rejection of alternative sites renders the fair share criteria illusory because it will dictate the
outcome in the siting of all city facilities.").
450
CRrrERIA, at art. 4.1(a).
451
CRITERIA, at art. 5.1(b).
452 See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
453 See COMMISSION ON THE HOMELESS, supra note 274, at 101-02.
454

See supra note 424.

455

See supra notes 377-88 and accompanying text.

456

CRITERIA, art. 9.1.
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commission to articulate why it believes that an agency adequately
considered fairness issues.
The New York City fair share criteria are an innovative and
thoughtful attempt to grapple with some of the problems posed by
efforts to measure and compare the impact LULUs will have on different communities. While the criteria are far from an ideal solution
to those problems, they illustrate that further work in this area is
likely to make the equal division theory a more promising solution
to the problem of disproportionate siting.
E.

The Suspect Class Approach

The last major proposal to address discriminatory siting calls
for special scrutiny of, or a presumption against, siting proposals
that may have a disparate impact upon certain types of neighborhoods. For example, Rachel Godsil has proposed that Congress
adopt legislation similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964457 that would provide a remedy to communities overburdened
by hazardous waste facilities. 45 8 Under Godsil's proposal, a minority community could make out a prima facie case of discriminatory
siting by establishing that a proposed site would "result in a burden
on their community greater than the burden on a white community
due to the presence of other pollutants.. . ."459 The burden would
then shift to the defendant to show that the chosen site was environmentally suitable. 4 60 If the defendant met that burden, the plaintiff
would then have to show that alternative sites existed that were also
environmentally suitable. 4 61 The burden would then shift again,
and the defendant would have to prove that the chosen site was
"necessary" to safely dispose of hazardous wastes. 4 62
Godsil's suspect class proposal reflects the narrow notion that
fairness simply requires a lack of racial discrimination. 46 3 The remedy would be unavailable to poor white communities targeted for
LULUs. 4 64 The remedy also would be unavailable to a minority
4-57

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

Godsil, supra note 11.
Id. at 422 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Godsil's proposal seems to view disparate impact as evil even if unaccompanied
by discriminatory intent. Her proposal therefore goes beyond the intentional discrimination theory outlined supra notes 323-36 and accompanying text. As discussed supra
note 324, if disparate impact is unaccompanied by discriminatory intent it must be independently justified as a theory of fairness. Godsil does not offer a justification, other
than the practical difficulties of proving discriminatory intent.
464
For a critique of Godsil's proposal from a leader in the environmental racism
movement, see Cole, supra note 295.
458
459
460
461
462
463
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community until that community had borne an equal share of the
burden. For example, if both a white and a minority community
were equally well suited for a facility, but neither was plagued with
pollution, the decision to place the facility in the minority community would be unassailable as long as decision-makers did not reveal
any intent to discriminate against that community on the basis of
race.
Godsil's proposal attempts to answer questions about how to
balance fairness concerns against other issues like safety by providing that safety would outweigh fairness if the siter could show that
the minority community was the only safe disposal site.465 But to
require that siters prove that no safer site exists is a high burden.
Even if siting officials could satisfy the burden, safety is a matter of
degree. It seems odd that a one percent improvement in safety can
trump, for example, a 100 percent decrease in fairness. Safety is
also a function of cost. If, for example, land and operating costs in
the minority community are significantly lower, but all other factors
are equal, the same amount of money may buy greater safety in the
site in the minority community.
While Godsil's proposal addresses the difficulty that minority
communities have in establishing a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause 466 because of the intent requirement of Arlington Heights,467 it
aims too low by embracing a limited vision of fairness and does not
address the hard issues raised by even that limited notion.
The "Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993," introduced by
Congresswoman Cardiss Collins (D-Ill.), is another version of the
suspect class approach. 468 The draft requires licensing officials to
disapprove solid or hazardous waste facilities in "environmentally
disadvantaged" communities if the facility threatens the community's health or environmental quality.469 An exception exists if
there is no alternative location that poses fewer risks and if the
proposed facility will not release contaminants or increase the cumulative impact of contaminants on the community. 470 "Environmentally disadvantaged" communities are defined by the proposed
legislation as those in which either the percentage of the minority
population is greater than that of the state or nation, the percentage
of the population living below the poverty line is at least twenty percent, or the per capita income is eighty percent or less of the na465
466
467
468
469
470

Godsil, supra note 11, at 424.
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.

See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess (1993).
Id. § 3.
Id.
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tional average. 4 7 1 Additionally, to be "environmentally
disadvantaged," the community must contain a hazardous waste facility, a municipal solid waste facility, a site at which a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances has occurred, or a facility subject to federal toxic chemical release reporting
4 72
requirements.
The Collins proposal seems to reflect a notion that siting
should be progressive to make up for past discrimination against
4 74 it
poor and minority neighborhoods. 4 73 Like dispersion statutes,
provides relief only for those neighborhoods that already have born
some burden, and does not concern itself with the fairness of siting
generally. But it is narrower than the dispersion approach because
it is concerned with already burdened neighborhoods only if they
are poor or minority communities. The draft therefore seems to
adopt the corrective justice prong 4 75 of the progressive siting
theory.
The bill shares many of the practical problems of the dispersion
approach. 4 76 The draft defines "neighborhood" as the two-mile radius around the proposed facility, but does not explain why that is
the appropriate definition, nor does it vary the definition with the
type of facility proposed. The draft ignores a neighborhood's existing burdens if they do not relate to hazardous or municipal solid
waste. It allows the presumption against siting in an environmentally disadvantaged area to be overcome by a showing that no less
risky alternatives exist, but it does not address how concerns such as
47 7
cost are to be weighed in the identification of alternative sites.
Additionally, by limiting the remedy to poor and minority communities, the draft implicitly presumes that those communities were selected as hosts in the past because of racial or class-based prejudice,
a causal claim that the existing evidence does not support. 478
CONCLUSION

Those who hope for genuine change in the way LULUs are distributed among neighborhoods should be wary of abstract calls for
fair siting. As this article has demonstrated, unless the notion of fair
471
472
473

Id. at § 3(D)(1)(A).
Id. at § 3(D)(1)(B).
See supra notes 277-48 and accompanying text.
474
See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
475 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
476 See supra notes 165-98 and accompanying text.
477 Oddly, the bill allows the presumption against siting to be overcome by a showing that no less risky alternative exists, even if equally risky alternatives do exist. See

H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993).
478
See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
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siting is tied to a specific theory of fairness, it is impossible to determine what fair siting will look like in practice or to determine how
effective proposals to ensure fair siting will be. It obviously is easier
to be abstract. Concreteness only leads to problem after problem
after problem. What good does it do to know all of those problems?
Law review articles are supposed to solve problems, after all, not
raise them in scores.
But hard looks at seemingly incontestible concepts lead to better solutions than even the most enthusiastic agreement with vacuous slogans. This Article seeks to foster better analysis of
disproportionate siting by taking that hard look. It suggests answers
to the most potent general objections to fair siting proposals. It
points the direction for future research that would shore up weaknesses in the evidence that LULUs are disproportionately sited. It
articulates the most promising theories that can be used to support
calls for fair siting. Finally, the Article details the nature of the beast
that proponents of fair siting must confront in order to translate a
theory of fair siting into a practical and effective siting program.
Knowing the problems should bring us at least one step closer to
the solutions.

